PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM

29. Years in Polish student revolt

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

MYTHS—REALITY—POLICY

"MONOLITHIC" VS. "CRUMBLING" COMMUNISM

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POLITICS AND ECONOMICS IN POLAND AND HUNGARY

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Myths, Perceptions, Policy

A Symposium

EDITORS' NOTE: In his essay below, Mr. Ezergailis examines what he regards as a number of enduring misconceptions about international communism, past and present—as well as Western policies which, in his opinion, have flowed directly from these misconceptions. In the belief that the issues he has raised deserve further inquiry, we have invited a number of students of international communism to comment on the essay, asking them to deal, inter alia, *with the following questions: In what sense could the international Communist movement under Stalin be termed "monolithic," and to what extent is this characterization still valid today? In view of the current conflicts between different Communist parties and states, is it still possible to speak of an "international Communist movement"? How has the growing independence of at least certain Communist parties* vis-à-vis *Moscow (or Peking) affected their internal organizational structures and overall policies? The contributors to this symposium include recognized authorities on the USSR, China, and international communism; former high-ranking members of various Communist parties; editors of the leading journals on Communist affairs; and finally, persons who have participated directly in so-called "cold-war activities," as well as their critics. The symposium will be concluded in the next issue of* Problems of Communism.

"Monolithic" *vs.* "Crumbling" Communism

By Andrew Ezergailis

There is something about communism that fosters myth-making. So it is among the admirers of communism as well as among its detractors—on the left as well as on the right. One apparently needs a certain balance of closeness to and familiarity with communism and of physical and emotional detachment from it to be free from these myths and to be able to penetrate them. Since World War II, Western thinking about communism has suffered from two principal myths, or oversimplifications. Chronologically, the first one to appear was the myth of monolithic communism, which reached its apogee in the early 1950's. It has not altogether disappeared even today, but it has been largely discredited by academicians and political experts. The second, which now appears to enjoy a vogue comparable to that of its predecessor, is the myth of disintegrating or crumbling communism.

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An ironic aspect of all this is that many of the same people who did such an excellent job of exposing the myth of monolithic communism themselves fell victim to the current myth of crumbling communism. Both myths may have had some degree of correspondence to the prevailing conditions of the Communist world. Yet, when such superficial and oversimplified notions are believed too fervently and elevated to the status of doctrine, there is the obvious danger of their becoming fetishes and the cause of serious errors of judgment in policy-making.

The two myths are interrelated in the sense that the second arose, in large part, in answer to the first. When the proponents of the thesis of crumbling communism first came forward, their view had much to commend it, for it showed the fallacy of equating monolithic communism simply with the existence of a centrally controlled state apparatus and made us consider whether it was a matter of power politics, of ideological agreement among world Communist parties, or of organization among fraternal socialist states. But by now, the weaknesses of the thesis of crumbling communism have also become obvious. Its proponents have failed to think of communism as a historical problem that arose more than fifty years ago; and their concern has been shallowly contemporary. They have not raised the question of whether Leninism was monolithic; they have been preoccupied with Stalin and Stalinism. Moreover, there is one important failing which the advocates of both doctrines share alike: they have both failed to ask why Communist regimes are capable of terrorizing their populations, yet incapable of forcing their workers to increase productivity or of preventing the theft of state property. Both myths have been abstractions constructed by theorists outside the Communist world who have ignored the views of those living under communism.

Participants in the Symposium

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MICHEL TATU—Commentator on Soviet affairs and former Moscow correspondent for *Le Monde* (Paris); author of *Power in the Kremlin* (New York, Viking Press, 1968).

HUGH SETON-WATSON—Professor of History at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London; author of numerous studies on Tsarist, Soviet, and East European history.

BERNARD S. MORRIS—Professor of Government, University of Indiana (Bloomington): author of *International Communism and American Policy* (New York, Atherton Press, 1966).

RODGER SWEARINGEN—Editor, with G. R. Urban, of the journal *Studies in Comparative Communism* (Los Angeles); author and editor of a number of works on Communist affairs, including *Soviet and Chinese Communist Power in the World Today* (New York, Basic Books, 1966).

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MASAMICHI INOKI—Professor of Law and Political Science at the University of Kyoto; author of numerous articles and books, in both Japanese and English, on Asian and Communist affairs.

REX MORTIMER—Former high-ranking member of the Australian CP; currently studying toward his doctorate.

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If the concept of a monolithic communism led the US to overcommit its resources in the cold war, it is also true that the theory of crumbling communism has contributed to the commission of equally grave errors. For example, although recent US policy has often been accused of being grounded in the antiquated notion of monolithic communism, it is perfectly reasonable to assume that it was the very opposite myth—that of "crumbling communism"—which was responsible for the kind of US involvement that developed in Vietnam. After all, since about 1960, most if not all the US presidential advisers on foreign policy have subscribed to this concept. More importantly, if any American president during this period had believed that international communism was monolithic, the logic of his position would have dictated either complete withdrawal or immediate and massive military commitment. On the other hand, piecemeal tactics—whether they take the form of escalation or de-escalation—are more consistent with the assumption that North Vietnam is alone and isolated from other Communist powers, and that even a partial show of American strength would therefore suffice to bring its aggressive activities to an end.

It should be mentioned here that the tendency to associate the so-called "domino theory" exclusively with the belief in monolithic communism is an error; in reality, this theory may also be consistent with the doctrine of crumbling communism. President Kennedy's position on these questions is a case in point, inasmuch as it can be demonstrated that he believed in both the domino theory and the idea of crumbling communism. The concept of guerrilla warfare or insurgency, which Kennedy stressed, was crucial to the domino theory, but it played no part in the doctrine of monolithic communism. It is ironic that many who today are advocating US withdrawal from Vietnam may, in a subconscious and unanalyzed fashion, believe in monolithic communism. Many of them, certainly, appear to believe in communism as the wave of the future.

One proof that the doctrine of crumbling communism has become a fetish is that its proponents do not cease to flagellate believers in monolithic communism, even though they are hard put to name any statesmen or scholars who still believe in it. What they are doing, in fact, amounts to beating a dead horse. They do not deny, of course, that monolithic communism once existed. Indeed, they affirm its past existence in order to argue that it exists no longer. Since they tend to associate monolithic communism with Stalin, they find it easy to argue that the former is as dead as the latter. The logic of this position obviously leaves much to be desired.

The image of communism has undergone various metamorphoses since the 1917 Revolution. There has been something cyclical about it. Although Communists have occasionally attached the label "monolithic" to their party, the term has hardly ever been descriptive of the real essence of the movement. Even before coming to power, the Bolsheviks were known more for their schisms than for their unity, and the same was true in the 1920's and even the 1930's. What has been so unique and at the same time puzzling about communism is that somehow schism has been at the very core of the movement's strength. It does not follow from this that there will never be a schism which will prove ultimately debilitating and pestilential, but so far the Communist record on this score has been a successful one. The Bolsheviks were stronger in 1917 than in 1903, in 1930 than in 1922, and in 1955 than in 1944. Is there any reason to believe that communism is weaker today than it was in 1956? It is doubtful that the schism between Communist China and the Soviet Union has meant or will mean any weakening of the Communist movement as such, either internally or in the world at large.

This is not at all to argue that there is today—any more than in the past—anything like monolithic communism. It is merely to point out that there are around the world many Communist groups which hope to gain power through minority uprisings. There has also been a frequent tendency to misunderstand or overrate the nature and extent of disagreements in the Communist world. For instance, Mao Tse-tung's "Cultural Revolution" has certainly convulsed China, but while its end effects remain problematical, chances are that Chinese communism will emerge from it stronger than before. By the same token, the political developments of 1968 in Czechoslovakia may have been tolerated for a time by Moscow and Czechoslovakia's Communist neighbors precisely because those developments created an atmosphere of turbulence in the Soviet bloc after ten years of relative—and debilitating—calm. One can observe in this connection that the weakening of communism in Czechoslo-

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vakia before the five-power occupation of August 1968 led immediately to its strengthening in Poland and East Germany. Indeed, one reason why communism has been weakening in Czechoslovakia and Hungary may be that Eastern Europe has not been terrorized to the degree that Russia itself was.

To say that schism is not a debilitating aspect of communism does not mean that there is no striving on the part of Communist regimes to achieve centralization of power or even a monolithic order. But it is always a matter of striving towards that objective. No Communist leadership has ever boasted of having actually gained monolithic control. It is spoken of, rather, as a struggle to be won. Schism and unity may simply be parts of the multi-faceted Leninist political and ideological dialectic. The cases of Yugoslavia in 1948 and of Hungary in 1956 both prove—if they prove anything—that communism was not as united and strong when it was thought to have been monolithic, just as the case of Czechoslovakia in 1968 proves that communism is not as weak and disunited now when it is thought to be disintegrating and crumbling. This should teach us one thing—that embracing the current myth about communism has frequently betrayed us.

The concept of a monolithic communism was unkown before World War II. During the 1920's and 1930's, the prevailing view was that the Soviet Union was barely holding its own as an international power, and that were it not for internal terror and propaganda, the Communist regime in the USSR would collapse altogether. The Kronstadt revolt, the famine of 1922-23, the bungled Communist insurrection in Estonia, the party feuds, the forced collectivization, the comic Stakhanovite competitions, the suicidal purges of the 1930's, the Finnish "winter war"—such was not a record likely to inspire fear of communism among the great Western powers. If anything, Hitler thought less of Stalin than Charles XII did of Peter the Great. Nor did the fortunes of the Great War do anything to change this opinion until mid-1942. Stalin himself, confronted by the Nazi onslaught, expected to have to withdraw his forces behind the Urals.

Curiously enough, it took virtually a single event—the battle of Stalingrad—to change this low evaluation of the strength of the Soviet Union and of communism. Robert Sherwood wrote that ". . . as the result of one battle, Russia assumed the position of a great international power. . . ." [1] From that moment on, the image of monolithic communism gradually grew until it became the predominant view—almost the obsession—of the early 1950's. There is perhaps no other instance in history when the image of a state, or of a political system, changed so radically in so short a time. But this sudden reversal of the Western evaluation of the Soviet Union and of communism was unwarranted. On the one hand, the USSR and its system must have had some hidden springs of strength if they could still survive after Hitler's armies had penetrated deep into the heart of the Soviet motherland and when the outside world thought them virtually doomed. On the other hand, it seems reasonable to assume that many of the weaknesses that allowed the Nazi penetration survived the victories of Stalingrad and Berlin.

The myth of monolithic communism, however, has its roots much farther back than the battle of Stalingrad. In a way it predates the Bolshevik Revolution, and its foundation was laid by the Communists themselves. It goes back, in origin, to the character and ideas of Lenin—to his iron will, his singleminded purposefulness, and the cult of force in which he believed. More than any other man in history, Lenin was able to impart his ideas to his successors. In Stalin they found expression in his determination to transform Russia at any cost. Many prominent Bolsheviks have been men of small stature, but their overabundant optimism and firmness of will compensated for their shortcomings, and in our minds they took on the shape of giants. The very term "Bolshevik" conveyed a sense of monolithism.

After the Revolution, all the cultural media—literature, art, the theater, sculpture, and architecture—were given the task of creating some physical embodiment of this Bolshevik yearning and will toward monolithism. The uniqueness of early Soviet art, its energy, experimental quality and freshness, derived from its striving to give expression to this revolutionary purpose and spirit. Though many of the ideas for new art forms and the rebuilding of cities remained simple sketches in the notebooks of artists and architects, some of these Promethean experiments were carried out.

[1] R. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, New York, Harper & Row, 1948, p. 571.

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Dramatists attempted to free the theater from the confines of the stage and bring it into the streets, wanting to make the whole city one pulsating, living theater in which not only the actors but the totality of toiling masses would participate. Composers discarded old symphonic scores and sought to create a new music of real sounds—the shriek of factory whistles, the pounding of hammers, and the clatter of motors. Above all, things were conceived on a grand scale. Man as a mere individual ceased to exist and was replaced by a giant abstraction—the new Soviet Man. To honor this idealized Man, new poems had to be written that stuttered like machine guns. The minstrels of the giant were Alexander Blok and Vladimir Maiakovsky. Stalin destroyed the early revolutionary art, but he remained a true heir of Lenin and kept the will and determination to build a new—and monolithic—Russia at any cost.

The trouble with the monolithic image the Bolsheviks tried to foster was that few outside the Soviet Union believed it for a long time. Some fellow travelers caught the spirit of it, but they failed to get the image across to others. In an ultimate sense, the artists of the Soviet Union failed in their task. They did not find a counterpart for pyramids and cathedrals that would stand forth before the world as a symbol of their monolithic Prometheus. But where the artist failed, the soldier succeeded. If few believed in the Soviet giant before the war, few disbelieved it afterward. The fruit of Soviet victory was not just the defeat of Germany and the extension of Soviet power, but also ultimate success in selling the image of monolithic communism. It was sold to both the political Right and the political Left. The Center stood speechless and confused.

Stalin, too, deserves considerable credit for reinforcing the myth of Communist monolithism. If he was recognized before the war as an inveterate liar, the same trait was taken afterward as a sign of Machiavellian subtlety and iron will in the pursuit of Communist goals. The cynical violation of treaty promises, brutality towards the conquered populations, the ruthless destruction of democratic governments—everything added to the monolithic image of Stalin and his party. Perhaps some Western statesmen were moved to accept this image partly by a sense of shame at having been outwitted by Stalin and of guilt at seeing Eastern Europe engulfed by communism. Certainly the peoples of the East European countries which came under Communist rule, or of the occupied and annexed Baltic states, can hardly have been taken in by the image of a monolithic and efficient communism in view of the internal division and bumbling ineptitude of their new Communist leaderships. The image of communism that emerges from Eastern Europe as a whole is to be sure one of harsh authoritarianism, but it is hardly monolithic.

A curious set of problems arises when we begin to inquire about the meaning of the term "monolithic communism." First, there is confusion as to what it means in ideological terms. A proponent of the "crumbling" Communist thesis would very likely begin to hedge if asked to define what he thought the ideology of monolithic communism was—and his difficulty would be readily understandable because Marxism as seen through the prism of Leninism was never monolithic. In a way communism could become monolithic in the ideological sense only if it abandoned Leninism. For the Leninist ideology contains within it many divergent currents that seem to be pulling in various directions at once, even though they are supposedly reconciled and unified through the processes of the Marxian dialectic.

But what of Stalinism? One might say that Stalin sublimated and simplified the conflicting currents in the Leninist brand of Communist ideology. For instance, one need not be a dialectician to discern that the Stalinist doctrine of "socialism in one country" is merely a narrower and simpler version of Leninism despite Lenin's greater stress on the concept of world revolution.

Turning to Stalin's successors, it is not difficult to establish that they—Khrushchev especially—tried to return to the broader, more inclusive ideology of Leninism. What has sometimes been viewed as a splintering of Communist dogma under Khrushchev appears rather to have been, in reality, an attempt to return to the wellspring of Leninism—in other words, a move towards a reconsolidation of dogma. By the time Khrushchev took the helm, it was clear that Stalin's simplified brand of Leninism had outlived its effectiveness, particularly for the purpose of spreading Communist revolution to the Third World. The Khrushchevian doctrine of peaceful coexistence may have appeared to many as a Soviet retreat from international revolution, but if Stalin's doctrine was socialism in one country, then peaceful coexistence means a return to internationalism. Few experts on communism would deny that Khrushchev pursued a much more ambitious global policy than Stalin ever did.

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Those who believe that communism is coming apart at the seams commonly point to the recent trends towards ideological polycentrism as evidence for their point of view. No doubt these trends reflect a desire for greater independence on the part of the Communist parties of the world, but it does not necessarily follow from this that Stalin's successors in the Kremlin have been totally and unalterably opposed to any degree of polycentrism. Nor is polycentrism inconsistent with Leninism. A study of various Communist parties in existence in the early 1920's would show that there were many ideological divergencies among them, and that Lenin tolerated—or even approved—this diversity. Unanimity such as is considered characteristic of monolithic communism was not a requirement of Lenin. Touching on this question in 1922, he declared:

At the Third Congress [of the Communist International] in 1921 we adopted a resolution on the organizational structure of the Communist parties and on the methods and content of their work. The resolution is an excellent one, but it is almost thoroughly Russian, that is to say, everything is taken from Russian conditions. This is the good side of the resolution, but it is also its bad side.[2]

Stalin's successors may thus be simply returning to a Leninism that allows ideological and tactical variations as long as they are variations on a common theme. The question to be asked is not whether *communism* is crumbling but rather whether *Leninism* is crumbling. If one could prove that the international Communist movement is undergoing major changes in terms of Leninism, then it could indeed be said that communism as we know it is crumbling.

Proponents of the thesis of crumbling communism might concede some aspects of the preceding analysis, but they would probably put forward another set of arguments which, though seemingly more sound, may be equally delusory. Regardless of whether or not the ideology of communism is crumbling, they might contend, it has fundamentally and essentially ceased to be as decisive a factor as the realities of modern economic life and considerations of national power and self-interest. Within all the Communist countries, but especially in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, they would argue, economic realities have corroded communism to the point where Communists do little more than pay occasional lip service to it in much the same way as many Christians in the West pay tribute to the eternal verities of the Bible only on Sundays. They would also contend that, in matters of foreign policy especially, it is the realities of power and national interest that take precedence over ideology. Nationalism is said to be a more potent force in the modern world than ideology.

There is nothing new in these arguments. After all, much the same sort of things were said about Lenin even before he came to power. His opponents in 1917 called him nothing less than an unprincipled opportunist and swindler. Moreover, anyone familiar with the early history of the Bolshevik regime is aware that even then some of Lenin's own subordinates complained that the ideological cause of world revolution was being sacrificed on the altar of nationalism. There was, of course, nothing like a Soviet bloc in Lenin's day, and the issue of communism *vs.* nationalism therefore posed itself in quite a different context from that of today; but that is beside the point. What is important to note here is that the sincerity of the Communists' professed dedication to ideological goals, as opposed to national ones, has been questioned ever since the Revolution.

The motives of Khrushchev have been questioned on much the same grounds as were Lenin's. No one would deny that significant changes have occurred in the Communist world, but one also must recognize that many aspects of communism are ageless. *Pravda* in 1969 still reads very much like *Pravda* in 1924. It is of little use to show that the communism of today has become pragmatic, nationalistic and Machiavellian, unless it can also be shown in what way these qualities influence present Soviet policy differently from the way they influenced Soviet policy in the past. On the question of nationalism especially, it must be remembered that Lenin sought to effect something of a merger between Marxism and nationalism in the colonial and "semi-colonial" areas of the world. He fully realized that nationalism was a revolutionary force, and he saw the need to harness it.

I remarked earlier that the believers in crumbling communism claim that Communists today merely pay lip service to their ideology like those Christians who display their faith solely by going to church on Sunday. This raises the intriguing question of whether communism can crumble in the same sense that Christianity has been losing its force in modern times. Is it possible to be a Sunday

[2] V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works*, Vol. X, p. 332.

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Communist? The evidence would seem to be overwhelmingly against such a possibility. The only refugee from the Soviet Union who did not become an ideological turncoat was Trotsky. Apparently it is psychologically impossible to be "a little bit" Communist: one cannot be a lukewarm Communist or feel lukewarm towards communism once one has converted from it. This assertion is not disproved by the fact that there are many careerists in the Communist Party; they were already there in 1918. For the true Communist, faith in the ideology, or the loss of it, must be total. The only well-known person who could perhaps be described as a Sunday Communist is Isaac Deutscher. He apparently could switch back and forth between the roles of Trotskyite and scrupulous scholar in the best sense of the word. To be sure, Sunday Communists are not to be confused with so-called "internal emigrants" from communism—a category to which a large number of the Soviet literary intelligentsia seem to belong.

To say that communism is neither monolithic nor crumbling does not necessitate taking the position that it is unchanging. Any searching historical and social analysis must of course take into consideration the aspects of change, but it also must take into consideration the things of permanence. Unfortunately, many analyses of communism and of the Soviet Union do not exhibit such a proper balance. Most of the changes we have seen in the Soviet bloc have been fundamentally organizational, and it is doubtful that the term "crumbling" accurately describes them. The Sino-Soviet split is, of course, more than an organizational change; it is a schism. But it would be a mistake to think that either China or the Soviet Union, or communism as such, has been weakened by it. On the contrary, as far as one can tell at present, both Communist powers seem to have gained new strength and new friends and allies as a consequence of the split. One might even venture the guess that twenty years from now the split will be seen as a catalyst for a renewal of Communist ideological zeal. Who, after all, would have predicted five years ago that in Europe and the United States a new generation of students would today be "liberating" university buildings under the banner of Marxist slogans and invoking the names of such Communist revolutionary heroes as Mao Tse-tung, Ho Chi Minh, and Ché Guevara?

It is too early to assess the full significance of recent developments in Eastern Europe, but it is doubtful that the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia bolsters the case either for monolithic or for crumbling communism. It has merely underscored the need for rethinking anew our premises about communism. After Czechoslovakia, certainly, it is hard to adhere to the contention that the growing independence of the East European Communist states reflected a weakening of the Communist system; rather, it represented a Soviet attempt to experiment with federalism. No doubt there were in Eastern Europe many other forces at work that promoted this tendency towards federalism, but one should not ignore the simple fact that even the Communists recognize that it is more noble to rule by persuasion than by force. The overcentralized structure that Stalin created also appears to have proven itself too expensive and too inefficient. In allowing a measure of federalism, the Soviet Union took the calculated risk that some states might overstep the line, as Czechoslovakia seems to have done. For the Soviet Union the bitter moral of the experiment lay in the fact that it showed federalism doesn't work for the Soviet bloc as it does, by and large, for the NATO alliance.

The thesis of this article has been that Western statesmen and political observers, off and on since World War II, have let their judgment be warped by some oversimplified myths about communism. It is still to be seen which of these myths—that of monolithic or that of crumbling communism—has wrought greater harm. The first myth has often caused Western observers and statesmen to be unduly nervous and to overreact to the Communist challenge. Some even thought that communism posed a serious internal threat to the United States. The myth of crumbling communism, on the other hand, has led many to conclude that communism is no longer a threat anywhere in the world, including Vietnam. Neither assumption is consonant with the truth, and neither facilitates our relations with the Communist world.

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COMMENTARIES

Michel Tatu:

Sovietology and Its Critics

Broadly speaking, practitioners of Sovietology may be divided into two categories. Those in the first category prefer to go about their work by digging into the available source materials—primarily the Soviet press and official statements—in order to ascertain what people "behind the curtain" are saying, and by drawing conclusions from these materials in the most scientific manner possible—that is to say, with caution and modesty. Those in the second category concentrate instead on what their fellow Sovietologists are saying, trying to poke holes in their rivals' theories in order to set up their own pet notions in opposition to them.

The latter type of Sovietology, although sometimes interesting, is certainly not the most fruitful. It is nevertheless widely practiced, especially in the United States. One of its drawbacks is that it is frequently motivated by the desire to "sell" a certain thesis or doctrine and resolves itself into a polemic of opposing labels—a polemic that becomes the livelier the farther away it gets from reality. In the end, the polemicist winds up attributing a universal character to such and such a doctrine solely for the purpose of making it easier to refute and reinforcing his own claim to originality.

So it is with the theory of "crumbling communism," which Mr. Ezergailis informs us is a myth "elevated to the status of doctrine" and the prevailing view among Western political experts and policymakers "since about 1960." Actually, while I cannot claim to have read everything that has been published in the West on the subject of communism, I do not at all have the impression that this "doctrine" dominates the scene at present. Some Soviet experts, it is true, concur in the opinion of France's Michel Garder that communism is in its "death throes," while others, like Z. Brzezinski in the United States, view it as undergoing a process of "degeneration." But if these theses, particularly the second, are in fact fairly widely subscribed to in West European "progressive left" circles, including certain Communist party elements, they do not by any means appear to have permeated Western Sovietology in general—much less the thinking of the governments concerned.

In particular, it seems extremely hazardous to assert, as Mr. Ezergailis does, that the thesis of crumbling communism was responsible for American involvement in Vietnam. If any outside factor influenced the US course of action there, it was doubtless the Sino-Soviet conflict—which was a fact and not a doctrine. Moreover, if either one of the two opposing theories discussed by Mr. Ezergailis could be called responsible for US involvement in anti-Communist actions abroad, it would more likely be the doctrine of "monolithic communism," since it was in the heydey of this doctrine that most of those involvements occurred—from Korea to Berlin, and Greece to Taiwan.

Mr. Ezergailis is more successful when he discusses the thesis of monolithic communism, which did in fact dominate Sovietological thinking for a long period—albeit not without some salutary exceptions. As he quite rightly points out, monolithism is not so much an established state as a tendency. That has not prevented Soviet propagandists from affirming, both under and since Stalin, the monolithic character of their party and society. In any event, it is clear that whatever monolithism exists in the USSR—if it does—can be maintained only by means of a maximum and concerted effort on the part of the regime. Mr. Ezergailis is therefore right on this point, but he goes on to make some strange observations.

The first is that monolithism developed only after Lenin, that Stalinism was a deformation of Leninism

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in this respect, and that the tendency towards polycentrism we see in the Communist world today represents a return towards Leninism deliberately chosen by the Soviet leaders. It is true that the Bolshevik regime of Lenin's day appears to have been less monolithic than that which followed. But if one considers monolithism a tendency rather than an actual condition—as Mr. Ezergailis reminds us we should—then it must be recognized that the period 1917-24 saw at least as much done towards achieving "monolithization" as was accomplished during the entire Stalinist period from 1924 to 1953. The subjection of the international Communist movement to control from Moscow through the "Bolshevization" of the various national Communist parties began not under Stalin but under Lenin.

As for the inverse phenomenon of "demonolithization" which has been seen in various areas since the death of Stalin, it resulted from factual circumstances and not from a change in doctrine. Under existing conditions, Khrushchev could no longer employ the brutal methods of his predecessor and substituted others—persuasion instead of penal coercion, revolution "by example," etc. His goals, however, remained the same as those of Stalin and Lenin: to construct at home a society wholly centered on and obedient to the party, and therefore monolithic; and to forge abroad an international Communist movement voluntarily looking to Moscow for leadership, hence equally monolithic. Without doubt, the notion of building a monolithic Communist bloc based on free consent is an illusion. While Khrushchev may have entertained such an illusion, it is difficult to agree that he went so far as the "experiment in federalism" which Mr. Ezergailis believes to have been tried by the post-Stalin leadership in Eastern Europe. Suffice it to recall not only the Soviet intervention in Hungary in October 1956 but also Khrushchev's hostile reaction to Gomulka's accession to power in Poland shortly before. Moreover, if the successors of Khrushchev ever entertained the same sort of illusion, it now has been abandoned, as the 1968 Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia demonstrates.

Other aspects of Mr. Ezergailis' discussion that seem somewhat simplistic are his apparent equation of monolithism with dogmatism and the idea that monolithism necessarily goes hand in hand with a "hard-line" policy. Actually, monolithism signifies only a tendency to impose the ideology and policies of the ruling group on every member of the society, and to suppress—whether by force or by persuasion— all opposition. From this point of view, one set of Soviet leaders differs from another only in the methods they employ. On the other hand, the policies which form the core of such monolithism can be very different. Thus Khrushchev, in denouncing Stalin and glorifying his own actions, tried to impart to *his* policies a monolithism every bit as complete as that which had existed under Stalin. After all, the best way to be a Khrushchevite was still the same as it had been to be a Stalinist—namely, to repeat the slogans of the Khrushchev policy line with the same discipline and lack of originality with which Soviet citizens had mouthed Stalinist slogans in the past.

Some other minor points deserve attention. In one passage of his article, Mr. Ezergailis affirms that "the weakening of communism in Czechoslovakia before the five-power occupation of August 1968 led immediately to its *strengthening* in Poland and East Germany" (italics added). Here he seems to be confusing "strengthening" and "hardening," which are two quite different things. Moreover, to begin with, the question of whether communism was "weakening" in Czechoslovakia before August 1968 needs to be examined more closely. One form of communism was indeed weakening—*i.e.*, the Soviet form—but the "Prague Spring" had produced a unity between government and people which more than one Communist leadership might have envied. In this sense, monolithism gained in Czechoslovakia, while in Poland and East Germany it declined by reason of the fact that many Poles and East Germans disagreed with the anti-Czech policy of their leaders.

Again, if one admits that one of the dominant traits of Communist regimes—and of some others as well—is their tendency towards unity and monolithism, it is not possible to maintain that either the Soviet Union or China has gained "new strength" as a result of the schism between Moscow and Peking. Where, indeed, is this "new strength," and where the "new friends and allies," that the USSR and China—if we are to believe Mr. Ezergailis—have gained in this affair? On the contrary, looking at it from the standpoint of the socialist camp as a whole, it is evident that the schism has caused both parties to the conflict to lose friends, and that the allies lost by the USSR have not gone over and become friends of the Chinese, but have instead chosen a third course—that of non-alignment with either side. For the single case of a direct switchover (*i.e.*, Albania, which went straight over from the Soviet to the Chinese camp), one can count at least four Communist regimes—North Korea, North Vietnam, Romania, and Cuba—which have prudently chosen to keep their distance from both camps. Even the Yugoslavs, who for a long time were the No. 1 target of Chinese Communist propaganda, have not let that induce them to join Moscow's camp in the Sino-Soviet confrontation. In the Western coun-

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tries, finally, one has still to see proof that the splits which have occurred in one Communist party after another have "strengthened" either the Soviet or Chinese side, or indeed the forces of world communism.

Mr. Ezergailis' further "guess" that "twenty years from now the split will be seen as a catalyst for a renewal of Communist ideological zeal" likewise calls for a more detailed elucidation. What he appears to have in mind is the radicalization of left-wing movements in Western Europe and the United States, and more particularly the spread of Maoism among Western student youth. The crucial question, however, is whether the cause of communism in general, or Chinese communism in particular, is gaining from it. It must be noted first of all that the Chinese Communists had more sympathizers ten years ago than they do now, inasmuch as all Communists were then as much pro-Chinese as they were pro-Soviet. It would seem that the force of attraction of such an enormous, solidary bloc embracing close to a billion people, as the Communist world then did, would have constituted a much more powerful catalyst for the enthusiasm of those seeking after ideological paradise than the spectacle of the present discord. It would perhaps be more exact to say that if, twenty years from now, anyone will have gained from the present schism, it is likely to be, not communism, but China as a nation, by reason of having freed herself from Soviet hegemony.

Even admitting, however, that the action of radicalized youth might eventually succeed in bringing about a "Communist" revolution in a major Western country—which remains to be seen—what sort of communism is it likely to be? Maoism itself would be a minority tendency alongside Trotskyism, anarchism, and the other -isms which abound within the broad periphery of the radical Left. The revolution could conceivably open the way for a dictatorship of the Left, in which case it would more probably be pro-Soviet than pro-Chinese; but it could also—and perhaps most likely of all—lead to a dictatorship of the Right brought about by a backlash of the conservative middle classes, who are infinitely more numerous in the advanced Western countries than are the revolutionaries. Finally, the end result might even be a communism which would come to terms with bourgeois democracy and evolve into a modified form of social democracy. To speak of a Communist revolution, therefore, holds forth several very different possibilities.

By the same token, perhaps Mr. Ezergailis' gravest fault is not so much that he goes out to do battle against either the thesis of monolithic communism or that of crumbling communism as it is that he speaks simply of "communism"—as if such a term lends itself today to any blanket definition. In reality, communism is crumbling in certain countries where it has been too long implanted without any reinvigoration of its institutions, and where it has now become identified with the preservation of an empire in difficulties. In the author's view, such is the case in the Soviet Union. But the Soviet Communist regime also remains monolithic inasmuch as all its actions tend in that direction—and are seemingly achieving their purpose, at least in the sphere of internal policy. In other countries where Communist rule is younger and faces an external threat, communism can be at once monolithic and non-crumbling, as for instance in North Vietnam, Albania, and—to some degree—Romania. Finally, Yugoslavia provides an example of a communism which, as long as the present regime continues to remain stable, is both non-monolithic and non-crumbling, but which might fall into the "crumbling" category if things were to go badly for the regime.

All this serves to point up the dangers inherent in trying to subsume contemporary communism under any single definition, and more generally in attempting to affix any meaningful labels to it. The Communists themselves have shown us the futility and dangers of this practice.

Hugh Seton-Watson:

Decline and Durability

Mr. Ezergailis' article is a valuable contribution to the study of a subject that has been far too neglected: Western attitudes regarding the Communist world. Attitudes and reality are not the same thing, though they are linked to each other. Western attitudes influence Western policies, and these in turn influence the reality of the Communist world. Hence the importance of these attitudes.

The myths of "monolithic" and "crumbling" communism, both of which have been fashionable in the

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West at different times, are dangerously misleading; yet, like all myths, they have had a certain connection with reality. Communist rulers and leaders have long had an obsessive aspiration towards monolithic unity, and disintegrating factors also are at work in Communist-ruled societies. The essence of the Western error in the first case has been to mistake aspiration for reality, and in the second case to confuse the incipient stages of a process with its completion. Both perhaps reflect a certain political impatience that seems to be characteristic of modern mass democracies, especially perhaps of the United States. Press, radio, and television commentators, particularly, cannot bear to admit that changes are slow processes. Situations which remain the same are boring, and the reading, listening, or viewing audience must never be bored. The Soviet scene, so obviously important for the whole world, cannot be presented in the same way again and again. New and exciting things must be discovered, and if there are none to discover, then they must be wished into existence.

This passion for novelty is also connected with another pathological feature of the mass democratic mind, or at least of the minds of many of its mass-media prophets: the determination to see world politics as a struggle between vice and virtue. In the days when the myth of monolithic communism prevailed, Communists were represented as devils in human form, and the Soviet Union as the Kingdom of Darkness. Then, when the commentators discovered that Russians were fairly normal human beings, it quickly became fashionable to assume that they were politically immaculate. From this it was but a short way to the belief that there never has been any real danger from the Communists, that the alleged danger was an invention of wicked men, that the United States has a virtual monopoly of political sin, and that its enemies are by definition virtuous. This view has become rather popular in many Western democratic countries—including the United States itself—and especially among intellectuals and student youth.

To a middle-aged European professor who has followed these problems for some years, it has long appeared to be a mistake, in national, social or ideological conflicts, to think of one side as virtuous and the other wicked. Rival groups are usually about equally composed of good, bad and indifferent men and women. It is of course much easier to see this when one is observing a conflict in a distant land or in the historical past, yet one need not altogether lose this basic understanding even when one is directly involved. Enemies are enemies because they pursue aims or interests which threaten one's own and therefore must be resisted—not because they are evil. This does not mean that one should abdicate all moral judgment. Individual enemies may indeed be evil, as Hitler and Stalin unquestionably were. Individual actions may also be evil: the conquest and oppression of Poland and Bohemia first by Nazi and then by Soviet totalitarianism were certainly evil acts, and there are many who would regard the World War II destruction of Hiroshima or the punitive burning of Vietnamese villages as comparable in character. Yet the notion that enemies must be wicked, or that good men cannot be enemies, is nonsense: one may have enemies and still respect—even love—them. This truth is the essence of the Biblical command to love one's enemies. Christ did not mean that one's enemies are always right, that one should subject oneself to their will, or should hand over to their rage those whom one was committed to defend—whether Czechs in 1938, Poles in 1945, or South Vietnamese in 1969.

In the heyday of the late Joseph McCarthy, many eminent Americans eloquently inveighed against "atheistic communism." The truth is that communism, a body of doctrine with which one may agree or disagree in greater or less degree, had very little to do with the case. The rulers in Moscow were and are implacably hostile to all governments which they did not or do not control, and most hostile to the strongest of all of these, the government of the United States. This hostility was originally inspired in some of them, in their younger days, by passionate belief in Marxism-Leninism. However, what has long threatened the United States—and world peace—is not Marxist doctrine or the infectious example of a nonexistent Communist paradise, but the implacable hostility of men organized into a well-disciplined apparatus of political power and possessing immense military and industrial resources. This hostility has never changed, though periods of aggressive action have alternated with periods of passivity, and even with occasional pacific postures, in accordance with their estimate of the forces arrayed against them.

The carapace of boastful self-righteousness in which the minds of Brezhnev and his colleagues are encased is quite impervious to rational argument or benevolent gestures, but evidence of countervailing power, and of the will to uphold that power, impresses them. At present they cannot impose monolithic unity on Communist parties in Western countries, or on the Communist governments of China and Cuba, both of which deviate alarmingly from the Soviet model; but this does not mean that they have given up the hope of imposing it in the end. In Eastern Europe they *are* able to impose such unity. It is true that they still behave rather mildly in some cases: Romanian independence is tolerated within rather broad limits,

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and Hungarians are able to enjoy a great deal of personal liberty. But the case of Czechoslovakia is not encouraging. It is not just that the Soviet Union and its allies invaded Czechoslovakia. A year later the Czechs and Slovaks are being compelled to say that the invasion was not an invasion, to falsify their history all over again, to praise the Russians for their disinterested aid, and even to show love for Big Brother.

Yet, at the same time, the undermining forces which observers have noted in Soviet society are still there; indeed, they are growing. Economic inefficiency, labor discontent, managerial frustrations, and the national aspirations of the non-Russians are all still present. The younger generation not only feel but show increasing disrespect for their elders. Russia is ruled by men in their fifties who took the first decisive steps in their rapid rise to power when they were still in their twenties—by denouncing their parents and their parents' friends. These men seem no longer to have the ruthlessness to treat their children in the same way. Perhaps there is some profound psychological explanation for this: children do not choose their parents, but parents have deliberately produced their children and may be inhibited from destroying them. Certainly, young Soviet intellectuals have begun to speak out in a way that was inconceivable even ten years ago, and repression has not silenced them. Whether Russia will produce new Hertzens or new *Narodovoltsy*, and whether the faster pace of the 20th century will produce quicker results, are anybody's guess. The facts remain: communism in the Soviet Union is not visibly crumbling, but the forces which may ultimately produce a crumbling are there.

One may of course argue that "communism" in a much broader sense is a live and vigorous force in many parts of the world. In South Africa it may appear to growing numbers of young whites and blacks the only way out of race hatred, just as in Yugoslavia a generation ago it appeared the only way out of mutual extermination for Serbs and Croats. In South America the word "communism" has romantic and populist appeals which are clearly attractive. As for the utopian "communism" that is fashionable in the allegedly affluent societies of the West, it is certainly not monolithic, and one can hardly apply the word "crumbling" to something that is too insubstantial to crumble.

Whether the Soviet regime, which is still by far the most important organized force claiming to represent "communism," will achieve monolithic unity or crumble to pieces will depend on a long process which may perhaps be described as the competition in demoralization between West and East. In Western societies, the last decades have seen a rapid growth of utopian demands and an equally rapid decline in the morale of the political class. The sneers of the communicators and the jeers of the student prophets are less alarming than the fears of those whose task should be to rule. When politicians and officials begin to believe that it is wrong to govern, when masochism or weak conscience or plain funk prevents them from giving orders, it is not surprising that riots and backlashes break out below. The decisive factor for the "crumbling" of a regime is the morale of its political class. In varying degrees in all the Western countries, the political class appears to have lost its nerve, but there is no evidence that this is yet happening in a big way in the Soviet Union. The Soviet economy is primitive and inefficient compared to the most advanced Western economies, and Soviet methods of government are more brutal and wasteful than ours, but in the Soviet Union the hierarchy of political power remains unchallenged and the will of the rulers to give orders and use force is unshaken. If the paralysis of political will which we see in the West progresses to the point where Western nations cannot govern or defend themselves, then the narrow-minded, semi-barbarous, but disciplined and resolute Soviet leaders will have the world at their feet. Meanwhile any judgment as to whether Soviet communism will prove monolithic or crumbling is premature.

Bernard S. Morris:

What's in a Label?

If it is the sense of Mr. Ezergailis' article that the concept of "monolithic communism" formerly, and that of "crumbling communism" now, are both oversimplifications, and that American policymaking off and on since World War II (why not since World War I?) has suffered from such oversimplified slogans about communism, it would leave me unperturbed. But the author goes on to posit a correlation between American policy and monolithic or crumbling communism, ascribing responsibility for escalation in

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Vietnam, for example, to adherents of the "crumbling communism" doctrine (though providing virtually nothing in the way of documentation or reasoned argument to back this up). Moreover, the author doubts that the schism between Communist China and the Soviet Union has weakened communism internally or as a movement. Indeed, he writes: "One might even venture the guess that twenty years from now the split will be seen as a catalyst for a renewal of Communist ideological zeal."

This recalls the argument propounded by certain American experts in the early 1960's that a careful dialectical reading of the Sino-Soviet split would reveal a heightened threat to the security of the United States and the other Western powers. That is, the "contradictions" between the Russians and the Chinese would be "synthesized" at a higher level of unity in accordance with dialectical laws and would thereby pose even greater problems for the non-Communist world! "Experts" of this type always took comfort in the threat of communism: their political virtue was thereby safeguarded. They were never "wrong"; at the same time they were rarely right. If Mr. Ezergailis is telling us that the USSR is strong and that China might even get stronger, he is telling us nothing we don't already know, and he is evading a reasoned analysis and appraisal of international communism, monolithic or crumbling.

On this and on other matters Mr. Ezergailis' exposition is murky at best, but he does raise a number of interesting questions. Among them is the whole problem of changing trends in the analysis of state communism and international communism, to which I will confine the bulk of my remarks. It is true that Western writing on world communism could be characterized more often than not as mythopoeic because of its preoccupation with Communist ideology, the nature of the total state, or cold war politics. "Totalitarianism," developed as an ideal construct for analysis of the Soviet Union, was transmogrified into a "blueprint" model for analysis of the whole international Communist movement. This analysis, focusing primarily on the centralized and essentially responsive character of the Communist movement, tended to overlook the tensions between the national parties and the Moscow center—the factors of nationalism and particularist interests—and consequently fostered a mechanistic view of the movement. Obsession with the "blueprint" model of international communism and its manipulation from above inhibited recognition of the legitimacy of individual Communist parties as agencies of social change articulating the interests of various groups within particular societies. Thus, individual Communist party leaderships confronted problems within their own constituencies; they had to represent something other than Soviet interests in order to attract voters in Western Europe, to effect a "quiet revolution" in Latin America, or to build an underground capable of challenging the semi-feudal dictatorships of the Near East. The failure to probe beneath the surface of the national Communist parties' allegiance to Moscow distorted analysis of the role and function of these parties, conveying a simplistic view of the international Communist movement as a whole.

Moreover, the establishment of Communist states in East-Central Europe and Asia after World War II fundamentally altered the nature and operation of the international Communist movement, which has since developed in the direction of polycentrism—or what Mr. Ezergailis chooses to characterize as "the myth of disintegrating or crumbling communism." By characterizing it as "myth," Mr. Ezergailis seems to want to deny that international communism is crumbling, or perhaps he simply wants to suggest that the state of its crumbling has been exaggerated, or both; it is difficult to divine. In any case, the evidence provided by the *behavior* of the Communist parties themselves points to the conclusion that the international Communist movement no longer functions, as it once did, as a centralized, disciplined movement guided in its doctrine, strategy and tactics by Moscow. I should think that this is no longer a matter of debate. With Albania, China and Yugoslavia clearly fencing themselves off from Moscow, with a number of ruling and non-ruling Communist parties throughout the world pursuing independent policies, and with Moscow unable to impose its policies at will even in East-Central Europe, much less to push through a generally acceptable policy position for the bloc, the international Communist movement may not merely *be* "crumbling"; it may for all practical purposes have already crumbled.

Perhaps the difficulty of coming to conceptual terms with these developments in the international Communist movement stems from the existence for all to see of the USSR and the People's Republic of China together with certain middle-range Communist powers. But the mere existence of Communist states, however powerful, does not necessarily make a movement. Moreover, the serious differences that have developed between these states on foreign policy issues, organizational problems, strategic imperatives and others, as well as the opportunities which the dissension has created for the individual Communist parties to strike out in national directions, suggest that the international Communist movement will never reacquire its former cohesion. It has thus far been unable to devise an operational formula for reconstituting itself as a

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coherent movement in the changed circumstances of today. Failure to distinguish between Communist states *qua* states and communism as an international movement may be at the root of Mr. Ezergailis' contention that not much has changed in the nature of the Communist enemy. If so, he, too, has been mesmerized by the very mythology of anti-communism which he decries, with its penchant for abstractions such as "international communism" or "Asian communism."

The existing state of affairs raises problems for any analyst who attempts to provide a conceptual framework and an unambiguous terminology. He very properly should reexamine previous notions of "totalitarianism" and "monolithism" to ascertain the validity of their use at the present time *and* to establish what if anything in these notions still holds true. There does not, however, seem to have been a critical and systematic reexamination of the leading concepts of the 1950's and 1960's either by their purveyors or by their critics. Perhaps the adherents of the totalitiarian model feel that it was and still is valid for the pre-Khrushchev era, and some may feel that it remains applicable today. Others have moved away from the totalitarian model and mechanistic interpretation for a variety of reasons, which include the objective changes in the Soviet Union and the Communist movement, the shift in US policy toward cooperation with the USSR, and the increased emphasis in the universities on comparative politics.

The current tendency among American political scientists concerned with the USSR and communism is toward the development of comparative approaches to the study of communism and the wedding of the methodology and theory of the social sciences to area studies (the latter now being regarded as something like a divorcée in ill repute for having spawned the "totalitarian" model) with a view to producing systematic and presumably more objective research on communism.[1] Whatever merit there may be in this trend, scholars in the field appear to have discarded the totalitarian model and are focusing instead on the examination of Communist states as "normal" polities. Presumably, empirical and comparative studies will yield insights into the "crumbling" of communism, though this does not appear to be a primary concern. In fact, it is striking that there is among academics today relatively little concern with *international* communism—in either its "totalitarian" or "crumbling" varieties. Preoccupation with communism as an international political and social movement, in the style of the late Franz Borkenau, now has few devotees. Perhaps it is a healthy sign from the standpoint of public policy that the study of international communism suffers from relative neglect. For it is high time that officialdom, supported by academic paraphernalia, discard the justification of policy in terms of "international communism" or "Asian communism" and instead speak forthrightly about political realities, including the occasional usefulness and necessity of cooperating with Communist states for mutual interest and mutual non-destruction.

[1] For an up-to-date collection of articles on problems of methodology and conceptualization, as well as social science theory and Communist studies generally, see Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., Ed., *Communist Studies and the Social Sciences*, Chicago, Rand McNally & Company, 1969.

Rodger Swearingen:

The Dangers Within

It would seem proper at the outset to clarify the two concepts set forth here in juxtaposition—"monolithic" *vs.* "crumbling" communism, inasmuch as both may be open to several interpretations. Perhaps the reasons for the wide acceptance of both these concepts should be sought in the role of ideology and Soviet domestic policy on the one hand, and in foreign policy and organizational strategy on the other. To put it more succinctly, even during the early years of the Soviet state, before Stalin succeeded in making it fully monolithic, the Communist parties around the world behaved in a monolithic fashion by recognizing only one Rome. Since World War II, the picture has changed. The emergence of new Communist regimes in various countries—producing a total of fourteen Communist parties in power throughout the world—has been accompanied by a growth of nationalism and independence in these countries. Moreover, Peking's intrusion into Moscow's hitherto exclusive preserve as leader of international communism and the ramifications that this has had in Eastern Europe, Africa, South and Southeast Asia, and Latin America have further contributed to the impression of "crumbling" communism. Not that most of the Communist parties,

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whether in or out of power, are any less anti-capitalist, anti-American, or (in the case of the Asian parties) anti-Western than they have ever been. The point is that they are no longer entirely unified, nor necessarily pro-Soviet. And a few of them even show signs of having "gone soft" on capitalism.

The growing spirit of nationalism or national communism in Eastern Europe as well as in the Communist-ruled areas of Eastern Asia casts serious doubt on the entire Marxist-Leninist view of international relations. Lenin's classic theory of imperialism has from its inception been accepted as the basis of international relations by Communist parties throughout the world—including the Chinese Communists. How does this relate to the problem of monolithic *vs.* crumbling communism? If conflicts within the international community—indeed, wars themselves, according to Lenin's interpretation—all result from imperialism, "the final stage of capitalism," then the obvious solution to these problems is the destruction of the capitalist-imperialist nations and their replacement by a tranquil one-world community of socialist states.

This theory had never seemed convincing to non-Communist scholars in the pre-World War II era, and doubt began to mount increasingly as the world moved through the two and a half turbulent decades of the postwar era. The first hint that monolithic "international" communism was on its way out came dramatically with the Yugoslav defection from the world Communist camp in 1948. That event, however, was explained away by the faithful as merely the brash action of an ideological deviate, even though it was evident that the disagreement between Belgrade and Moscow went much deeper. Still, here was an avowed socialist country at odds with the socialist fatherland, an obvious contradiction of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Since then, the growth of nationalist and anti-Soviet sentiment within the countries of Eastern Europe has virtually demolished the image of the "one world of communism." Events in Poland and Hungary in 1956, and more recently in Czechoslovakia, speak eloquently for those who argue that monolithic communism is dead. The split between the Soviet Union and Communist China has, if anything, dealt an even heavier blow to the concept of monolithic communism. By 1960 it had become quite evident that the two giants of the Communist world were drifting—indeed, pushing each other—further and faster apart.

Let us turn now to some of the specific points made in Mr. Ezergailis' article. "Is there any reason to believe that communism is weaker today than it was in 1956?," he asks, answering with the assertion that "it is doubtful that the schism between Communist China and the Soviet Union has meant or will mean any weakening of the Communist movement as such, either internally or in the world at large." I would have to argue the opposite on both counts. Surely the Chinese Communist economy has been adversely affected by the withdrawal of Soviet aid and advisors; Peking's foreign policy has been substantially weakened by the loss of Soviet military assistance and diplomatic support; and the abortive "Great Cultural Revolution" has proved disastrous in terms of Peking's image abroad. The difference between Communist China's posture in Korea in 1950-51 and in Vietnam in 1965-68 reflects these changes in her position. As we know, the Chinese Communists intervened in the Korean War in 1950 with some 800,000 so-called volunteers, but they have so far chosen not to intervene militarily in Vietnam. What accounts for their less aggressive posture in the Vietnam conflict?

One can cite four probable reasons. First, whereas Peking in 1950 could assume Soviet military support in a confrontation with the United States, it is difficult to imagine that the Chinese Communist leaders could entertain any such thought today. Secondly, whereas Korea was situated perilously close to the heartland of Communist China, Vietnam is many thousands of miles away. Thirdly, US policy towards the Communist world, particularly with respect to acts of Communist aggression, has substantially hardened since Korea. And finally, given the generally divided state of the Communist world as well as China's own internal political divisions and economic problems, Peking's ability to take risks abroad is now seriously limited.

As to Mr. Ezergailis' criticism of the view that "the realities of power and national interest . . . take precedence over ideology" in determining Communist foreign policy, I must say that I share that view. It seems clear to me that whenever the national interest has conflicted with Marxist-Leninist doctrine, the former has been given top priority. However, the Communist leaderships have usually taken great pains to convince the faithful that whatever course they adopted was the one that Marx or Lenin would have followed had they been living today and been confronted with a similar problem.

Coming back again to the critical issue of the schism between the Soviet Union and China, Mr. Ezergailis not only sees the schism as not weakening either of these powers or communism in general, but he asserts that "as far as one can tell at present, both Communist powers seem to have gained new strength and new friends as a consequence of the split." Even apart from my earlier comments on the weakening of Communist China's economic and military potential, however, it must be evident that neither Peking nor Moscow has gained "new strength" from the schism,

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and to say that they have gained "new friends and allies" because of it is to stretch logic and imagination beyond the point of no return. Nor can I agree with the author's surmise that twenty years from now the Sino-Soviet split will be seen as a "catalyst for a renewal of Communist ideological zeal." In these fast-moving times, to predict what lies two decades ahead is obviously risky, but it seems evident to me that the difficulties between Moscow and Peking, deep-seated and fundamental as they are, are not likely to be settled in our lifetime. Thus, I would argue in conclusion that we are in the presence of a crumbling communism not likely to be put back into monolithic working order for years to come—if ever. Unfortunately for the West and for all nations dedicated to genuine democracy, however, this does not reduce international tensions since most of the elements that make up the world of crumbling communism seem as dedicated as ever to destruction of the values that are fundamental to democratic society.

Klaus Mehnert:

"Polydoxy" *vs.* "Monodoxy"

monolith—[from *monos*, single + *lithos*, stone] a single stone or block of stone.
crumble—to break into small pieces; hence, to fall to decay.
—Webster's Collegiate Dictionary

Mr. Andrew Ezergailis' paper has admirably served its purpose as a stimulator of discussion. I, for one, disagree with almost everything he says and consequently feel quite willing to argue with him—which was, no doubt, the reason for his writing the way he did.

Some of his statements, to be sure, are difficult to dispute. Mr. Ezergailis accuses specialists on communism of producing and believing two myths: first, the myth of monolithic communism, and later that of crumbling communism. But he does not tell us the names of the myth-makers—and for good reason. Practically all serious specialists on communism (and why bother about the others?) employed the methods advocated by him—namely, "searching historical and social analysis" and taking into consideration not only "the aspect of change" but also "the things of permanence."

The trouble with Mr. Ezergailis' paper is his strange use of the word "monolithic." I fail to see how a monolith can have "divergent currents . . . pulling in different directions at once," nor can I discern any reason why the word "monolithic" should necessarily refer to something broader rather than something narrower. Why at all use this unfortunate term by which Stalin tried to create the image of a system and movement as solid as a rock? Stalin's communism had many cracks, but they had little to do with petrography.

To take the Webster definitions quoted above, communism has never been "a single stone or block of stone," nor is it now "breaking into small pieces" or completely "falling to decay." It has always displayed something of both. Therefore, the question which should interest us—for the sake of theory as well as of practical politics—can only be: To what extent was communism "monolithic," and to what extent was (or is) it "crumbling" in any given period? One more point: communism can mean many things. In the remarks that follow, I shall consider it first as an ideology and second as a political factor (although both, of course, do overlap).

With regard to terminology, since we are dealing with ideas and not with rocks or sand, the terms "monodoxic" and "polydoxic" seem more appropriate to the present discussion than "monolithic" or "crumbling" communism. The question, then, may be formulated thus: To what extent have there been in communism elements of monodoxy on the one hand, and polydoxy on the other? (Here I shall consider only the four decades during which I have personally known the USSR, spending there—on frequent visits—a total of five years.) In 1929, when I first went to the Soviet Union, Russian communism was fairly polydoxic. Stalin was in many ways only *primus inter pares*: there were others with ideas of their own, Bukharin in particular, also Tomsky (the trade union leader), and of course Trotsky, banished but still very much alive. Also among Communists outside the USSR there were profound disagreements about the nature of communism: in Germany, for instance, between Heinrich Brandler and Ernst Thaelmann. But during the following years Stalin "liquidated" all dissenters at home and within the Communist parties abroad. When Trotsky was murdered in 1940 the last anti-Stalin

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Communist of importance was eliminated. After that, for some years, there was complete monodoxy—until 1948.

When Tito managed to hold his own in the face of overwhelming Stalinist pressure, world communism began to become polydoxic—and it has remained so. Russia, which once dreamed of becoming the "third Rome" of Christianity, has turned out to be the "first Rome" of communism, Belgrade becoming the second, Peking the third, Havana the fourth—and so on into the unknown future.

In addition, a supranational communism of remarkable intellectual vigor has arisen to add one more dimension to this polydoxy—the New Left. Moscow has been remarkably helpless in the face of this worldwide revolutionary movement which has proven far more attractive to restless youth than Soviet communism. For every hundred analyses of this phenomenon published in the non-Communist world, there is hardly one in the USSR.

Within the frontiers of the USSR, to be sure, communism is rather monodoxic, certainly more so than prior to the rise of Stalin. But this, in my opinion, is due not so much to a unity of belief as to the power to enforce conformism and to the growing lack of interest on the part of most Soviet citizens in intra-Communist ideological disputes.

If we next look at communism from the point of view of political power, we find a similar development. Here, monocentrism has given way to polycentrism: surely, there is now more than *one* power center, although opinions may differ as to precisely how many there are. Yet, in spite of this, Soviet communism is politically much more powerful today when Moscow is only one of several centers than it was in the period of monocentrism. And there is every indication that the USSR is firmly determined to use this power to its best advantage and without scruples, as it did when it invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968, or when it disseminated roundabout threats to China in 1969. China, too, is very likely stronger today than it was in the days of monocentrism, when Mao himself acknowledged the leadership of the Kremlin. For one thing, China now has a growing nuclear arsenal of her own.

The power of individual Communist states may very well be greater in a period of polycentrism than in one of monocentrism. But communism as a whole—and it is this we are discussing—is weaker because of polycentrism by reason of the fact that the conflicts between the various centers use up part of communism's strength. Surely, for the rest of the world, it means a great deal that Moscow no longer directs all Communist parties on the globe. How immeasurably stronger would communism be if it had but one center?

Only in one respect has polycentrism increased the strength of communism. In a number of countries, especially in Italy and France, it has made it easier for the Communist Party to play the role of a national party independent of Moscow's control. But would any one say that the recent disturbing events in Italy are due to this? Hardly, for they are very much the fault of those who are in power in the non-Communist sections of Italian society.

It is, of course, very true that a correct understanding of communism is vitally important for the determination of Western policies. But, for a non-American observer like myself, it is hard to believe that decisions in Washington depend on an answer to the rather primitive question: Is communism "monolithic" or is it "crumbling"? True, the belief that North Vietnam was "alone and isolated from other Communist powers" would have been wrong—but was there such a belief in Washington in the first place? To my knowledge, American research on communism has been for a long time far too sophisticated for such simple-minded reasoning.

As to the 1970's, it may very well be that ideological differences and power rivalry within the Communist world will diminish. In fact I expect an improvement in Sino-Soviet relations after Mao—and so, it would appear, does Moscow. But communism will remain "polydoxic" and polycentric. I find it easier to imagine all Christians accepting Pope Paul VI than all Communists following Brezhnev—or Lin Piao.

Alec Nove:

The Way the Cookie Crumbles

I disagree profoundly with Mr. Ezergailis, but the issues he raises are well worth discussing, and he has therefore performed a service by airing his views, even if they are wrong.

In the first place, it seems to me that he uses the term "monolithic" rather loosely, as a synonym for

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"powerful," or perhaps "successful." Soviet victories in World War II undoubtedly made a deep impression on many minds in many countries, but this has nothing much to do with monolithism as such. One could be monolithic and effective, as well as monolithic and ineffective. Moreover, one must surely distinguish between claim and reality. For example, it isn't true, as the author asserts, that "no Communist leadership has ever boasted of having gained monolithic control"; in fact, the Soviet party has repeatedly claimed that it was monolithic and that it *was* in control, and it still continues to make this claim—all reality to the contrary. It can be argued that Lenin's party was not monolithic in this sense, since it recognized or tolerated open differences of opinion within and outside the party. Art, literature, economics, philosophy and history were not monolithic in the early 1920's. The formal claim and image of unanimity, the *one* party line to which all had to conform, was a post-Lenin development. It could be argued that the quest for unanimity was implicit in Leninism from the first, or that Lenin would have imposed monolithic conformism had he lived long—and had time—enough to do so. Be that as it may, only after the elimination and liquidation of all opposition did the party become fully monolithic in its formal image.

The formal claim to be monolithic, however, must not be equated with what actually happens. Unanimity, as we all know, is usually only a façade. The party has long been the scene of social and economic conflicts played out behind closed doors between what may legitimately be called "pressure groups." Since Stalin's death, some of these conflicts have found expression in print. Despite all this, the word "monolithic" remains prominent in the official vocabulary, and the party leadership continues to assert that, armed with the sure compass of correct doctrine, it knows the right answers to all important questions. No other organizations are allowed to challenge either the party or its policies, and all means of communication are under firm control, as is the whole appointments system by which the political leadership recruits and supervises the elite. Mass terror is gone, but important elements of the Stalin system have been preserved, even though there is a kind of centralized pluralism, or pluralistic centralism, which does not fit the pure totalitarian model.

I must admit that I am not too fond of the term "monolithic" as a description of reality. But the opposite of "monolithic" is not "crumbling," nor is there any connection between monolithism on the one hand and either effectiveness or any given policy on the other. Mr. Ezergailis seems to be puzzled that a regime that could shoot people is unable to enforce efficiency, and he seems to believe that "bungling ineptitude" suggests the absence of monolithism. Yet it is patently clear that terror can itself be a cause of inefficiency. Thus Marshal Rokossovsky, in his war memoirs, mentions a transport operation supervised by the NKVD in which the latter so terrorized the railwaymen that the whole operation came to a halt.[1] A scared manager is not necessarily an effective manager! I can think of few things more "monolithic" than the Prussian army under Frederick the Great. Yet, faced by French revolutionary armies, the Prussians were destroyed—which again demonstrates the lack of any causal relationship between monolithic structure and either power or effectiveness.

Nor does monolithism tell us anything at all about purpose or policy aims. One could set up a model of a conservative-minded, nationalist regime which has modified its onetime revolutionary ideology. The regime may behave as a great power, while exploiting its revolutionary reputation for tactical purposes. Or take the hypothetical example of the United States acting out the role cast for it by Soviet propaganda—that is, engaging in nuclear threats, "exporting counterrevolution," playing the part of a "world gendarme," and so on. Wouldn't all these actions be perfectly consistent with a monolithic, a totalitarian, or a pluralistic political system? My point here is, simply, that terminology may be misleading, and that what really matters is what Communist or other powers actually *do*, what their priority objectives, their relations with one another. etc. *are*—and what general conclusions we may draw from such data. Let us see, then, how Mr. Ezergailis treats these questions.

"Schism has been at the very core of the movement's strength." Has it? History has shown only that some schisms result in unity—a unity *minus* the schismatics. Mr. Ezergailis claims that the Sino-Soviet quarrel has not resulted in a weakening of the Communist movement. I find this view extraordinary. Communist parties have been split, many have become demoralized, and the two greatest Communist powers denounce and threaten each other—how can all these momentous developments be compared with the earlier examples of "polycentrism"? "There are around the world many groups which hope to gain power through Communist uprisings," asserts the author. *But what is a Communist?* Anyone who waves a red flag? Can the definition cover Trotskyists, quasi-anarchist rebels in some Latin American jungle, Cohn-Bendit, Dubcek, Tito, Sik, Brezhnev, Longo, Ceaucescu, or General

[1] Konstantin Rokossovsky, *Soldarski dolg*, Moscow, 1968, p. 195.

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Moczar . . .? Are they all Communists, along with Mao and General Lin Piao? If they are, do we really "misunderstand or overstate the extent of disagreement in the Communist world"? Do not many of them frankly detest each other and denounce their so-called comrades as enemies? The "guru" of today's New Left, Professor Herbert Marcuse, for instance, is described in *Pravda* as a "werewolf" (*oboroten*).[2] Are these "tactical variations on a common theme"? Indeed, not only is the world Communist movement no longer monolithic, but it is arguable whether it exists at all.

It is possible that there were some Turks in the 17th century who ruled out an internecine struggle among Christians on the ground that both Catholics and Protestants shared a common ideology and were united in their hatred of Islam. If so, they were wrong, of course—as the bloody Thirty Years' War was to demonstrate. A schismatic war three centuries ago, however, is not an argument for the inevitability of a Sino-Soviet war in the 20th century—*pace* Mr. Harrison Salisbury.[3] The "delicate balance of terror" virtually precludes such a likelihood. All of which should not blind us to the overwhelming evidence of disarray and hatred in the so-called Communist world. To be sure, neither should it lead us to the conclusion that the Soviet Union is "crumbling," or that it does not present awkward problems for Western policymakers. It is equally clear that the USSR continues to maintain a firm grip in a number of East European countries.

The Soviet regime seems firmly in the saddle. It is a mighty military power. However, Brezhnev's claim to be the true heir of Lenin is widely questioned among Communist parties. This is true not only in such countries as Italy, but also in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Romania. The image has crumbled in their eyes. This is also the case in South America, Africa, and India. Critical attitudes towards both Moscow and Peking are also widespread in Cuba. The contrasts between Moscow's standing among Communists and pro-Communists today and what it was in both the Lenin and Stalin eras could not be more striking.

Given the general disarray within the Communist camp and given also the bitter hostility of China, why should Moscow still be bent on setting up more Communist regimes which it would be unable to control? It is true that Soviet or Russian interests have played a very important part in determining Soviet policy for a great many years. The question is rather: does it now seem to be in the Soviet or Russian interest to have more potential rivals in the form of governing Communist parties?

Towards the end of his article, Mr. Ezergailis asks: "Can one be a lukewarm Communist?" He answers the question in the negative, which can only mean that according to his definition anyone who is lukewarm cannot be a Communist. One is entitled to one's own definitions, but this is hardly a helpful one. Mr. Ezergailis then uses the label "Sunday Communist" to describe one who quotes sacred texts on feast days, attaching this label to—of all people—Isaac Deutscher, who was one of the most single-minded and devoted ideological Marxists whom I have ever met. Why? Because, explains Mr. Ezergailis, Deutscher was sometimes a "scrupulous scholar." I am afraid I don't even know how to deal with such curious reasoning.

The author has quite failed to identify the kind of Communist that many of those whom he criticizes have in mind. Let me try to do it, therefore. He is a provincial party secretary, the semi-educated, tough, domineering and unquestioned boss of his satrapy, able to dispense material privilege to fellow officials, nationalistic, anti-intellectual, antisemitic, and above all wholeheartedly devoted to his own promotion. Many of this kind have redefined the ideology to include these characteristics, or have reconciled the above ideas with it. They believe in the redefined ideology not just on Sundays but from Monday through Saturdays as well, though they make sure to keep a tame secretary on hand with a card index of appropriate quotations from Marx and Lenin for all occasions. Suppose, just suppose, that a Communist party comes to be dominated by such men as these. They will advocate monolithism, because they are accustomed to it and it helps to preserve their position. But my imaginary party secretary could hardly be described as a Messianic revolutionary, and an analysis of his future actions should take into account his real characteristics. Need I add that such a party secretary would have loudly praised the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, just as his ancestors wholeheartedly favored the invasion of Poland to suppress the Constitution of 1791? It is possible to impose one's own concept of order upon a neighbor, and to extend one's sphere of influence by whatever means are at hand, even without having read Marx or Lenin.

So, to summarize: It seems to me that the author has been the victim of his own definitions. *Power*, and even the aggressive use of power, can coexist with a

[2] *Pravda*, May 30, 1968.

[3] In his recently published book, *War Between Russia and China* (New York, W. W. Norton, 1969), Mr. Salisbury sees "a proliferation of signs that the two superstates are headed toward a collision course and war" (see Foreword, p. 9).

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pluralist society, and is therefore irrelevant to "monolithism" as such. "Monolithism" as a doctrine, or aspiration, is perhaps another way of defining totalitarianism, and it is then a matter of empirical research and analysis to determine *the degree of monolithism that actually exists* (or is claimed) in a particular country at any given date. All this has no direct connection with the altogether different question of efficiency.

The issue of *unity and discord among Communists* in various countries is something else again. Thus one can conceive of a "monolithic" Soviet party violently at odds with other parties. Indeed, this is clearly the case at the present moment.

Finally, there is the complex problem of *changes in objectives or priorities within a party* which nominally retains the same ideology and the same formal aims. History has known not a few examples of such changes, but when they occur they cannot be proved by doctrinal quotations, since value and legitimacy attach to the principles of continuity and orthodoxy. In other words, a tightly controlled and nominally monolithic political system may devote itself to the pursuit of nationalist great-power causes, while continuing to adhere to "Marxism-Leninism." *That* might be the way the cookie crumbles.

Donald W. Treadgold:

Faiths Eroded

Mr. Ezergailis is concerned about the relation of two myths—those of "monolithic" and "crumbling" communism—to Western and especially American policymaking since World War II. He believes that both myths—the one that presumably held sway until 1953, and the other since then—have had considerable influence on Western policymakers, and that their effect has been bad. But his main purpose is to question the validity—as well as the effects of—the myth of "crumbling" communism. I am skeptical about the allegedly pernicious effects of both myths, though I agree that communism is not "crumbling," and that we need more precise analysis in discussing the issues involved.

"Monolithic" means "one rock"; no men are rocks, and mineralogy cannot supersede political science. But did anyone ever think the contrary? From the Russian Civil War until Stalin's death, the prevailing Western view was that the Communist movement was controlled by a single center—namely, the Moscow Politburo, which was for much of that time Stalin's personal tool. Throughout all these years, the Soviet Union, its East European satellites, and the international Communist movement as a whole had been rent by various factional disagreements, as well as by attempted armed revolts and serious ideological schisms. But the intra-party oppositionists never succeeded in capturing the party, and the dissidents outside the party never came close to imposing their views on Moscow. Popular hatred of the Soviet regime, which erupted most threateningly in the period of the Nazi military victories in 1941-42, almost toppled it, but did not cause it to fall. Communism was indeed single-centered (and in that sense "monolithic"); since the center—however narrowly—has survived, so has the rest. Wherein, then, were Western policymakers misled?

Beyond the oblique suggestion that the myth of monolithic communism "led the US to overcommit its resources in the cold war," Mr. Ezergailis fails to cite any specific examples of the supposedly evil effects of this particular myth on US policymaking. Not so, however, when it comes to the myth of "crumbling communism," to which he specifically attributes "the kind of US involvement that developed in Vietnam." Here I find his reasoning obscure. My understanding is that high US officials feared that American intervention would drive Moscow and Peking closer together, closing a breach that was by then unmistakable, and that they were surprised and relieved that it did not; but I may be misinformed. Surely, at any rate, no one has seriously thought that "North Vietnam is alone and isolated from other Communist powers"; rather, the justifiable assumption has been that if Soviet and Chinese help ceased, Hanoi would not be able to continue the war on its own.

I doubt, therefore, that US policymakers have been significantly misled by either of the two myths. American foreign policy has had various weaknesses, but substitution of blind devotion to the constructs of Kremlinology for careful examination of the facts is probably among the least of them.

One fundamental difficulty of analyzing the history of communism in terms of the two alleged "myths" in question is that attention is drawn exclusively to the issue of whether the Communist movement is con-

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trolled by one or several centers. This brings me to the crucial problem of how to define the very word "communism." For surely "communism" may mean any or all of three related things: (1) the international Communist movement, consisting of the national parties and their members, and its activities; (2) the Marxist-Leninist ideology, as interpreted by the rulers in Moscow or Peking (as well as, at the moment, by Havana), and as accepted by the members of the international movement; (3) the political, social, and economic system (or systems) prevailing in countries ruled by Communist parties (though Communists themselves, of course, use the term "socialist" in this connection, since not even the Soviet Union claims to have attained the higher, "Communist" stage of society).

From the mid-1920's to 1945, and to some extent up to 1953, there were no overriding reasons for distinguishing among these senses of the term; in the post-Stalin era it is essential to do so. The Moscow Politburo no longer controls the entire international movement or the system (meaning the countries where Communists rule). That is a fact, not a "myth." Peking, Belgrade, Bucharest, Tirana, and Havana today make their own policies and follow Moscow's only if it suits their purposes. As for the non-ruling Communist parties, the British party may, as it recently did, repeat its condemnation of the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, and even the party of Reunion may vote against a Moscow-sponsored resolution; they are not automatically excommunicated by Moscow if they do so.

To be sure, some analysts have been tempted to bury both the notion of a "socialist camp" and that of an international movement—in my opinion, prematurely. In the aftermath of the Kosygin-Chou meeting in Peking, centrifugal forces seem to have diminished for the moment. If they erupt again, they may lead to a division of the movement into two or more distinct entities, disclaiming kinship with one another. That has not yet happened; even if it does, the precedent of Trotskyism and the Fourth International suggests that some kind of further common action is not to be excluded.

Schism does not necessarily destroy a movement; four centuries after the Reformation, Paul VI addresses Protestants as fellow-Christians. However, it may and indeed is very likely to do damage to it. Mr. Ezergailis seems to misinterpret the survival of Stalin's Russia as proof that Stalin's measures against his enemies strengthened rather than weakened communism, and he goes so far as to think that China will be stronger after the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. (Here we may indeed have some myth-making to deal with, but lack of space prevents that detour.)

If, however, Moscow is no longer in control of the entire movement, does that mean that communism has "crumbled"? Mr. Ezergailis is right in thinking that it has not, though I do not follow all of his arguments. The plausible reasons that he adduces against the likelihood of a "crumbling" communism are drawn from the field of comparative religion, though there is some confusion in his discussion of them. He asks whether there can be "Sunday Communists." Such people are said to be like those Western Christians who pay no attention to Christianity except to attend church on Sunday; but Mr. Ezergailis denies that "Sunday Communists" exist, with two odd exceptions. Plainly he is wrong on at least two counts.

To begin with, though there are many Western Christians who give their religion little thought, sometimes professing Christianity to pollsters without even going to church on Sundays, it would be a mistake to assume that they are not influenced by their professed religion. They live in a society whose culture was formed by Christianity and whose ethical norms were worked out in Christian terms. The apocryphal clergyman knew this when he asked the atheist, "Tell me about the God in Whom you do not believe." The test of Christianity's influence is not how many hours a week men spend in church or even how many times men violate what they take to be Christian precepts. "Sunday Christians" have existed from the time of the primitive church; the reason for the illness of Christianity today is to be found not in the number of "Sunday Christians" there are but in the character, commitment, and culture of the clergy and of the creative minority among the laity.

Do "Sunday Communists" exist? Of course they do, and have for a long time; Gorky's commitment to Marxism-Leninism before the Revolution certainly placed him in that category. Many in Communist countries, including some party members, practice only the obligatory observances and are apathetic toward the regime, or even hate it. But one may be an indifferent Communist or even a bitter anti-Communist and still retain many Marxist-Leninist beliefs and habits, as anyone who has talked to former Communists or refugees from Communist countries will testify.

There are significant differences between communism and Christianity that cannot be explored here, and it is a pity, for the whole side of communism that invites comparison with religious faith has not received the attention it deserves, being usually dis-

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missed with a few unsubstantiated generalizations or brief references to rather trivial phenomena. Let me mention only two basic differences between organized religion and communism: today one can break with Christian churches or leave Christian-dominated countries, but one cannot break with communism (except in non-Communist countries) with impunity; second, Christianity prescribes acceptance by the believer of no fixed scheme of history, politics, or social organization, whereas communism does. For these as well as for many other reasons, it is unwise to use the history of Christianity as a model for predicting the future development of communism. Yet one may safely, in my opinion, make the following generalization: no matter how much time any Communist party member spends on party meetings and no matter how much and what kind of Marxist-Leninist literature he reads, as long as he accepts the goals and practices of his party leaders, he remains a Communist. Authoritarian churches have sometimes *preferred* that the rank and file not bother their heads too much about theology. To return, then, to Mr. Ezergailis, although he may be somewhat confused about "Sunday communism," he is right in thinking that it will not destroy the Communist system or the international Communist movement.

If the system and movement become still more polycentric or even split irreversibly into fragments, communism will not "crumble" as long as the ideology —or ideologies, if one prefers—retains its charismatic quality. One should remember, however, that religious heretics, by definition, share a common core of belief with the orthodox, and that no two groups can argue or even fight so doggedly as those who agree on 95 percent of what is at issue between them. By all accounts, ideological fervor is weakening in the USSR. And yet Communist ideology may still survive a long time—*if* ideological challenge from within can be silenced. There was more ferment before 1966 in the USSR than there has been since then, and perhaps the hidebound regime of Brezhnev has for a time at least found an effective solution, if a dullard's, by simply sitting stolidly on the lid.

In China the ideology is startlingly alive. The "thoughts of Mao" may not really help sell rotten watermelons, but they have been given the kind of currency which no other book in history has probably ever had in a comparable period of time. The same is true to a degree in Cuba and, strikingly, in many non-Communist countries, including those in the West.

Mr. Ezergailis asks in passing: Who would have predicted that in the West "a new generation of students would today be 'liberating' university buildings under the banner of Marxist slogans and invoking the names of . . . Communist revolutionary heroes . . . ?" The answer to this question is, perhaps: not many, except those who had observed the rapidly increasing philosophical and religious confusion among Western elites and the growing aversion of the young to demagogic political leaders and to teachers whose slick professionalism is often a substitute for genuine moral and intellectual values. Communism as an ideology (*not* as a movement, though it makes its contribution to several different organizations) now exercises more influence in the Western world than at any time at least since the 1930's, and perhaps even before. (Among the radicals, to be sure, it faces competitive ideologies, such as anarchism, but then Bakunin proved no match for Marx in the past and is likely to suffer a posthumous defeat in the future.) As he contemplates this remarkable phenomenon, how could even the most cynical Soviet apparatchik fail to suspect that Marxism-Leninism may still have its uses?

Foreign policy-makers in the West may never have been seriously misled by "myths" about whether the Communist movement or system had one center or more; however, a clear perception of the realities of Communist ideology seems now, as in the past, to elude them. The same may be true of those who are responsible for domestic policies as well.

Masamichi Inoki:

The Japanese CP: An Instructive Paradox

I agree with Mr. Ezergailis' thesis that the concept of disintegrating or "crumbling" international communism is as unfounded and misleading as the antithetical myth of "monolithic" communism.

For an instructive example, we may turn to the Japanese Communist Party. The JCP began to gain strength rapidly in 1960, just as the Sino-Soviet split was emerging into the open. Its membership, numbering 43,000 in June 1959, had doubled to 88,000 by

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July 1961, at the time of the Eighth Party Congress. When the Ninth Party Congress took place in November 1964, the membership had climbed still further to 150,000, and it reached the figure of 270,000 by the time of the next congress held in October 1966. In other words, the Japanese Communist Party, which had been utterly powerless during the "reign" of the myth of "monolithic" communism, achieved a remarkable growth at a time when the myth of "crumbling" communism was winning wide acceptance.

Of course, this is not to say that the JCP remained feeble during the 1950's *because* international communism was monolithic, or that it could attain this phenomenal growth during the 1960's because international communism had begun to crumble or disintegrate. But there is no doubt that the scathing denunciation of the JCP by the Cominform in January 1950 was instrumental in causing the party to embrace the "Molotov-cocktail strategy"—that is, to turn from non-violent to violent methods of achieving power. By 1963, however, the JCP could hope to shed its long reputation as Moscow's fifth column—and thus to expand its membership—only by openly defying the CPSU, and later by breaking with the Chinese Communist Party and publicizing its "independent" position. In this sense, the demonolithization of international communism was of decisive importance to the growth of the JCP.

Today, international communism is neither monolithic nor crumbling. With its roots in the Communist movements of many countries, it represents a peculiar blend of Marxist-Leninist ideology and diverse national interests. Of course, the Communist parties of the satellite nations in Eastern Europe are bound to Russia's national interests. Similarly, some of the Communist parties in East Asia were once under the sway of the Chinese CP, and even today Peking seems to retain a degree of influence over Communist parties and splinter-groups in a number of countries throughout the world. By now, however, international communism cannot be viewed as anything but the sum total of diverse local Communist movements with different national nuances.

Some of these Communist movements are growing in strength, while others are declining. Some are youthful and dynamic; others have become decrepit and rigid. As far as the more dynamic parties in the non-Communist world are concerned, they aim at expanding their strength by exploiting general discontent. In highly industrialized countries, they may fan popular anxieties regarding air and water pollution, or try to capitalize on the frustrations caused by widening income gaps. In countries where US military bases exist, Communists concentrate on campaigns to remove these bases and, in general, on manipulating and exploiting anti-American nationalism.

In general, it is safe to assume that in developing nations the very process of industrialization and the attainment of a high level of economic growth contribute to the strength of the native Communist movements. In addition, whenever the United States intervenes militarily in a civil war within a foreign country —as in the case of Vietnam—the Communist movement there is bound to exploit anti-American sentiments and consequently to enhance its power.

The subject of Vietnam brings up a point on which I must part company with Mr. Ezergailis—namely, the relationship of the two myths to US involvement in Vietnam. I am afraid I cannot agree either that American intervention is somehow "grounded . . . in the antiquated notion of monolithic communism," or that it has in any way been influenced by "the very opposite myth . . . of crumbling communism." In South Vietnam the United States simply failed to understand the nature of an indigenous revolutionary movement, conceiving of it purely in terms of indirect or direct aggression from the outside—that is, from Hanoi. Furthermore, in 1964-65, many Americans were convinced that back of Hanoi lay the powerful influence of Peking, and that only military intervention could stem the tide of aggression by international communism—be it "monolithic" or "crumbling."

Next, I should like to take issue with Mr. Ezergailis' view that the concept of monolithic communism was unknown before World War II. Of course, he is perfectly correct in pointing out that the Battle of Stalingrad was the turning point in Russia's emergence as the second strongest power in the world. But the concept of monolithic communism existed already in the latter half of the 1920's. This concept, which accorded with reality until 1942-43, ceased to be applicable thereafter. In Europe, the success of the Tito-led partisans in seizing power from below, without the aid of Soviet bayonets, ushered in a period of antagonism between Yugoslavia and the USSR, while in China the victories scored by Mao Tse-tung led to severe strains in the relations between Moscow and Yenan. In other words, international communism could retain its monolithic character only as long as Stalin's Russia remained the sole Communist nation in the world; or, put differently, the international Communist movement could remain monolithic only so long as Stalin was able to impose his policies, grounded in Russia's national interests, on Communist movements in the rest of the world.

To the extent, therefore, that one can pinpoint the time when the international Communist movement lost its monolithic quality and began to develop

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along pluralistic lines, this moment came when Yugoslavia and China succeeded in establishing Communist regimes by dint of their own efforts, without the help of Moscow. Until his death, Stalin endeavored to preserve the image of a monolithic Communist world, but Tito's continued defiance made it difficult to keep this image alive. Russia's dismantling of industrial installations in Manchuria following Japan's World War II defeat and her delay in returning the Port Arthur naval base to Communist China further aggravated the antagonism between the Soviet and Chinese Communist Parties, thus causing even more drastic fissures in the world Communist movement. Indeed, it would be no exaggeration to say that after World War II, monolithic communism continued to exist only in Stalin's wishful thinking, reality having already rendered it a thing of the past. The open emergence of the Sino-Soviet split was not the cause of the disintegration of the international Communist movement, as Mr. Ezergailis seems to imply: the processes that rent it apart had been slowly maturing for a number of years, ever since the successes achieved by Tito and Mao Tse-tung.

As for the future prospects, I would say, again, that the advance of industrialization and economic development in the non-Communist world is likely to provide Communist movements with favorable conditions for strengthening their power. And the longer United States forces remain in Vietnam, the better the chances of Communist parties in neighboring countries to inflame anti-American nationalism and thus to enhance their own influence.

In countries ruled by Communist regimes, we may anticipate the further growth of various "revisionist" tendencies as the discrepancies between Communist ideology and Communist reality become more and more apparent. They may take the form of a search for partial liberalization or may even give rise to tendencies bordering on visionary anarchism. By and large, however, I believe that no matter how many doctrinal changes and innovations take place, the power of the ruling Communist parties is not likely to weaken or disintegrate in the foreseeable future.

The situation of parties in the non-Communist world, of course, is different. There the contrasts between the myth of "paradise on earth" and bleak reality isn't as apparent to rank-and-file members as to the populations of Eastern Europe. Therefore, the process of emancipating themselves from the dreams they have nurtured for so many years may last considerably longer and may prove far more complicated. However, recent experiences—such as those of the Italian and French CP's—have demonstrated to what extent a Communist party, once placed in the position of a major—and *legal*—contender for power, begins to lose its revolutionary zeal and even its zest for power. To conclude, then, on a paradoxical note, the larger and more prominent the Communist parties in the non-Communist world, the weaker their impact and the less serious the danger they pose to democratic values and institutions.

Rex Mortimer:

The Australian CP: Causes of Disarray

Even in Australia, where political innovation of any kind tends to be slow and cautious, it is apparent that current perceptions and evaluations of communism are more fluid than they have been for a long time. Whereas until very recently communism had played a part in domestic political conflict out of all proportion to its actual strength or influence, the last national election campaign, in October 1969, showed that it has ceased altogether to be a serious issue. In this case, political reality seems at last to have overtaken cultivated myth. With two Communist parties vying for the allegiance of the 4,000 or less souls on their books, and the larger of the two itself riven by ideological conflict between "national" and pro-Soviet tendencies, the realization has at last dawned that neither exercises any measurable influence upon political life beyond a strictly limited and predominantly constructive role in the trade union movement.

The Communist "threat from the north," on the other hand, remains a subject of passionate debate and policy concern. But even here a change is discernible from the established approach which essentially viewed the problem in terms of the outward expansion of communism from twin centers. Signs of a new and, some would say, more sophisticated appraisal are evident in the fact that our impeccably conservative government has shown more than a modicum of interest in Russia's kiteflier for a South-

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east Asian regional security arrangement, with its clear anti-Chinese undertones.

It might be argued, then, that Australians are on the way to embracing a new mythology of "crumbling" communism.

At this point, it would seem desirable to clarify meanings in view of the fact that Mr. Ezergailis, to my mind, nowhere makes clear what he understands by either "monolithic" or "crumbling" communism, and indeed uses both terms in several different senses. These failings are compounded by a resort to the literary device of paradox rather than analysis, and by his curious and mystifying references to an apparently omnipotent Leninism. To make my own position clear, I take "monolithic" communism in this context to refer to an identity of ideology, strategic aim, and organizational structure among those parties which attached themselves to the various forms of "international" sponsored at one time or another by Moscow. In this light, three relevant and in no way novel propositions appear to me to be valid.

Firstly, that the concept of a monolithic Communist movement, while superfically attractive at a certain stage in contemporary political history (*circa* 1919-1960), always represented at best a considerable oversimplification that sponsored much bad scholarship as well as a great deal of even more faulty policy-making. By ignoring or depreciating the national characteristics of Communist parties and the appeal of Communist social-revolutionary policies in specific environments, followers of the concept nurtured a conspiracy thesis of Communist growth which persists to this day.

Secondly, that whatever restricted validity the concept once possessed has long since rotted away. The decay began with Tito's successful defiance of Stalin in 1948 and since the onset of the Sino-Soviet split has spread to all the limbs and the trunk. The doleful spectacle of the divided, unrepresentative, and futile Communist conference in Moscow in June 1969 bears eloquent witness to the present state of "international Communist unity." I find it ludicrous, especially in view of the desperate and unscrupulous measures both Moscow and Peking have taken in their vain efforts to shore up their respective international edifices, even to contemplate that there was any element of contrivance in this debacle. To contend otherwise is to argue the existence of what would be the most remarkable enterprise in self-destruction of modern times.

Thirdly, that the disintegration of the Communist "international" has seriously weakened the external capabilities of both the Soviet Union and China. This is a more disputable proposition, since the former in particular has continued to expand its influence in some areas by the deployment of conventional techniques of diplomacy and influence-gathering, very probably aided by the diminution of its role as a "revolutionary" agent. But the argument that divisions do not weaken the Communist movement because the Soviet Union is stronger today than a decade ago exhibits fallacious reasoning. Obviously, the test to be applied would have to compare the actual present influence of the USSR with what it might have been in the absence of such divisions. I have no doubt that the preoccupation of the Soviet Union and China with the security threat which each represents for the other, as well as the greatly weakened hold of both upon the sources of political disaffection in non-Communist countries, have significantly diminished their ability to exercise initiatives in the international sphere. It is possible that the extent and effects of these fissures have at times been exaggerated, though I think the opposite has been more commonly the case. The United States' ill-advised involvement in Vietnam was, I believe, the product of more complex causes, but if one were to isolate one factor which, more than any other, contributed to this miscalculation, then I would opt for underestimation of the national character and appeal of Vietnamese communism—in other words, an error stemming from the monolithic concept of communism.

Acceptance of the view that the international coherence of communism has disintegrated does not necessarily imply any general evaluation of the potential of communism in different locales. In point of fact, the effects of the great split upon individual Communist parties have varied considerably, largely according to the degree to which they depended upon the "center" for their sustenance. We should not forget in this connection that the most successful Communist movements of the past twenty-five years have been those whose connections with the international apparatus were the most tenuous.

Generally speaking, communism will continue to find its strongest base in those economically underdeveloped countries where the strains induced by modernization pressures are greatest and most clearly related to foreign domination or influence. Wherever, in addition, centralized state systems have been traditionally strong and entrepreneurial functions poorly developed, and where the ruling elites exhibit manifest incapacity, the possibility of Communist challenge is present. Even so, the prospects for communism in these conditions do not at present seem to be so favorable as they once did, in large measure because of the emergence of armed forces officer corps as rival counter-elites.

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In economically advanced countries, on the other hand, communism is clearly a declining force. Having failed to make use of such opportunities as existed during critical phases of the industrialization of their societies, most Communist parties in the West are unable to adapt to post-industrial conditions. Bureaucratic degeneration is only one aspect of their obsolescence; of greater significance is the fact that their "electorates" are today socially conservative, far more intent upon holding and improving their social gains than risking them in revolutionary "adventures." Hence even the strongest of these parties—the Italian and French—are constrained to seek access to power by establishing their indispensability to the stability of the political system. It is hard to envisage them succeeding in the absence of extraordinary inepitude on the part of the ruling groups.

A few Communist parties, such as the larger of the two in Australia, have endeavored to adjust to the content and style of post-industrial protest, but so far they have succeeded only in reaching a sort of halfway house between Communist orthodoxy and neo-Marxian revisionism. What is significant, however, is that the more they seek to relate to contemporary springs of social revolt, the more they tend to diverge from the ideological and organizational criteria by which alone a movement may be identified as "Communist."

It remains a fact, however, that even the most "revisionist" Communist parties still feel a tug towards the old "center." The Australian one, for example, sent its representatives to Moscow last June, even though it expected the worst and dissented on every substantive issue. Similarly, non-Communist radicals, including the student rebels, also experience some sense of identification with communism, with Communist hero figures, and even at times with the Communist state systems. A satisfactory explanation of this phenomenon would have to take into account many factors, but ideologically the conjunction lies in a common antipathy towards capitalist social values and hence a common attraction towards one or another aspect of Marx's critique of capitalism. For differing reasons, then, revolutionary socialists, left-wing political chieftains, Communist state bureaucrats, campus rebels, and Asian modernizing intellectuals all share some elements of a common ideology. But the consequent mutual interaction between these disparate elements is fragile and strictly limited; their interests and aspirations are too diverse to be accommodated under any single ideological or organizational umbrella; and it is productive only of confusion to conceive of them all as furthering some deep Communist or Leninist purpose.

Perhaps the best indicator of the "crumbling" of the old Communist order is that the Soviet leaders, aware of their inability any longer to control or manipulate dynamic movements of revolutionary social change, are today as anxious as the United States to prevent them from upsetting the international equilibrium. Soviet rhetoric scarcely conceals the fact that urges towards social revolution must now be directed as much against the Soviet as against the American power system. This is not yet the case with China, since her efforts to establish a world role lead her to encourage movements which she hopes will undermine the position of her rivals. For this reason, China will continue to exercise a romantic attraction for many left-wing radicals, without however exerting more than a peripheral influence upon their goals or techniques.

I would conclude, then, that communism is "crumbling" not only as an internationally-coordinated movement, but as the distinctive form of revolutionary social action in our time. If there is in its present disarray any working-out of a Leninist, or any other, dialectical process, then it escapes me.

Joseph Starobin:

The Prospects of Evolution

Mr. Ezergailis raises so many problems and ranges over such a broad time-span and such vast historical terrain that it seems difficult at first glance to grapple with his distinctions—except for the central one, which is to underline the severe limitations of both concepts: that communism has always been monolithic, and that it is now in a process of disintegration. He advises against the dogmatic view, and who can disagree? Dogmas have, in all societies, misled their adherents and stood in the way of analysis.

My own view, partially elaborated elsewhere, holds that communism as a system of thought and action

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has long been in deep crisis.[1] But to say this does not mean that the system must necessarily crumble for that reason, nor that one cannot live with an opposing system simply because it is in crisis. Nor is communism unique in this regard. Democratic capitalism is also in crisis and experiences great difficulty in resolving problems of inner change and of adjustment to a world that is quite inhospitable to its premises. The difference has been, perhaps, that while this crisis is acknowledged in the West and the politics of our time revolve around the attempt to grapple with it, most Communists, and especially the Russians, have denied their inner crisis, have loudly proclaimed the virtues of their system even as it staggers, and have refused to analyze the roots of their own dilemma or to undertake the changes in doctrine and practice that would be required to overcome it. Not only is their lack of candor intellectually ridiculous, but it injects an explosive element into their crisis.

If there is any simple—or perhaps oversimplified—way in which communism's crisis can be defined, I would stress first the enormous difficulty the Communist system experiences in making the transition from the tasks of mobilizing underdeveloped societies to the more complex and challenging problems of modern industrialization. Wherever this stage has been reached, as in the Soviet Union itself, or where it was the point of departure, as in Czechoslovakia, the weapons of communism have turned against the system. Management cannot continue to function under highly-centralized plans; the market economy, in some form, becomes essential; popular participation in decision-making cannot proceed in an atmosphere of misinformation, censorship, and party fiat; and all the techniques of dictatorship not only become outmoded but react against the system and burst its integument. Nor have these problems been satisfactorily resolved even in Yugoslavia, where they have been frankly acknowledged, or in China, where a vast preventive mobilization of the most primitive kind has sought to anticipate them. And the crisis has extended itself as well to the more important non-ruling Communist parties, such as those of Italy, France, and India. In these countries the Communists have increasingly come to realize how empty are the supposed models of Communist development—whether Soviet or Chinese. This realization is reluctant on the part of the French Communists, and where it *has* been faced, as for example by the Italian party, no clear answers have as yet been given. It may be, as Mr. Ezergailis suggests, that the polycentric tendency was already envisaged by Lenin in 1920 and that Khrushchev hoped for some federalist solution which would make it possible to preserve the coherence of the Communist world. At bottom, however, polycentrism is really a search for independent paths undertaken because the basic models have become discredited—and all the more so because they stubbornly refuse to admit the crisis itself. Polycentrism is thus an exasperated protest and does not stabilize the system at all.

The other, equally dynamic aspect of the Communist crisis has to do with the tremendous problems being encountered in ordering the relations among Communist states and parties. Here the panorama is almost one of chaos, and the failure of "proletarian internationalism" to surmount national rivalries has been glaring. This was already a problem in the days of the Third International when the primacy of Soviet national and internal needs could be rationalized as being in the long-range strategic interests of world communism. But now the very premises of Communist world strategy are placed in question. Ideological rivalry compounds the impact of divergent national interests, and Communists are bewildered to find themselves called upon to line up on either side of an ideological frontier marked by a bar of sand in the Ussuri River! If, more recently, the Russians and Chinese have decided to be "limited adversaries" as far as their state interests are concerned, the ideological rivalry continues unabated.

Very little of this, in my view, was ever terrain on which the West could successfully operate, nor could the Western governments take advantage of these difficulties and divisions in any explicit way. A rash attempt to do so now shows its results in the *cul de sac* of the Vietnam war, and the respectable ideologists who contributed to this grim adventure have yet to explain themselves and to make their own "self-criticism."

Never a monolith as so many supposed at the outset of the cold war, and yet not crumbling as many would have us believe today, communism can evolve only through peaceful competition with rival systems and in the most intimate contact with the achievements, ideas, and experiments—even the contradictions—of the Western mixed economy and Western democracy. It is only in "peaceful engagement" that hope lies not only for the accommodation of states but for the evolution of communism itself, and indeed of rival forms of human organization, into something more manageable and satisfactory to their own inhabitants and thus to mankind in general.

[1] See this writer's article, "Origins of the Cold War: The Communist Dimension", *Foreign Affairs* (New York), July 1969.

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Economics and Politics

EDITORS' NOTE: The following four articles deal with developments on the political and economic fronts in Poland and Hungary. Mr. Johnson addresses himself to the recent power struggle in Poland, which reached a high point following student demonstrations in March 1968; Mr. Gamarnikow discusses the impact of that struggle on the Polish economy and on moves toward economic reform. In reverse order, Mr. Shaffer reviews the measured progress of economic reform in Hungary, while Mr. Sandor discusses concomitant signs of cautious political liberalization in Hungarian society.

Poland: End of an Era?

By A. Ross Johnson

On March 8, 1968, thousands of students assembled peacefully on the grounds of Warsaw University to protest the expulsion of two dissident student leaders, Adam Michnik and Henryk Szlajfer. Reserve militiamen attempted to disperse the demonstration by force, the students resisted, the militia itself was called in, and the ensuing violence touched off three days of riots in Warsaw and protests in every provincial university town. Street demonstrations gave way to sit-in strikes, and only after two weeks, on March 23, did the protest end as the last demonstrators left the Warsaw Polytechnic building.

The 1968 student demonstrations were the culmination of two currents of social dissent, the first exemplified by the "Commandos," a group of ideologically motivated, politically conscious Warsaw university and secondary school students who had been incurring the displeasure of the regime since the early 1960's; the second, by the dissident Polish writers (many of them party members) who had long controlled the Warsaw branch of the Writers' Union.[1] In early 1968, after *Dziady* (Forefathers), a 19th-Century anti-Tsarist classic by Adam Mickiewicz, was banned from the National Theater be-

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[1] For the background, see A. Ross Johnson, "Warsaw: Politics and the Intellectuals," *East Europe*, (New York), July 1967; Michael Gamarnikow, "Poland: Political Pluralism in a One-Party State," *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1967.

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cause of the "anti-Soviet" reactions of the audience, these two lines of dissent merged. At an extraordinary session of the Warsaw branch of the Writers' Union on February 29, 245 members voted for a resolution critical of party cultural policy, as opposed to 124 for a party counterresolution.[2] Earlier, on January 31, a small student demonstration against the banning of *Dziady* had been dispersed by the militia, and it was to protest the disciplinary measures that the University imposed on Michnik and Szlajfer for their role in that demonstration that the March 8 meeting was organized. As militia truncheons fell, the oft-alleged political apathy of Polish students disappeared overnight.

An observer relying for his information on the student unrest solely on the Polish mass media would have come to a different conclusion: namely, that a conspiracy of discredited Stalinists, Zionists, and revisionists—supported abroad by West German revanchists and other nefarious imperialists—had plotted the student unrest as a frontal challenge to Poland's political system, and that in addition to disciplining the rebellious student leaders, it was mandatory to eliminate all their ideological mentors from public life.[3] On March 11, *Trybuna Ludu* listed the student "ringleaders" in a manner blatantly calculated to create the impression that most of them were of Jewish origin and the children of important state officials. On the same day, Warsaw First Secretary Jozef Kepa, in a speech to party activists, repeated these allegations, asserting that behind the students stood such "bankrupt politicians" as former Warsaw First Secretary Stefan Staszewski and former Politburo member Roman Zambrowski (both of whom were, in fact, demoted after 1956 because of their excessive "liberalism"). And, in typically demagogic fashion, Kepa served warning that the party would not be deterred from taking decisive countermeasures by the "bogey of antisemitism."[4]

It soon turned out that the article in the party organ and Kepa's speech were but the first salvos of a massive propaganda campaign, conducted by the Polish press, radio, and television, in Warsaw as well as throughout the length and breadth of the country. Within a few days, mass meetings of "workers" and party and state organizations were organized, and hundreds of resolutions—all dutifully reported by the media—adopted, demanding the "purge" and "exemplary punishment" of Zionists, "political firebrands," and other enemies, "no matter what their position." As the charges mounted in volume and intensity, it became clear that student unrest was a secondary issue—that what was emerging was an intraparty power struggle of proportions not seen in Poland since the upheaval of 1956.

The Partisans' Challenge

Since his return to power, Gomulka has used the authority accruing to him as a prominent victim of Stalinist repression (he was imprisoned from 1949 to 1954) and as the defender of Polish sovereignty in 1956 to manipulate and dominate opposed factional groupings and mutually hostile individuals in the supreme leadership of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP). By eliminating, in 1959-60, such "liberal" leaders as Jerzy Morawski and replacing them with former Stalinists (*e.g.*, Kazimierz Witaszewski and Julian Tokarski), Gomulka seriously compromised the possibility of the political system evolving in line with the spirit of October 1956. To be sure, his policies resulted neither in a return to the pre-1956 days nor in a rise to power of members of the Natolin faction. Gomulka continued to use such Stalinists, and not vice versa. The same was true for the most powerful hardline group, the so-called Partisans, and especially for their leader, Minister of Interior General Mieczyslaw Moczar, whose initial effort to win a seat in the Politburo in the early 1960's was frustrated by Gomulka at the Fourth Party Congress in 1964. Throughout the 1960's, other groupings continued to be represented in the party's supreme bodies—the ex-Socialists around Premier Jozef Cyrankiewicz, the "technocrats" headed by Silesian First Secretary Edward Gierek, technicians such as Stefan Jedrychowski, the "Gomulka center" itself—while members of the former Zambrowski or "Jewish liberal" faction and the related Pulawians[5] of 1956 still occupied second-level state posts. The enforced cooperation of disparate groupings was consonant with Gomulka's personal penchant for

[2] Texts in *Kultura* (Paris), April 1968.

[3] The analysis of the PUWP leadership crisis through May Day 1968, contained in the next few pages, was previously published in substantially the same form in *Survey* (London), July 1968.

[4] *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw) March 12, 1968.

[5] A liberal group formed in 1956, named after its meeting place of Pulawy, a town south of Warsaw.

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policies which, while avoiding any consistent effort to suppress intellectual dissent or engage in a more vigorous struggle with the Church—as the hardline elements have urged—have precluded any serious consideration of liberal proposals toward modernizing Polish society.

The dynamic forces in this constellation were the Partisans, with the other groups fighting an extended holding action. No attempt can be made here to trace the history of these factional groupings[6]; however, in the context of the 1968 leadership crisis, it is necessary to stress the special importance of antisemitism in distinguishing the neo-Natolinists and the Partisans from their opponents. The Natolin faction emerged in 1956 as a group of Stalinists attempting to use antisemitism as a major weapon in a power struggle with the inchoate Pulawy group, many of whose leading members were "Muscovite" Jewish Communists—*i.e.*, men who had spent the war years in the USSR under Soviet tutelage. Motivated primarily by belated moral revulsion at their erstwhile Stalinist behavior, the Pulawians had adopted a more liberal outlook. Long after the clash between these groups had outwardly subsided, when members of the Natolin faction had to some extent abandoned Stalinism and had again begun to play an important role in the *apparat*, they continued to regard Communists of Jewish origin as their "liberal" enemies.

As for the Partisans, they might be regarded as the spiritual descendants of the "Natolinists." Led by former leaders and members of the anti-German Communist underground and subsequently shunted aside by the men who had entered Poland with the victorious Soviet army, the Partisans directed their resentment at both the former Soviet ties and Jewish origin of leading "Muscovites." At first a loose conglomoration of like-minded individuals, they expected the death of Boleslaw Bierut, Gomulka's "Muscovite" predecessor, to clear the way for their return to political life and bureaucratic sinecures. It was only after 1958, when Gomulka failed to carry out the large-scale purge they had counted on, that they coalesced into a definite faction. Thereafter, the Partisans attempted to take over as many positions in the state and party bureaucracy as possible, using as a major weapon an antisemitic whisper campaign. They achieved control of the security apparatus and the veterans' organization, ZBoWiD, and made considerable gains in the organs of mass communication.

The student unrest in March 1968 provided the Partisans and their allies with an opportunity for a new challenge to Gomulka, with antisemitism once again their main tactical device. Ironically, it was Gomulka himself who, nine months earlier, had set the stage for their move. In an address to the trade union congress in June 1967, in the wake of the Arab-Israeli war, he warned of the danger of a "fifth column" of pro-Israeli Polish Jews. Prior to that speech, Gomulka (whose wife is of Jewish origin) had never displayed a trace of antisemitism. His remarks could best be interpreted as a reaction to the widespread sympathy in Poland (by no means confined to Polish Jews) for the Israeli cause—a sympathy diametrically opposed to Soviet interests and thus for Gomulka an inadmissible breach of discipline on a major "internationalist" issue. Whatever the explanation, his words (although deleted from the official texts of his speech) did initiate an "anti-Zionist"—that is, an anti-Jewish—propaganda campaign.

In the beginning only a few minor journalists of Jewish origin lost their jobs. Yet if Gomulka still appeared to be in full control, he had opened the door to public criticism of Jewish Communists and had thus voided one of the most important "zones of silence" so characteristic of his system and essential for its perpetuation—the strict taboo against public airings of the party's factional disputes. Thereafter, the hardliners could with greater boldness and credibility raise charges of "anti-party" attitudes against their political and personal enemies—not only Jews, but many other real or suspected opponents, including former "liberals" and ex-Socialists. Their first real success came in December 1967 with the dismissals of Leon Kasman as editor-in-chief of *Trybuna Ludu*, Leopold Unger as *de facto* editor of *Zycie Warszawy*, and Jerzy Zarzycki as chairman of the Warsaw National Council.

Cosmopolitans and Chauvinists

This was the immediate background to the events of March 1968. It may be that the hardliners deliberately forced a showdown, even causing *Dziady* to be banned—a move intended to reflect on their enemies in charge of the "cultural sector," especially Minister of Culture Lucjan Motyka and

[6] A useful survey is J. F. Brown, *The New Eastern Europe* (New York, Praeger, 1966), pp. 50-64.

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CC Secretary Artur Starewicz. In addition, by exacerbating student unrest, the Partisans *et al.* may well have wished to create an atmosphere of crisis in the country as a whole. While this interpretation, however plausible, cannot be substantiated, it is indisputable that student unrest provided the immediate excuse for the hardliners—led by the Partisans, who were strongly supported by Pax, the pseudo-Catholic group led by the former fascist Boleslaw Piasecki—to launch a drive for decisive power in the PUWP. The immediate objective was to oust second-level officials (especially those of Jewish origin) in the state bureaucracy, using as a pretext their children's involvement in the student demonstrations. Typical of the character of the propaganda campaign after March 8 was a resolution of the party *aktiv* in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs warning that "there can be no compromise with cosmopolitans and chauvinists," and that it was "impossible to tolerate their activity in any responsible position." [7] The Partisans *et al.* concentrated on encouraging party cells to take matters into their own hands, to adopt a stand "without waiting for directives 'from the top,'" and thus to confront the center with *faits accomplis*.[8] As the number of expulsions mounted, most of them the direct result of such pressure "from below," cultural and educational institutions such as the cinema organization Film Polski, the State Scientific Publishing House, and the Polish Academy of Sciences were subjected to intense criticism, and many prominent intellectuals and professionals, most of them Jews, also lost their jobs and were expelled from the party.

(The case of the *Large Encyclopedia*, published by the State Scientific Publishing House, is instructive. In late 1967, the *Encyclopedia* was—quite falsely—accused of downplaying the suffering of "Poles," as opposed to Jews, at the hands of Hitler, and three editors, including Stefan Staszewski, were dismissed. This charge was later linked with allegations of "criminal" financial abuses in order to purge the directorship of the Publishing House.)

In retrospect, it is clear that the public "anti-Zionism" of the time was only the tip of an iceberg of antisemitic invective spread by the Partisans. For example, two internal agitprop leaflets were issued in April 1968 by the Lodz Municipal Party organization: one, a pseudo-sociological analysis claiming that all important Polish Stalinists were Jews who encouraged an "excessive concentration of Polish citizens of Jewish origin" in such key departments as the security service; the other, a crude tract postulating an international Jewish conspiracy.[9] The wellsprings of ancient antagonisms having been tapped, the purge took on a life of its own, with "Zionists" being "encouraged" to emigrate, and the prospective émigrés (whose "Zionism" had never impelled them to depart for Israel in the past) being subjected to humiliating ordeals—including formal renunciation of Polish citizenship, being forced to leave their apartments in perfect condition, paying back the cost of education, and having their belongings (and sometimes bodies) carefully searched before their departure. Although public signs of antisemitism largely disappeared after the fall of 1968, the exodus continued even after September 1, 1969, when the special provisions for Jewish emigration were formally terminated. All told, up to one-half of the roughly 25,000 Poles of Jewish origin left the country, thus making Poland virtually *Judenrein*.

The magnitude of anti-Jewish excesses and of the tragedies they involved should not, however, obscure the fact that they were primarily the consequence of antisemitism manipulated from above—especially by the Partisans—in the course of an intraparty power struggle. Hence, whatever the similarities in the passions aroused, it would be a mistake to equate this phenomenon with antisemitism in prewar Poland. In the words of an early victim of the purge, now living in Israel, sociologist Zygmund Bauman:

The present-day antisemitism, which is inspired from above, must be seen for what it is . . . an instrument of internecine political struggle which has nothing in common with any Jewish problems. The anti-Jewish struggle is not an end in itself but only a means to an end.[10]

That end became obvious immediately after March as the Partisans broadened their attacks to include government bodies such as the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Finance, and Culture. The purpose

[7] *Trybuna Ludu*, March 26, 1968.
[8] Kazimierz Kakol, in *Prawo i Zycie* (Warsaw), April 7, 1968.
[9] Zbigniew Falinski, Wiktor Malski, Henryk Maciejewski, *Polityka partii i rzadu i jej przeciwnicy* [*The Policy of the Party and Government and its Opponents*] and Wladyslaw Kmitowski, *Syjonizm, jego geneza, charakter polityczny i antypolskie oblicze* [*Zionism, its Origins, Political Character, and Anti-Polish Countenance*], both published by the Lodz Party Propaganda Center, April 1968.
[10] Zygmund Bauman, "The End of Polish Jewry—a Sociological Review," *Bulletin on Soviet and East European Jewish Affairs* (London), January 1969.

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of the campaign was twofold: first, to remove most of the men in charge of Poland's major institutions and replace them with Partisans and their adherents; and second, eventually to weed out "revisionists" (that is, *all* the opponents of the Partisans) from all levels of public life. "Criticism has divested itself of anonymity, its edge has been directed against specific people," one Partisan-controlled journal boasted, warning that it "still has to touch whole areas of our political, social, and economic life." [11]

Ultimately, of course, such criticism reflected on the political leadership of the Politburo and of Gomulka himself. The critics did not limit themselves to insinuations; some of Gomulka's policies were openly questioned in the press. Thus, already on March 24, Partisan spokesman Kazimierz Kakol published an article in which he declared that the positive changes initiated in 1956 had been thwarted by a combination of bureaucratic incompetence and inertia. Calling for the development of "socialist democracy" in order to harness the creative energies of Polish youth, he challenged Gomulka by name to "offer an answer as to the further prospects of development." [12] In April, in the course of a unique personal interview, Moczar publicly affirmed his leadership of the purge campaign. He attacked Zionist influence in the publishing field and, referring explicitly to the split in the party between the "Muscovites" and the "domestic Communists," castigated the Soviet connections as well as the Jewish origins of the former.[13]

Having scored their initial victories—that is, having succeeded in eliminating a number of middle-level officials—the Partisans launched a public discussion of the shortcomings of the Gomulka system itself. At the same time they promoted their own image—and primarily that of their leader, General Moczar—as staunch patriots whose dedication to the glorious traditions of their country transcended political and ideological differences with their erstwhile opponents. The most salient example of this was the "rehabilitation" of members of the wartime anti-Communist Home Army (Armja Krajowa), who were welcomed into the ranks of Moczar's ZBoWiD. Taken at face value, the criticisms of the Gomulka system—the accusations of bureaucratic ineptitude, blocked careers, and political and economic stagnation—were essentially sound and could be supported by Poles of widely differing political persuasions. What was crucial, however, was that all these articles paid tribute to the achievements of "October," while rejecting its spirit; not once did they raise issues endemic to the 1956 upheaval, such as the role of the party or the preservation and broadening of intellectual freedom. In short, the Partisans were making a demagogic effort to extend their support beyond their institutional bases in the security forces and mass media, an effort which partially succeeded—for a time. Even young people rose to the bait. However primitive and lacking in ideas they found the "old soldiers," many ambitious young Poles whose careers had been blocked by bureaucratic dead weight, and who wanted to see Poland "moving again," aligned with the Partisans.

Gomulka's Response

With the campaign assuming ever more massive and strident proportions, it is legitimate to raise the question of why it took the party's first secretary nearly two weeks to take any public notice of it whatsoever. The answer to this question is indicated by the ambivalent nature of the speech which Gomulka finally made at a meeting of the Warsaw Party *aktiv* on March 19, 1968.[14] On the one hand, the First Secretary reaffirmed his uncompromising hostility to any "reactionary" forces that aim at "undermining the foundations of Poland's national existence" for the sake "of some abstract freedom and artistic license." As for antisemitism, after reminding his listeners that among the "ringleaders" of the student demonstrations there were many "of either Jewish origin or descent," Gomulka divided Poland's Jews into three categories: "Zionists," who would be encouraged to emigrate (though only to Israel); "cosmopolitans," who could not be "forced" to become "genuine" Poles and who would no longer be employed in "fields of work in which national affirmation is essential"; and finally "the most numerous group . . . who have but one fatherland," and who have "through their work and

[11] *Trybuna Mazowiecka* (Warsaw), April 27-28, 1968.
[12] *Prawo i Zycie*, March 24, 1968.
[13] *Trybuna Ludu*, April 13, 1968. He referred to "the arrival in our country [from the USSR in 1944] of politicians dressed in officers' uniforms who later felt that, for this reason alone, they . . . had a right to leadership. . . ."

[14] *Ibid.*, March 21, 1968.

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Antisemitism as a Weapon

Student Unrest: An Explanation

The alliance contracted between the state of Israel and the German Federal Republic . . . implies not only the services performed by the German Federal Republic for Israel but also *vice versa*. The services rendered by Israel and Zionism to the GFR [are part of a] broad campaign which, on the one hand, is to provide a certificate of good conduct to the present GFR authorities and to clear them of their Hitlerite criminal past and, on the other hand, to defame the underground struggle of the Polish nation against the Hitlerite occupant and to shift the responsibility for the murder of six million Jews in concentration camps to the Polish nation. At the same time, this campaign aims at undermining the authority of the political leadership of People's Poland . . . and setting intellectuals and youth at variance with the main requirements of patriotic responsibility for People's Poland.

—*Slowo Powszechne*, March 10, 1968.

Disproportions

Why it it that a relatively large number of people of Jewish origin can be found among certain groups of intelligentsia . . . and in responsible posts in some central institutions? Their number is not so large as is generally believed, but all the same it is much larger than one might expect on the basis of the percentage of Jewish population in our society. Why can we note a particular susceptibility to revisionism and the development of Jewish nationalism in general and Zionism in particular in the attitudes of certain Jewish milieus . . . ?

—Andrzej Werblan in *Miesiecznik Literacki*, June 1968.

Jews—Cowards—Anti-Communists

. . . In the Jewish concentration camp in Janisz, the Hitlerites kept nearly half a thousand people . . . at forced labor. In November 1942 . . . [the Polish] partisans opened the gates of freedom for them and at a mass meeting insistently called upon the prisoners to go into the woods and take up arms. In vain. They remained in camp, until they were shot to a man near Annopol.

—*Sztandar Ludu*, April 15, 1968.

In the Western centers of psychological warfare an important role is played by Jews—refugees from socialist countries, specialists in "Communist affairs."

—Jan Dziedzic, Tadeusz Walichnowski, *Apropos of the Israeli Aggression (1967)*, Warsaw, 1968, p. 65.

Nazis, Israelis, and Money

You worry, I worry, all of us worry. Golden Mrs. Meir, please answer my last worry: is it true what they say about your commander-in-chief, Moshe Dayan, that he is not Dayan at all but Otto Skorzeny, the expert in rape and murder of Uncle Adolf's S.S.? . . . Furthermore, Madame Meir, I have heard that—for heavy money—you are hiding in your closet Hitler's assistant, Martin Bormann. Is this true?

—*Glos Robotniczy*, May 12, 1968.

Gomulka on Antisemitism

But no matter what the feelings of Polish citizens of Jewish origin are, our party opposes with full determination all symptoms of antisemitism. We combat Zionism as a political program, as Jewish nationalism, and this is right. This has nothing in common with antisemitism. Antisemitism exists whenever somebody is against the Jews only because they are Jews.

—*Wladyslaw Gomulka*, March 19, 1968.

A Comment From Paris

Gomulka is a hypocrite when he claims that "anti-Zionism has nothing in common with antisemitism," and when he explains: "Antisemitism exists whenever somebody is against the Jews only because they are Jews." Since in Poland, save for the ONR and the Falange (and some members of the National Democratic Party) [all prewar semi-fascist and nationalist partisans], "consistent" racial theories *à la* Nuremberg have never existed, one could easily maintain that there was never any antisemitism in Poland. Poles did not come out against Jews "because they are Jews," but because Jews are dirty, greedy, mendacious, because they wear ear-locks, speak jargon, do not want to become assimilated, and *also* because they *do* assimilate, cease using their jargon, are nattily dressed, and want to be regarded as Poles. Because they lack culture and because they are overly cultured. Because they are superstitious, backward and ignorant, and because they are damnably capable, progressive and ambitious. Because they have long, hooked noses, and because it is sometimes difficult to distinguish them from "pure Poles." Because they crucified Christ and practice ritual murder and pore over the Talmud, and because they disdain their own religion and are atheists. Because they look wretched and sickly, and because they are tough and have their own fighting units and are full of "*khutspah*." Because they are bankers and capitalists and because they are Communists and agitators. But in *no* case because they are Jews.

—K. Jelenski in *Kultura* (Paris), May 1968.

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struggle . . . honestly served People's Poland and the cause of socialism." At the same time, Gomulka declared that Zionism, while a hostile force, was not a threat to the perpetuation of socialism in Poland, and he shifted some of the blame for the riots to revisionists, reactionaries, and enemies of the Polish-Soviet alliance. Furthermore, he also seemed to dissociate himself from a comprehensive purge by asserting that accusations against individuals should not be made without prior approval of the appropriate party body. A similar approach characterized the speeches of Zenon Kliszko and Cyrankiewicz in the Sejm (parliament) on April 10.

Both Gomulka's initial silence, then, as well as his attempt not to invest the purge with an exclusively antisemitic character, strongly suggest that the campaign had not been launched at his direct instigation, and that its magnitude and ferocity caught him by surprise. Yet his stand—as well as that of Cyrankiewicz and Zenon Kliszko—could be called "moderate" only in a very relative sense; not even Gomulka disavowed "anti-Zionism" or opposed a party purge, but sought only to limit and channel it for his own purpose. (As for the Jews, they could take little solace in the knowledge that any form of ethnic or religious self-identification left them with only two choices: either emigration to Israel, or second-class citizenship in "People's Poland"). Indeed, just as Gomulka's June 1967 speech prepared the ground for the "March events," so did his March 19 speech provide the ultimate justification for the purge, including its antisemitic aspects. All of which demonstrates the extent to which, by the spring of 1968, Gomulka had become dependent on the hardliners and how much his views were compatible with theirs. Given these two interrelated factors, the hardliners could both foster a political debate on the origins of the "March events" and determine its terms of reference. If called upon to justify their behavior, they could argue that they were urging the implementation of principles propounded by Gomulka himself.

One of the few press organs which refrained from the "anti-Zionist" campaigns was the party weekly, *Polityka*. The journal had been a longstanding target of the Partisans; now it was denounced by *Trybuna Ludu*, the party daily, for glorifying economic managers, and was criticized personally by Moczar for opposing the "patriotic education" of the youth.[15] Yet *Polityka's* editor-in-chief, Mieczyslaw Rakowski, rejected the criticism as unfounded, in a manner implying that he had support higher up; this was one sign that Gomulka had resolved to resist the hardliners' onslaught.[16] Another sign was given at the Sejm session in April, when Gomulka demonstrated that, if he could not prevent demotions, he was still in a position to control appointments to top state bodies. Thus Edward Ochab was replaced as Chairman of the Council of State by Gomulka's close supporter, Minister of Defense Marian Spychalski; the latter was succeeded as Defense Minister not by the Partisan candidate, General Grzegorz Korczynski, but by General Wojciech Jaruzelski, a professional army officer not connected with the Partisans.

A week later, apparently sensing a strengthening of Gomulka's position, Warsaw First Secretary Jozef Kepa shifted sides. Still avoiding any hint of a conciliatory attitude towards the dissident students and intellectuals, he publicly decried party excesses such as making "hasty generalizations concerning certain alarming elements in our economic and social life"; "social demagogy"; attempts to gain popularity "through a search for applause, through 'playing to the gallery'"; and "vulgar mudslinging." Criticizing the Partisan-controlled mass media, Kepa emphasized the importance of "democratic centralism" and insisted that the May Day festivities in 1968 be organized as a show of support for Gomulka's personal leadership.[17] In fact, the celebrations in Warsaw passed without serious incident as a manifestation of party loyalty to Gomulka. Thereafter, the number of meetings and attacks in the mass media subsided to some extent. Yet if Gomulka had managed to limit the flow of extremist criticism (and to take a few countermeasures),[18] he had by no means ended the threat to his position. Nor did the purges come to an end. Among those dismissed in July were Albrecht and Jerzy Sztachelski, the Ministers of Finance and Health respectively.

Symptomatic of the confused state of affairs at this point was a major article by Andrzej Werblan, head of the CC Science and Education Department, which publicly restated the "anti-Zionist" charges of the Lodz party pamplets mentioned earlier, albeit in a more refined and "ideologically sophisticated"

[15] *Ibid.*, April 10 and 13, 1968.

[16] *Polityka* (Warsaw), issues of April 13 and 20, 1968.

[17] *Trybuna Ludu*, April 18, 1968.

[18] *Glos Pracy* (Warsaw), May 9, 1968, demanded of Kazimierz Kakol "a more serious and responsible public expression of opinions."

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form.[19] According to Werblan, there had been a disproportionate number of Jews in the prewar Communist Party of Poland, many of whom were attracted to it not for "class" reasons, but because it had been the only political party opposed to all forms of national discrimination. It was this "cosmopolitan" faction, said Werblan, that exercised a powerful influence after the downfall of Gomulka in 1948, drawing into the party such typical representatives of "petit-bourgeois Jewry" as Professors Brus and Bauman, placing its supporters in the public security organs and the central party apparatus, and in general waging "a struggle against that section of the leadership which created the PWP" [20]—*i.e.*, by implication, "genuine" Poles. In 1956, the members of this group embraced "revisionism" for purely opportunistic reasons, and though some of them were retired from public life, those that remained—especially writers and "those involved in teaching the social sciences"—"started to descend to anti-state activity", finally instigating, along with other "revisionists" and reactionaries", the "March events" in an effort to "sow discord between Poland and the Soviet Union and to drag Poland out of the socialist camp and bring it into the orbit of dependence upon the West." While "any attempt," said Werblan, "to condemn a man for his national origin should be rejected," only a consistent policy aimed at "improving the national ratio" would "eliminate this problem."

Coming from the pen of a radical Partisan antisemite, such an article would be perfectly comprehensible. Yet Werblan's career (he was secretary to Bierut and a Pulawian in 1956) left no doubt that, no matter how unreservedly he seemed to mouth Partisan arguments, he was not a spokesman for Moczar. His purpose, he later stated, was to "counteract emotions" and "raise the level of political discussion." [21] It would appear that, while publicly echoing many of the Partisans' arguments, he was attempting to mitigate their explosive implications for the Gomulka leadership—if not for Poland's small Jewish community.

Paradoxically, Werblan's article may have helped Gomulka to reconsolidate his authority at the Twelfth PUWP Plenum, which he succeeded in postponing until July. At first glance, the Plenum seemed to signal a major Partisan advance, considering that Moczar was elevated to alternate Politburo membership and to the CC Secretariat. Yet Moczar would have been satisfied only with full Politburo status; moreover, his limited promotion was the Partisans' only gain. Nor was the Plenum discussion dominated by Partisan spokesmen. At most, four out of 35 speakers supported the Partisan cause, while the dominant tone was set by Gierek and Kliszko, who stressed the danger of "nationalism" and criticized the excesses, including unjustified charges of "Zionism," that had occurred in the course of the post-March purge. The purge itself, however, was still not at issue. The same approach characterized the draft theses for the Fifth Party Congress issued by the Plenum, indicating that Gomulka had to some extent succeeded in resisting Moczar's challenge.

The Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia further strengthened Gomulka's position, for he was a prime beneficiary of the Soviet leaders' obvious distrust of "nationalism" and of their wish to perpetuate the *status quo* in Eastern Europe. True, after August 21, 1968, the "Zionist" threat was revived in some of the Polish media, and as late as early November, scurrilous antisemitic leaflets attacking Kliszko and Mrs. Gomulka were circulated in Warsaw. Partisan spokesman spread rumors to the effect that, had they been in power, Poland would not have joined in the August 21 invasion. Publicly, however, they immediately endorsed Poland's participation, thereby weakening whatever credibility they had managed to win for themselves as "genuine nationalists." [22]

The Fifth Congress

That Gomulka had succeeded in reconsolidating his authority was confirmed by the Fifth PUWP Congress, held in Warsaw in mid-November. It was on that occasion that Moczar suffered the major and humiliating setback of failing to win a full Politburo seat. To be sure, the hardliners were successful in forcing the demotion of several leaders; yet Moczar was ostentatiously passed over, as Stanislaw Kociolek (First Secretary of Gdansk voivodship), Josef Tejchma (CC Secretary in charge of agriculture), and Wladyslaw Kruczek (First Secre-

[19] "A Contribution to the Genesis of the Conflict," *Miesiecznik Literacki* (Warsaw), June 1968.

[20] The prewar Communist Party was reconstituted in 1942 as the Polish Workers' Party (PWP) and was renamed the Polish United Workers' Party following its absorption of the Socialist Party in 1948.

[21] *Trybuna Ludu*, July 11, 1968.

[22] Kakol on Polish Television, Aug. 27, 1968.

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tary of Rzeszow voivodship) were elevated to the Politburo. The First Secretary of the Poznan voivodship, Jan Szydlak, was promoted to candidate Politburo membership and to the Secretariat, while Stefan Olszowski, head of the CC Press Bureau, also entered the Secretariat. With the possible exception of Olszowski, none of these is a Partisan.

More far-reaching were the changes in the Central Committee. Of the 83 surviving full members, 31 were dropped. The CC was almost completely purged of Communists of Jewish origin (the two apparent survivors being Eugeniusz Szyr and Starewicz), of "liberal" Pulawians, and (with three exceptions) of former Socialists. At the same time, a few notorious Natolinists were dropped, while representation of the voivodship apparat and "worker-activists" was dramatically increased. And, although the CC was appreciably rejuvenated, this occurred not through a mass influx of Partisans but by the inclusion of younger "pragmatists"—*e.g.*, economist Jozef Pajestka (44) and former Deputy Foreign Minister Adam Kruczkowski (38).[23] The major emphasis of the Congress was on "unity": "revisionism" was denounced as the main danger; "Zionism," though it did not go unmentioned, was downplayed, and there was a marked absence of the kind of personal recriminations so characteristic of the spring and summer. Gomulka himself issued a warning against any repetition of "mudslinging" and "character assassination," declaring that it was now the duty of every member, "no matter what his position," to support the Congress line.[24]

Yet Gomulka's successful reconsolidation of power within the PUWP leadership and his adroit manipulation of contending power groups and individuals must not obscure the fact that the First Secretary has in effect facilitated the rise of new countervailing forces in the PUWP. In response to the dissatisfaction in the party apparat, he accepted the devolution of certain powers from the center to the regional party organizations and permitted low-level activists to be represented—at least symbolically—in the top party organ. Belatedly recognizing the Partisans' appeal to ambitious young party members, he sanctioned the emergence of a new grouping of younger "pragmatists" in the party leadership. By so doing—and Moczar's defeat notwithstanding—Gomulka became responsible for what was probably the greatest paradox of the Fifth Congress: the fact that his own reelection to the post of First Secretary marked, in effect, the end of his personal domination of the party, creating new limits on his political power.

The "Anti-revisionist" Onslaught

The year 1968 was a turning point in Poland in another sense, too. The power struggle within the party resulted—at least in the short run—in the imposition of qualitatively more repressive measures against a variety of intellectual groups, with the various contenders for power in the PUWP competing for honors in rabid "anti-revisionism." While a comprehensive examination exceeds the scope of this article, the nature of these measures may briefly be indicated.[25] For months after March 8, the writers who had denounced the party's cultural policy at the February writers' meeting were subjected to vicious abuse in the press (in the case of the literary and music critic Stefan Kisielewski, a beating as well), expelled from the party (if they had not left previously), and subjected to a comprehensive publication ban. The Fifth Congress reaffirmed this censure.

Most vicious of all was Partisan sympathizer Wladyslaw Machejek, who railed against "so-called creative freedom for all" and "ideological compromise in a literary work."[26] Such threats were old hat in Poland; now, however, they were accompanied by deeds. Immediately after the Fifth Congress, the Warsaw Branch of the Writers' Union met to elect delegates to the forthcoming national Writers' Congress. For the first time since 1956, the party organization succeeded in controlling the choice of delegates, and Jerzy Putrament, party secretary of the Warsaw Branch, could boast that none of the writers who had left the party under the "unfurled banner of revisionism" had been elected.[27] At the national congress in Bydgoszcz in February 1969, the Union statute was changed to subordinate the key membership committee to the Main Board, where party direction was most easily exerted, and CC Secretary Olszowski challenged

[23] However, 600 out of about 1700 delegates reportedly voted against the reelection of Szyr, Starewicz, and Jedrychowski—one indication of Partisan support on this issue at the Congress. Nicholas Bethell in *The Times* (London), March 20, 1969.

[24] *Trybuna Ludu*, Nov. 17, 1968.

[25] See Harold Lauen, "Der intellektuelle Aderlass," *Osteuropa* (Stuttgart), March 1969; Karl Hartmann, "Polens geistiges Leben in der Krise," *ibid.*, May-June, 1969.

[26] *Trybuna Ludu*, Nov. 15, 1968.

[27] *Ibid.*, Dec. 14, 1968.

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Polish writers to choose their "side of the barricade." True, a slight degree of restraint was displayed when the Writers' Union stopped short of expelling the dissidents of 1968 and Olszowski proclaimed that "the road back is open to everyone," but the party leadership had effectively suppressed, for the time being, the Writers' Union as the main institutional locus of dissent since 1956.

The Polish cinema, too, underwent a major upheaval after March, being taken to task for financial irregularities, ideological weaknesses, and penetration by Western and especially West German influences (some films had been co-produced with West German companies).[28] The fact that many of Poland's leading film directors were Jews (with long-standing party membership) only "helped" matters, of course. In 1968, most departments of the world-famous Lodz film school were closed, the eight production teams which had dominated the Polish cinema for years were disbanded, and such prominent producers as Alexander Ford and Jerzy Bossak left the country. Jerzy Passendorfer, a producer well known for his Partisan sympathies, moved into the limelight. His film, "On the Road to Berlin," seemed to herald a new "new wave" of ideologically orthodox Polish films emphasizing heroic patriotism. The Polish theater underwent similar changes, with Kazimierz Dejmek (producer of the ill-fated *Dziady*) losing his job as director of the National Theater and Polish plays being subjected to greater ideological control.

Over 100 faculty members lost their posts at Warsaw University after March 1968, and hundreds more were dismissed from other educational institutions; many of these emigrated. Some 15 alleged "ringleaders" of the student demonstrations were sentenced to prison terms ranging from 18 months to three and one-half years. An educational "reform" abolished the traditional autonomy of university departments, established a new university admissions policy favoring politically "reliable" students from worker and peasant families, and increased the number of teaching hours devoted to "ideological education." The Fifth Congress endorsed mandatory manual work for students during vacation periods in order (in Gomulka's words) to strengthen their ties "with the creative endeavors of the working class." It also endorsed the policy of increasing the "mobilizing" role of the youth organizations. The Union of Socialist Youth was urged to model itself on the Stalinist Union of Polish Youth, which disintegrated in 1956, and an attempt was made to make the formerly more apolitical Polish Student Association an instrument of party control.

The campaign against "revisionism" extended to numerous other institutions as well, including research institutes, publishing houses, and the Academy of Sciences, which were not only purged of their leading intellectuals but forced to curtail their relatively autonomous scholarly pursuits and to emphasize such themes as the danger of Western "ideological subversion" and the failings of "bourgeois democracy." The ideological justification for this sweeping transformation of Polish intellectual life was formulated by Gomulka himself prior to the Fifth Congress, when he declared that the party's "leading role" required its active intervention in such fields as the social sciences.[29]

Turning to agriculture, the Fifth Congress confirmed earlier indications that the party leadership was determined to push ahead with its ideologically-conditioned preference for expanding the area of state farms at the expense of private farming, ignoring the opposition of many agricultural experts (who pointed, *inter alia*, to the relative inefficiency of state farms) and the resistance of the peasantry. Only in two areas did the Congress indicate a desire on the part of the party leadership to pursue less negative policies—the economic system and relations with the Church. On the latter issue, the various contenders for power in the PUWP, apparently perceiving the dangers of involving the Polish clergy in the intraparty struggle, were careful to avoid any major attacks on the Church.

In sum, prior to and at the Fifth Congress, the PUWP leadership threatened to abandon the relative restraint which the party had displayed towards ideologically unorthodox individual and group behavior since 1956—a prime characteristic of what had become known as the period of the "small stabilization." Decrying the "naiveté and liberalism" displayed towards dissidents since 1956, the party now threatened to follow up threats with decisive "administrative measures."[30] The Fifth Congress thus portended the end of the "post-October period."

[28] See Ryszard Gontarz in *Prawo i Zycie*, April 7, 1968.

[29] *Trybuna Ludu*, Oct. 22, 1968.

[30] Remarks of Jozef Kepa to the Fifth Congress, *ibid.*, Nov. 13, 1968.

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1969—The Party in Transition

Following the Fifth Congress, some of the Partisans, refusing to accept defeat, attempted to revive the momentum of their spring offensive. According to reliable reports, in early December Partisan spokesman Ryszard Gontarz condemned Kliszko and Starewicz by name and explicitly criticized the Fifth Congress for still engaging in "half-measures." Franciszek Szlachcic, a former deputy to Moczar in the Interior Ministry, was found to have carried out a special "bugging" of the premises of top party officials—a case reminiscent of the Rankovic affair in Yugoslavia. Moczar fell out with his close aide, Colonel Marian Janic, over charges that the latter's wife was of Jewish origin. Taken together, such reports[31] suggested that the Partisans' factional cohesiveness was weakening, that they were losing the adroitness in political infighting they had displayed in the past. Concomitantly, the sense of élan and purpose which had won them much support and sympathy from ambitious young Poles seemed to decline.

Gomulka took direct countermeasures. Esoteric attacks on the Partisans mounted in the press.[32] Several of Moczar's key aides, including Gontarz and Tadeusz Walichnowski (the latter head of the Interior Ministry's "nationalities" section, who drew up lists of people to be purged, and who has authored several explicitly antisemitic books), were ousted from their jobs, while others were subjected to a publishing ban. Yet the counteroffensive was interrupted, and an attempt was made to present Poland and the world with an image of a monolithically unified party. Addressing a Warsaw party conference in early February 1969, Kepa, the Warsaw First Secretary, brazenly dismissed "rumors" of "alleged internal struggles in the party" as the invention of "foreign subversive centers."

The enemy invents the existence of various groups: Partisans, Technocrats, "Young Turks," etc. Various party activists are given labels: antisemites or nationalists, or defenders of revisionists and Zionists.[33]

Kepa was seconded by Gomulka himself, in attendance at the meeting, who denounced the "piffle" concocted by Western media about "Comrade M. Moczar" and ordered the party to "reject completely" such "provocations."[34]

How is one to explain this astonishing spectacle of a ruling Communist leader publicly defending a major rival who had come close to ousting him? In attempting to answer this question, one must remember that Gomulka has always made a particular fetish of party "unity." Only a few weeks after his return to power in 1956, for instance, he appealed to the party to drop factional labels, to judge activists "not by their words of yesterday, but by their work of today."[35] Twelve years later, stung by the frank discussion of the power struggle by Western media, Gomulka sought to resurrect a facade of party unity—not from a position of weakness, as in early 1968, but precisely because he was now in a position of relative strength. Given the (albeit qualified) reconsolidation of his authority at the Fifth Congress and his countermeasures against Moczar's aides, Gomulka apparently judged that the Partisans' challenge had been effectively disposed of, and (especially given Moczar's rumored self-criticism at this point) that his interest would be better served by retaining Moczar in a visible position in the top leadership—*i.e.*, by isolating him rather than launching a comprehensive purge likely further to disrupt the party and to rekindle support for Moczar within the *apparat*.[36]

Thus in 1969, Moczar almost seemed to be on display, representing the PUWP at the Danish Communist Party Congress and attending a Soviet Embassy reception in February, joining the rest of the top leadership to welcome the new Czechoslovak Party leader, Husak, on his first visit to Poland in May, and being elevated to the largely ceremonial Council of State in June. Surprisingly, he apparently continued to be responsible for the security apparatus at the Secretariat level, which implied that Gomulka had succeeded in neutralizing Moczar's *Hausmacht* in the Ministry of the Interior, while retaining effective supervision over security matters at the Politburo level. By the same token, although Moczar was reelected Chairman of the Main Board of ZBoWiD at the organization's

[31] Reflected in Leon Szulczynski's articles in *Kultura* (Paris), March 1969, and *Die Zeit* (Hamburg), April 18, 1969.

[32] *E.g.*, Starewicz's barb, at the Opole voivodship conference, at "people who think in the categories of the past and who live only on the memory of past achievements" (Radio Warsaw, Jan. 25, 1969).

[33] *Trybuna Ludu*, Feb. 8, 1969.

[34] *Ibid.*, Feb. 14, 1969.

[35] Wladyslaw Gomulka, *Przemowienia, 1956-1957* (Warsaw, 1957), p. 73.

[36] This to the obvious disgust of *Polityka* (March 8, 1969), which esoterically protested, with reference to "the cynical supporters of General Sukarno . . . , against solving conflicts according to the principle that 'the truth lies in the middle' . . . , [which is a] thoughtless method of ending showdowns and quarrels."

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Fourth Congress in September, there were several indications that his hold over ZBoWiD had weakened. Enemies of the Partisans, such as Albrecht and Szyr, were included in its Supreme Council Presidium, and Cyrankiewicz administered an implicit rebuke as he warned ZBoWiD of the need to distinguish "rational patriotism" from "nationalism." [37] Moczar engaged in a limited *mea culpa*, praising Gomulka before the Congress and pledging there that ZBoWiD would preserve friendship with the USSR "as the apple of our eye." [38]

As of this writing, the evidence is that Golmuka has contained and quite likely defeated the Partisans' bid for power. Given the strength and persistence that the Partisans have demonstrated since the early 1960's, it would probably be ill-advised to think that they have abandoned their dreams of power. It seems clear, however, that as a result of the events of 1968-1969, their crude attempts to exploit xenophobia and social and economic grievances are no longer so effective.

The Young Pragmatists

At the same time, the battlefronts of the past several years—especially the polarization between Gomulka's supporters and the Partisans—crumbled with the emergence in the PUWP leadership of a dynamic new political force. In 1969, the ambitious young "pragmatists," demanding repayment of the political debt Gomulka incurred to them for their support in his struggle against the Partisans, began to move ahead on their own. They include Kociolek, Tejchma, Olszowski, Szydlak, and Boleslaw Jaszczuk (the latter rose rapidly in 1969 to assume undisputed control over economic affairs, while the political fortunes of Edward Gierek, prior to 1968 the acknowledged leader of the "technocrats," markedly declined). At a lower level, the grouping includes such "experts" as the new deputy heads of the planning commission, Josef Pajestka and Witold Trampczynski; the new head of the Institute of International Affairs, Ryszard Frelek; and German expert Ryszard Wojna. It is important to distinguish clearly between this grouping of "pragmatists" and the Partisan faction. As the Partisans' élan faded, the "pragmatists" began to win over many younger Partisan supporters, the young *apparatchiki* and technical intelligentsia who had counted on having "a path upward to the threshold of power cleared for them by the sharp elbows of the militant faction." [39] Their loss to the Partisans is, of course, another important reason why Moczar's future prospects seem bleak. While some overlap between the two groups still exists, the "pragmatists" exclude members of the Partisan hard core —the ex-guerrilla secret policemen—and are headed on the whole by individuals never identified with the Partisans in the past.

Thus far, it is difficult to discern the precise political coloration of the younger *apparatchiki* and technocrats. In contrast to Gomulka's do-nothingness and the Partisans' know-nothingness in the economic sphere, for example, they have reportedly advocated economic reform on the Hungarian, not the East German model. In contrast to Gomulka's slavishly pro-Soviet "internationalism" and the Partisans' chauvinistic, inward-looking "patriotism," they seem to advocate a more nationally self-assertive foreign policy which would have similarities with (although not go as far as) Romania's. There have been inconclusive indications that they recognize the Catholic Church as a legitimate national institution with which the party would finally have to come to terms. On the other hand, they seem to endorse the harsh measures applied in the cultural and educational fields in 1968 and 1969.

However speculative the above may be, in 1969 the PUWP did decide on important policy changes, including a new attempt to reform the economic mechanism; a somewhat more Polish-centered and realistic approach to the German question (*i.e.*, an emphasis on the Oder-Neisse issue, which in the past had been subordinated to demands for recognition of the GDR) [40]; and a less hostile approach to the dissident Romanian Party. There were indications that a more conciliatory posture towards the Church might also be emerging.[41] It is difficult to account completely for these policy shifts—so soon after the turmoil of 1968—without postulating the influence of a new political force, the younger apparachiki and technocrats, limiting Gomulka's power in PUWP leadership councils.

[37] *Trybuna Ludu*, Sept. 20, 1969.
[38] *Ibid.*; and *Perspektywy* (Warsaw), Sept. 12, 1969.

[39] Hansjakob Stehle, "Polish Communism," in William E. Griffith, Ed., *Communism in Europe*, Vol. I, (Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press, 1964), p. 138.
[40] See A. Ross Johnson, "A New Phase in Polish-West German Relations," *Radio Free Europe Research*, June 20, July 3, and Aug. 14, 1969.
[41] See Andrzej Tokarczyk's article in *Glos Pracy*, May 22, 1969, emphasizing the community of interest of "believers and non-believers in Poland"; and *Perspektywy*, Sept. 12, 1969, indicating that a Papal visit to Poland might now be possible.

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End of an Era?

The emergence of a new leadership stratum raises at least the possibility that the "Gomulka era" may have come to an end, and that a new era dominated by a rationalizing, modernizing, "national Communist" elite having many traits in common with the Ceausescu leadership in Rumania may be in the offing. Yet several caveats are in order. It is unlikely that the younger "pragmatists" will succeed when all other Polish Communist leaders have failed to unify a historically faction-ridden party. Gomulka may yet outmaneuver the "pragmatists," rather than vice versa; an unexpected crisis in the near future may give Moczar another chance; the regional party apparat may further increase its influence; and new forces, too, may emerge. Even assuming the dominance of the "pragmatists" within the PUWP in the coming years, their prospects can only be appraised when their policies are more clearly defined. In espousing what appears to be a more genuine "national" communism than that pretended to by Moczar, and in offering a concrete program of economic modernization, the "pragmatists" stand to win greater legitimacy in the eyes of the people than any other element of the Communist Party since 1956.

If, however, they should attempt to continue the repressive measures of 1968, especially in the cultural and educational spheres—if they try to "mobilize" society "from above", as in Romania—then the chances of their establishing a viable political system would seem poor indeed. Poland's cohesive, articulate, culturally Western intellectual elite was weakened in 1968 but hardly destroyed. Given this elite, as well as the alienated youth, the entrenched private peasantry, and the unique, dynamic, ultimately political alternative to the party represented by the Church, any attempt by the "pragmatists" to carry out the ideological reconstruction of society is likely to fail; in the long run, it would raise the specter of mass upheaval. The party—and the country—have weathered the cataclysm of 1968-69; whether they can survive a potentially even more tempestuous convulsion remains to be seen.

The Polish Economy in Transition

By Michael Gamarnikow

During the thirteen years of Wladyslaw Gomulka's leadership, the Polish ruling elite has acquired the unfortunate habit of treating economic reform as a political football in its perennial factional infighting. The blame for this must be shared equally by the various brands of hardliners, by technocrats, by middle-of-the-roaders, and by quasi-liberals. Gomulka himself is, of course, the principal culprit. His ambivalent and often opportunistic style of leadership is primarily responsible for the fact that Poland, once the outstanding pioneer in the field of economic reform, must now be counted among the most persistent laggards.

The first and most comprehensive version of a new Polish economic model, as evolved during the early post-October (1956) period, never had much of a chance to progress beyond the stage of a

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coherent theoretical blueprint. The main mistake committed by the economic reformers in the 1956-57 period was that they wanted to achieve too much too soon.[1] The time was not yet ripe for implementing pragmatic reforms on such a scale. The other countries of the Soviet bloc, including those which later introduced economic reforms much along the lines advocated in Poland in the mid-1950's, regarded the 1956-57 blueprint as the epitome of ideological revisionism. Indeed, strong pressure was put on the Gomulka regime by those countries to stop playing with fire.[2]

This hostile outside pressure was, however, only one of the factors preventing practical implementation of the new economic model. Far more decisive was the active resistance of the dogmatic forces within the party and state establishment.

By late 1959, the dogmatists' counteroffensive had achieved most of its objectives. The Economic Council—a body of experts created for the express purpose of working out the theoretical principles of the new economic model—had become moribund in mid-1959, although it was not formally dissolved until the end of 1962. The changes in the organizational structure of industry had been effectively countered by the strengthening of centralized control, with its profusion of operational directives. The proposed reform of wages and prices, due to be implemented in 1958, had been abandoned entirely. Workers' Councils, which were originally intended to co-manage the independent enterprises, had been shorn of their essential prerogatives granted in the pertinent 1956 legislation.[3] At the same time, the concept of a Yugoslav-type workers' self-management system (a prominent feature of the 1956-57 version of the Polish economic model) was formally disowned.[4]

More significant still was the remarkable political comeback of unrepentant dogmatists and hardliners. By mid-1959 all members of the ruling elite who were genuinely associated with the October program of political and economic reforms had been ousted from positions of power and, in many cases, sent into political oblivion. This had resulted in a meaningful shift in the balance of power within the party leadership. Three notorious hardliners had been appointed to top economic positions, and shortly afterward the powers of central planners had been greatly strengthened.[5] For all practical purposes, this ended the first phase of economic reform in Poland.

The return to a monocentric economic system brought about serious economic difficulties, which reached their climax in the winter of 1962-63. Consequently, in the fall of 1963, the ruling elite again began to look more critically at the arbitrary methods of planning and management and to take a renewed interest in economic reform. In March 1964, the party leaders, preparing for their Fourth Congress in June, published a set of theses outlining, among other steps, concrete measures intended to reactivate some aspects of the new economic model. Although a number of these proposals were subsequently watered down in the final text of the Fourth Congress resolution, the bulk of them survived. A program of economic reforms based on this truncated blueprint was eventually given the approval of the Central Committee Plenum held in July 1965.[6]

The Politics of Economic Reform

Thus, after an interval of nearly six years, economic pragmatism again became official policy. But the political situation was entirely different from that which had prevailed in the early post-October 1956 period. In 1956-57, the quasi-liberal faction favorable to economic reform had held the levers of power and—equally important—had controlled the information media, which it used extensively to promote its pragmatic concepts of "socialism." In contrast, the 1964-65 version of the reform blueprint was devised and sponsored by the middle-of-the-road apparatchiks, not as an article of faith but under the pressure of economic necessity. The protagonists of the 1956-57 economic model had been genuinely convinced that the orthodox, centralized system of planning and management had

[1] The scope of this article does not permit an extensive description of the 1956-57 version of the Polish economic model. For more details, see M. Gamarnikow, *Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe*, Chapter II, "Poland: The Frustrated Pioneer", Detroit, Wayne State University Press, 1968.

[2] W. Brus, "Some General Remarks on the Changes in the System of Planning and Management," *Gospodarka Planowa* (Warsaw), November 1966, p. 11.

[3] "Draft of the Decree to be issued by the Polish Council of Ministers about the Organization and Prerogatives of the Workers' Councils," *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), Nov. 1, 1956. See also M. Kalecki, "Workers' Councils and Central Planning," *Nowe Drogi* (Warsaw), December 1956.

[4] "Draft of a Bill on Workers' Self-Government," *Trybuna Ludu*, October 11, 1958.

[5] A. R., "Increased Tasks and Prerogatives of the Planning Commission," *Trybuna Ludu*, Jan. 5, 1960.

[6] For the full scope of this second version of the reform blueprint, see M. Gamarnikow, "Economic Reform in Poland," *East Europe* (New York), July 1965.

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outlived its usefulness; the hestitant promoters of the 1964-65 edition of economic reforms were not so certain. Besides, they feared and distrusted any structural and operational change which might weaken their control over the economy and deprive the party establishment of its "leading role" in economic affairs.

Yet, despite its limitations, the 1964-65 blueprint did have a long-term potential. The proposed changes in the methods of planning and management (however inadequate) were a step in the right direction. They could well serve as a starting point for developing a broader and more cohesive program of economic reform, given the political will to put such a program into effect.

But even this emasculated version of economic reform was unacceptable to the powerful pressure groups of dogmatic ultras, political hardliners and entrenched bureaucrats. They fought against approval of the reform blueprint every inch of the way, playing skillfully on the apprehensions and reservations of Gomulka and his close associates. And when the watered-down version of the pre-congress theses finally became an integral part of the official party program, the dogmatists and hardliners reverted to their favorite tactics of procrastination, deliberate inaction, and other forms of bureaucratic sabotage. These tactics proved so effective that the proposed economic reforms remained only on paper. *Zycie Gospodarcze*, the organ of the economic reformers, complained bitterly that, although two years had passed since final approval of the new methods of planning and management by the Central Committee Plenum, the implementation of the reforms on various levels of administration left much to be desired.[7]

Even as this criticism appeared in *Zycie Gospodarcze*, the dogmatists and the hardliners were readying a massive counteroffensive against the economic reforms. As usual, however, neither the new model nor the economic reformers were the real targets of this onslaught. The carefully prepared attacks on the economic reforms and their protagonists were meant only to serve as means towards a more ambitious end—the conquest of supreme political power. The economic reformers were simply chosen as the initial objective because so many of them happened to be of Jewish origin.

Incomprehensible as it might seem, the event that made the Polish economic reformers (and through guilt by association, their reform program) especially vulnerable to an ideological onslaught by the hardliners was the Arab-Israeli war in June 1967. Anti-semitism became a political weapon in the intraparty struggle for power. First directed against some small fry in the mass communications media, it began to be exploited for all it was worth after the student revolt of March 1968 shook the foundations of Gomulka's regime. Political dissent was attributed to a "Zionist plot" directed against People's Poland.

Prominent economic reformers, such as Prof. Wlodzimierz Brus, were among the earliest victims, being denounced not only as "Zionist agents" but as "the principal carriers of the deadly bacilli of economic revisionism." [8] The hardliners and their allies hounded the leading reformers out of their jobs, out of public life, and even out of the country.[9]

The New Model Under Fire

The time was propitious for mounting an all-out attack on the theory and practice of the new economic model. There was a spate of pseudo-scientific articles castigating a number of prominent economists and their "revisionist" ideas. The technique was invariably the same: gross exaggeration of the political threat involved in the reforms, insinuations, and ideological denunciations. Thus, in one keynote article, the pragmatic reformers were accused of advocating an economic system in which "the real power will pass into the hands of a narrow group of economic experts, [while] . . . the leading role of the party would be reduced to a minimum." [10]

This campaign of denunciation and abuse continued for several months. The fact that most of the attacks were published in *Trybuna Ludu*, the central organ of the Communist Party, gave them the stamp of official authority. But the onslaught was weakened somewhat by the obvious unwillingness of reputable economists and political theoreticians to participate in it. Left to themselves, the third-rate scholars mobilized by the Partisans and their hardline allies soon ran out of arguments,

[7] J. Glowczyk, "The Reform and Men," *Zycie Gospodarcze* (Warsaw), July 30, 1967.

[8] W. Iskra, "Ideological Backbone of the Economy," *Trybuna Ludu*, April 23, 1967.

[9] For instance, Professor Brus lost his job in April 1968, became "an unperson," and was forced to leave Poland in October 1968.

[10] M. Krajewski, "Socialist Democracy and Market Socialism," *Trybuna Ludu*, March 29, 1968.

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and slowly but inexorably the anti-reform campaign began to lose momentum.

This gave the more serious, middle-of-the-road economists a chance to argue cautiously for a pragmatic approach to economic problems. A typical example was an article by Mieczslaw Mieszczankowski.[11] The author paid lip service to the neo-dogmatic party line by condemning "revisionism" in economic thinking (although in restrained terms), but the main thrust of his article was directed against "leftist revisionists," who were sharply criticized for their attempts "to eliminate or restrict such useful tools of economic analysis as the law of value, the profit motive, material incentives, or cost-accounting methods."

There were two reasons why the conservative assault on the economic reformers and their pragmatic solutions came to an end. First, there was a definite shift in the political balance of power within the party; second, there was a rapid deterioration of the economy. The combined effect of both factors was to make the ruling elite once more amenable to a fresh dose of economic pragmatism.

While the power struggle at the top might have ended in a virtual stalemate, at the lower echelons it created many opportunities for rapid promotion. The purge of alleged "Zionists," "revisionists," "leftist opportunists," "rightist opportunists" and other victims of the post-March witch-hunt created numerous vacancies in the apparatus. Moreover, Gomulka wanted to refute the Partisan charge that he was surrounded by "tired old men." The net effect has been that since March 1968 many men in their late thirties and early forties have advanced to positions where they can exert substantial influence.

In political terms, these new entrants into the power structure can hardly be classified as "liberals," or even as "progressives." But they are far less dogmatic than their predecessors, much better educated, and much more conscious of Poland's complex economic problems. They include a number of economic, agricultural and financial experts. Thus, the shift created a more favorable political climate for the approval of yet another program of economic reform, provided that it could be contained within the limits of ideological orthodoxy while at the same time promoting greater productive efficiency.

[11] M. Mieszczankowski, "Ideological Problems of the Economy," *Zycie Gospodarcze*, June 9, 1968.

Crisis in the Economy

The urgent need for working out such a program was underscored by the economic situation. The period of centralist restoration had resulted in the usual mismanagement of national resources. By the second half of 1968, the economy was in the throes of yet another of its periodic crises. The symptoms were painfully familiar: huge overinvestment of scarce capital goods, leaving many unfinished projects; investment projects whose original cost estimates were grossly exceeded; overemployment; low labor productivity; and a monumental disparity between the product mix of industrial output and effective industrial and consumer demand.[12]

The biggest headache was overspending on investments. The Five-Year Plan (1966-70) had provided originally for an expenditure of 840 billion zloty for investment purposes, of which 40 billion zloty were to be kept in reserve to meet unforeseen contingencies. By 1969, however, that reserve was already exhausted, and an additional sum of 60 billion zloty had to be found (obviously at the expense of the consumption fund) to cover the rising costs of new construction projects. Even so, only a limited number of "selected" investments were to be completed by the end of 1970. Construction work on the remainder was to be "frozen" or "temporarily suspended."

Elsewhere, too, the return to command methods of planning and management played havoc with the original Five-Year-Plan targets and estimates. Ever since 1966, employment limits had been systematically exceeded. By the end of 1968, employment outside agriculture had already reached a level of 9.4 million workers,[13] as against the planned target of 9.7 million scheduled for the end of 1970.[14] Such substantial overemployment not only tended to reduce labor productivity, but resulted in a huge, above-plan expansion of the wage fund, *i.e.*, the total earnings of those employed in the socialized sector. All these factors, combined with the inflationary impact of the over-long investment cycles,

[12] All these ills of the Polish economy were explicitly enumerated in the report of the Central Committee presented at the Fifth Party Congress, *Nowe Drogi*, December 1968, pp. 7-11.

[13] *Biuletyn Statystyczny* (Warsaw), No. 3, Table 5, p. 8. The 1966-1970 plan was based on the assumption that employment would grow at an annual rate of about 300,000.

[14] Cited in an unsigned editorial, "The Program of Universal Development of Our Country," *Nowe Drogi*, December 1966, pp. 6-7.

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created severe pressures on the scarce supplies of consumer goods.[15]

Faced with such irrefutable evidence of the inherent inadequacies of a command economy, the ruling elite decided that the traditional extensive methods of promoting economic growth ought to be discarded in favor of intensive ones. This basic decision, apparently adopted prior to the Fifth Party Congress held in November 1968, was officially set forth at that gathering by Gomulka and other speakers. Regime spokesmen pointed out, however, that it was obviously too late to introduce any substantive changes during the remaining period of the current Five-Year Plan. Therefore, the new system was to become fully operative only in January 1971, with the years 1969-70 to be treated as a transitory period in which the main economic task would be "to create appropriate conditions for the reconstruction of the national economy in the next five-year term." [16] The Congress resolution devoted considerable space to proposed changes in the system of planning and management. Although its provisions were couched in very general terms, they could be regarded as a mandate of sorts for elaborating a more cohesive program of economic reform.

After the official endorsement of the new policy by the Fifth Congress, the Young Turks within the party establishment managed to consolidate their positions in two important sectors. They took over all the top command posts in the economic superstructure, and they initiated a reform-oriented ideological discussion in the mass communications media to popularize their pragmatic ideas. The direction of economic affairs was taken over by a new team of younger technocrats and experts, supervised at the Politburo level by a former member of the post-1956 Economic Council, Boleslaw Jaszczuk. The takeover was later supplemented by more changes at the ministerial level, including the key chairmanship of the Polish National Bank.

Moving Toward Reform

At the same time, the party faithful and the economic apparatchiks were being reindoctrinated to condition them for the forthcoming ideological rehabilitation of the market mechanism, the profit motive and other instruments of economic pragmatism. The stage for this had already been set shortly before the Fifth Party Congress, when a prominent economic reformer, Dr. Stefan Kurowski (an erstwhile victim of vicious attacks by the ultras), was allowed to publish a series of three articles in *Zycie Warszawy*, in which he discussed at length the potentialities for applying the market mechanism in a Communist type of planned economy.[17]

The new ideological formula was summarized succinctly by Bohan Glinski, another economic reformer:

A great majority of economists in all the socialist countrists agree that, at the present stage of the development of socialist economies, the mutual relationship between the plan and the market has changed. According to the new prevailing trend of thought, these two basic concepts, instead of being opposed to one another, are, in fact, complementary.[18]

This was precisely the basic idea which had permeated Professor Brus' reformist theories, as set forth in his 1961 book on the use of the market mechanism in economic planning.[19] But the new forces in the post-Congress power structure were not really interested in the rehabilitation of Brus and the other victims of the 1968 anti-reformist witch-hunt. Their purpose was to establish the ideological legitimacy of their own pragmatic concepts.

The next logical step was to define more precisely the extent and direction of the proposed changes in the methodology of planning. As already indicated, the mandate obtained at the Fifth Congress by the protagonists of the new economic system was somewhat shaky and inconclusive. Thus, it was advisable, from the political point of view, to spell out at least the broad outlines of the proposed changes in the technique of planning and management and to give them the official seal of approval. This preliminary step was duly taken at the plenary meeting of the newly-elected Central Committee in early 1969.

It should be emphasized that the main purpose of the April 1969 Plenum was political, not eco-

[15] G. Pisarski, "The Achievements and the Difficulties of a Dynamic Growth," *Zycie Gospodarcze*, Dec. 22-29, 1968.
[16] "Resolution of the Fifth Congress," *Trybuna Ludu*, Nov. 21, 1968.
[17] S. Kurowski, "The Problems of the Plan and of the Market," *Zycie Warszawy*, Oct. 2, 3, and 5, 1968.
[18] B. Glinski, "The Role of the Market in a Planned Economy," *Gospodarka Planowa*, December 1968.
[19] W. Brus, *General Questions Concerning the Functioning of Socialist Economy*, Warsaw, State Scientific Publications [PWN], 1961.

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nomic. Hence no detailed blueprint of economic reform was presented at this meeting, and no approval was sought for a concrete program of economic reforms. In fact, there is every indication that no such cohesive program has been worked out even yet, although some meaningful changes in the methodology of planning and principles of management have already been agreed upon and officially announced. For instance, some of the main features of the new economic system were discussed at length in an authoritative article published in *Zycie Gospodarcze* under the signature of Jaszczuk himself.[20] Other measures were described in the official documents of the April Plenum,[21] or were proclaimed in other official statements. Thus, despite the fact that all the proposed changes have not as yet been correlated into a coherent whole and put together in a single official document, it is still possible to piece together a fairly accurate outline of the new economic system as it is likely to emerge in the early 1970's.

The New Economic Pattern

It is already quite certain, for instance, that the new system will be based on a qualitatively changed methodology of planning. Under the traditional monocentric system, a detailed version of the national plan was worked out by the central planners. The main indicators of this plan were then passed down the chain of economic command in the form of mandatory directives. Thus, the central planners prepared detailed plans for the individual ministries; each ministry did the same thing for its subordinate industrial associations (*zjednoczenia*); and the associations divided the work among the individual enterprises. It was a typical staff-and-line organizational pattern, giving no scope whatsoever for initiative and entrepreneurship at the lower levels of the industrial administration.

Under the new system, this traditional *modus operandi* is to be completely reversed. As Gomulka put it at the Second Plenum: "From now on, the plan will be built from the bottom upward, from the enterprises, through the associations and ministries, to the Planning Commission."[22] In more sophisticated terms, one could say that the new planning technique is intended to strike a balance between the principle of self-determination of production tasks at the enterprise level and the basic needs of the national economy as predetermined by the ruling elite. Thus, in contrast to the old monocentric system, individual enterprises will be given a real chance to work out their own production plans instead of being told what to produce by higher echelons. True, the plans must still be approved by the superior organs in the chain of economic command, but enterprise directors will have not only the right but the duty to propose their own production targets, and they can also argue the advantages of their own version of the plan instead of simply accepting mandatory directives "from above."

Jaszczuk, in his *Zycie Gospodarcze* article, explained the new methodology of planning in greater detail. The whole process of working out a draft Five-Year Plan will begin in the Planning Commission, which will prepare a long-term economic prognosis covering the period in question. This prognosis, according to Jaszczuk, should not only indicate the probable trends of development in the national economy, but must also contain reliable estimates of future market requirements (in both the industrial and consumer sectors), as well as the total volume of resources available. This document is then to be handed down the chain of economic command until it reaches the individual enterprises, where the actual work of preparing the draft of the national plan is supposed to begin.

The management of each enterprise, as well as the appropriate organs of workers' self-management, must study the long-term prognosis carefully and relate it to their own production potentialities. On this basis, every enterprise is supposed to work out its own production plan (or, better still, several alternative versions of it). These plans are then to be sent to the appropriate industrial association for scrutiny and approval. At this stage the proposed production tasks are to be checked by competent officials of the association to test their conformity with the main indicators and basic guidelines of the long-term estimates (notably with respect to growth of employment, increase in labor productivity, planned investment expenditure,

[20] B. Jaszczuk, "The Policy of Intensive Development," *Zycie Gospodarcze*, June 1, 1969.

[21] Politburo report to the Second Plenum of the Central Committee; Jaszczuk's and Gomulka's speeches delivered at the Plenum, and the Resolution of the Plenum, *Nowe Drogi*, May 1969.

[22] Gomulka's concluding speech at the Second Plenum, *Trybuna Ludu*, April 9, 1969.

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etc.).[23] Objections raised by the association have to be discussed with the management of the enterprise concerned and an acceptable solution found.

After all such differences have been settled, the production targets of individual enterprises are supposed to be integrated into one comprehensive plan for each branch of industry. These plans must, in turn, be presented to the appropriate ministries, where a similar coordination procedure is foreseen. Finally, the ministries are to forward the finished product to the Planning Commission, where the plans will again be checked against the long-term estimates and will then be used as the basis for preparing the National Economic Plan. After formal approval by the Council of Ministers and parliament, the plan becomes a binding legal document.

Planning Commission's New Role

Perhaps the most telling symbol of this breach with the old monocentric system is the qualitative change in the status of the Planning Commission. Under the traditional system, the central planners played a pivotal role not only in the process of planning but also in the operative management of the economy. They were not only the taskmasters who determined the production targets at all levels of the industrial structure, but also the supreme controllers of day-to-day performance. In short, the central planners used to run the whole economy. But within the operational framework of the new Polish system, they have been assigned a different and more peripheral role. They are to be relieved of all responsibility for operative management, which would devolve on the ministries, the industrial associations, and the enterprises. Moreover, they are not supposed to participate actively (and certainly not decisively) in the actual process of setting up the production targets of the national plan. Their main task will be to prepare long-term economic forecasts and predict future trends of economic and technological development.[24] Thus they are to be no longer the masters of the economy but rather its servants.

It is by no means certain, however, whether the new planning techniques will in fact work efficiently in the complex world of nationalized industry with its multitude of vested interests and time-honored practices. Indeed, the first trial of the new method in the course of preparatory work on the 1970 economic plan has run into serious trouble.[25] But even if one assumes that these initial difficulties can be straightened out, there still remains the crucial problem of establishing the basic criteria by which the merits and drawbacks of alternative versions of a given production plan can be objectively assessed. Under the old system this problem simply did not arise because the central planners acted as supreme arbiters. Now, however, more objective criteria than the planners' say-so or arbitrary directives by higher echelons are required. This, indeed, is the essential weakness of the new economic system, at least at the present stage. How to decide that one product mix is preferable to another? How to reckon the expected profitability of each line of production, and how to compare their estimated cost? What criteria should be used to measure the economic efficiency of a given enterprise? All these questions still await authoritative and unequivocal answers.

True, some tentative suggestions for such criteria have already been made. Professor J. Pajestka, generally considered the braintruster of the Jaszczuk team, clearly favors the use of a "controlled" market mechanism. "Our reforms," he asserted in one of his articles, "do not envisage a free and uncontrolled action of the market, but a conscious utilization of the market mechanism in order to better adopt production to our needs." This "conscious utilization," explained Pajestka, involves a deliberate use of price and financial controls to preserve market equilibrium.[26] But Jaszczuk, in his authoritative *Zycie Gospodarcze* article, emphatically advocated input-output analysis as the proper method of assessing profitability and industrial efficiency.[27] One can say therefore that, while the new economic leadership does seem to favor the use of more objective (and empirical) criteria for assessing economic performance, the actual methods of choosing between available alternatives have not yet been finally agreed upon.

[23] Prime Minister Jozef Cyrankiewicz's talk at a special seminar for higher officials of the economic apparatus, *Trybuna Ludu*, May 15, 1969.

[24] "Intensification of Production is the Only Way to Increase Social Wealth" (Jaszczuk's speech at the budget session of parliament), *Trybuna Ludu*, Dec. 22, 1968.

[25] "Letter of the Central Committee Secretariat of the PUWP about the Implementation of the Resolutions of the Second Plenum," *Trybuna Ludu*, Sept. 16, 1969.

[26] J. Pajestka, "Adapting Production Relations to the Dynamic Progress of Productive Forces," *Ekonomista* (Warsaw), January-February 1969.

[27] B. Jaszczuk, *loc. cit.* (footnote 20).

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Problems of Implementation

Indeed, as far as the future *modus operandi* of the new economic model is concerned, there are still quite a few open questions and unknown quantities concerning the practical implementation of accepted principles. The methods of investment financing have already been clearly defined. Thus, we know that the old practice of free investment grants is to be replaced by a system of interest-bearing credits, administered and supervised through the banking network. A standard three-percent rate of interest is to be charged on all investment credits, supplemented by a complicated system of bonuses and penalties depending on the length of the construction cycle and original cost estimates.[28]

But it is still unclear by whom—and on what basis—actual choices will be made between competing claims for the allocation of investment funds. It has been indicated that the decisive factor in making such choices will be the comparative effectiveness of investment outlays. But no one has explained how this comparative effectiveness is to be objectively measured, and by what standards. Nor do we know whether such tests would also be applied in the case of so-called "central investments," *i.e.*, construction projects which are, as a rule, politically (or ideologically) motivated.

In short, the blueprint of the new economic system is not yet complete. And this is by no means the main problem. There is still a lot of time left before the new model is supposed to become fully operative in January 1971. The pertinent decisions could still be made, the ambiguities clarified, the gaps closed, and appropriate instructions distributed to all levels of the economic structure. Hence, the really crucial issue is not whether a workable and pragmatic blueprint can be completed in time, but whether the ruling elite will muster the necessary political will to implement such a program of economic reforms without resorting to its traditional tactics of substituting half-measures and compromise solutions for the real thing.

No doubt, there are some powerful groups in Poland that do intend to push the reforms through. But the odds they are likely to face are considerable. At the moment, the protagonists of the new system seem to have the full support of Gomulka and his close associates, but Gomulka's record as a consistent advocate of economic reforms is notoriously bad. Twice before, in 1958-59 and again in 1967-68, he caved in on this issue under the heavy pressure of conservative elements and various vested interests. Because of his lack of comprehension of economic problems, Gomulka seems to be always ready to sacrifice rational economic reforms on the altar of "party unity," a particular fetish of his. Such an attitude, needless to say, greatly strengthens the hand of the dogmatists and hardliners who, despite the setbacks they suffered at the Fifth Congress, still remain a very powerful force.

Apart from the conservative opponents of economic pragmatism, the Polish reformers also face strong opposition from assorted vested interests bent on preserving the old system—that is to say, their own power, their jobs, and their privileges. Indeed, the entrenched bureaucrats have already resorted to their favorite tactics of sabotage in order to show that the new system will not work.[29] The only answer to such tactics is ruthless personnel changes at all levels of the economic superstructure. But can Gomulka be persuaded to sanction mass dismissals of obstinate bureaucrats and incompetent political appointees whom he regards as stalwart defenders of the party's leading role in economic affairs?

Thus, no one can deny that the Polish reform program faces considerable odds. But it is also a fact of life that implementation of the new methods of planning and management is virtually a "to be or not to be" question as far as the future development of the Polish economy is concerned. The only alternative to really meaningful change would be another dose of "little stabilization," followed by another major economic breakdown. The balance in the power structure is gradually shifting in favor of a younger generation of better-educated and pragmatically-inclined party apparatchiks. Herein, perhaps, lies the best hope for a genuine qualitative change in the Polish economic system.

[28] S. Majewski, "Changes in the Methods of Investment Financing," *Gospodarka Planowa*, August 1969.

[29] Radio Warsaw, Sept. 24, 1969.

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Progress in Hungary

By Harry G. Shaffer

Of all the Warsaw Pact nations which participated in the military intervention in Czechoslovakia on August 21, 1968, none was more reluctant than Hungary—for that little country had just started the implementation of economic reforms very similar to and in some respects more extensive than those being introduced in Prague. Now, nearly one and a half years later, Dubcek is out, his reform program has been suppressed, and the Brezhnev doctrine of "limited sovereignty" has been firmly imposed on Czechoslovakia. Yet the Hungarians appear determined to adhere to their charted course of extensive economic reforms—and the Soviets have done nothing to interfere; indeed they have even paid some lip service to Hungary's market-oriented road to socialism.

To convey the importance of the Hungarian reforms, and also to help explain the respective postures of Budapest and Moscow, it may be useful to examine Hungary's two decades of economic experience with centralized planning, the conditions in the mid-1960's that prompted the so-called "new economic mechanism," the content and impact of the reforms themselves, and finally—the nature of Hungary's relationship with and attitude towards the Soviet Union.

During the early post-World War II period, the Hungarian economic system, like that of all the other Communist countries of East Europe, was an almost exact replica of the prevailing Stalinist model. The central planning authorities prepared aggregate plans for each branch of industry, and the central ministries then worked out detailed plans for each enterprise. Decision-making at the enterprise level was reduced to a minimum, since higher echelons in the planning and administrative apparatus not only prescribed quantitative output, assortment, and delivery dates, but also assigned purchasers, set wage rates, decided upon the number and types of workers, allocated machinery and raw materials, fixed prices for both inputs and outputs, etc. While plans were mapped out in financial (monetary) terms, as well as in physical units, the former were generally adjusted to the latter, and the fulfillment and overfulfillment of the physical output quota was the principal basis for incentive rewards at the enterprise level.

Since, two decades ago, Hungary was predominantly an agricultural country in which relatively few economic decisions had to be made, since the leadership was willing to sacrifice other economic objectives in order to concentrate on rapid reconstruction and industrialization, and since there existed adequate opportunities for achieving growth by expanding the industrial labor force rather than enhancing productive efficiency (*extensive* rather than *intensive* growth), Hungary was able within a relatively short period to attain respectable economic results under a system of detailed command planning from the center. Yet today, many leading Hungarian economists and planners are the first to admit that central planners did not necessarily always make the wisest decisions, and that in any case centralization was carried too far in Hungary. For instance Istvan Friss—head of the Economic Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, member of the HSWP (Hungarian Socialist Work-

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Associate Professor of Economics at the University of Kansas (Lawrence), Mr. Shaffer's books include The Communist World: Marxist and Non-Marxist Views *(New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1967).*

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ers' Party) Central Committee, and supporter of the economic reforms—stated in a recent personal interview with this author in Budapest:

We have arrived at the conviction that trying to plan all economic details from the center, as we did, is not merely undesirable; it must never be done! Such detailed planning from above must choke personal independence and hamper development. Ways must be found to combine the overall goals of economic development with the greatest possible independence for leaders of local economic units. But this is easier said than done. It is clear that we have not yet found the tree of knowledge.

Whatever the advantages and disadvantages of a command-planning apparatus, Hungary had little choice in the matter prior to the era of destalinization. A non-Marxist-Leninist path was surely impossible for the little country that had fought on the side of the Germans against the Soviet Union during the war and was under occupation by the Red Army. In any event, market socialism (or "creative Marxism," as many East European adherents now like to call it) was without practical precedent in history, existed at that time at best only as a blueprint, and certainly would not have been permitted by the Kremlin during the Stalin or the immediate post-Stalin years. Since then, however, the economic and political environment in Hungary has changed greatly, and alterations in the planning system have become both urgent and feasible.

According to official sources, Hungary's national income has increased more than two and a half fold since 1950.[1] Although Western estimates are usually somewhat lower, there is no gainsaying that *average* annual growth has on the whole been satisfactory. However, economic development has progressed by fits and starts, with growth rates very high in some years, very low in others, and now and then even negative.[2] More important, growth rates during the 1960's have lagged behind those of the 1950's.[3] There are strong indications that without radical alterations in the system of economic planning and administration, long-run growth rates would have continued to decline. In part, this is due to the well-known fact that as an economy matures, as the number of economic decisions to be made multiplies, as the "revolution of rising expectations" makes the public more demanding, and as the opportunities for extensive growth diminish, the planning of all economic details from the center becomes ever more difficult. Moreover, in Hungary as in other relatively developed Communist countries, the combination of physical allocation of inputs, of irrational and inflexible pricing, of neglect of the principle of *khozrashot*,[4] and of an inadequate incentive structure geared chiefly to the fulfillment and overfulfillment of the physical output plan, began increasingly to show their now well-known detrimental effects: motivation to hide productive capacity in order to get a more easily fulfillable plan; hoarding of freely allocated inputs, irrespective of current needs; reluctance to risk innovation which might hamper the fulfillment of output targets during the period of changeover, and which, if successful, would simply result in assignments of larger output quotas in the future; and utter disregard for the quality and assortment desired by consumers (since production and not salability or profitability was the basis for the evaluation of enterprise performance and for the awarding of incentive premiums). Besides all these problems, Hungarian economists came to recognize that "overcentralization tends to retard the development of people by depriving them of the opportunity to think for themselves," as this author was frankly told at the Institute for Research on Economic Planning of the Hungarian State Planning Commission. As Sandor Ganczer, head of the Institute, and his senior researcher, Ferenc Janossy, both pointed out, the economy will be able to develop faster "if 50 or 100 people think and learn from their mistakes than if only five do."

It is in the light of these economic experiences—and of Hungary's relative performance within the bloc—that one must understand the Hungarian attitude towards economic reform. On the one hand, Hungary's progress during the 1960's was nothing like that of the economically more backward Communist countries such as Bulgaria and Romania; on

[1] By the end of 1966 Hungary's national income was reported to amount to 238 percent of the 1950 level (*Statistical Yearbook, 1966*, Hungarian Central Statistical Office, Budapest, 1967, p. 39). At the end of 1967 an increase of almost 7 percent over 1966 was claimed, amounting to 254 percent of the 1950 level. (Report to Parliament by Imre Pardi, Chief of the State Planning Office, in *Nepszabadsag* [Budapest], Dec. 22, 1967).

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] United Nations figures give the annual rate of increase of Hungary's net material product, at constant prices, as 5.9 percent for the decade 1950-60 (5.2 percent per capita) and 5.1 percent for 1960-66 (4.8 percent per capita). *Statistical Yearbook, 1967*, Statistical Office of the United Nations, New York, 1968, p. 543.

[4] Often translated as "economic accountability," the Russian term *khozrashot* refers to the self-supporting operation of a business—*i.e.*, to economic decision-making at the enterprise level guided by the criterion of enterprise profitability.

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the other hand, her economy was surely not in such dire straits as those of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, where corrective steps became a matter of utmost urgency. Hence, while radical changes in Hungary's economic system were necessary if economic performance was not to deteriorate, the house was not on fire and there was time for thorough preparation for whatever alterations were to be introduced.

Towards Economic Reform

Criticism of economic overcentralization first came into the open in Hungary during 1956, in the ferment created by the demise of the "Stalin cult". The Soviet-led suppression of the popular uprising in October 1956 marked the abrupt end of any hope for immediate political liberalization; on the economic front, however, it was not long before certain modifications in the centralized planning system began to appear. As early as 1957, profit-sharing was instituted, compulsory delivery quotas in agriculture were abolished, and industrial enterprises were relieved of the obligation to submit monthly and quarterly plans for the approval of higher authorities. Other changes followed: in 1959, wholesale prices were revised, and discount and special sale prices were introduced; by 1961 and 1962, Hungarian workers shared in enterprise profits to the extent of an average equivalent of two weeks' wages; in January 1963, the guidance and control of enterprises, theretofore exercised by ministerial industrial boards, was turned over to newly organized trusts, operated to maximize profits, with the component enterprises defraying the expenses and the workers sharing in the profits of each trust [5]; and in 1964 Hungary became the first Communist country outside of Yugoslavia to introduce a kind of interest rate in the form of a levy on fixed and working capital. And all through this period, the system of planned directives was being simplified.

However, systematic work on a thorough overall reform could be started only after the party decided to go beyond piecemeal changes. The first major step along that road was taken when a resolution of the party Central Committee in December 1964 called for a critical analysis of the entire apparatus of economic planning and administration. Eleven work groups, staffed by 130 experts, were set up to undertake an intensive study of the economy and to draft reform proposals.[6] Within less than a year and a half, the analysis was completed. The guiding principles of the reform of the economic mechanism, based on the proposals of the work groups, were unanimously approved by the May 1966 meeting of the HSWP Central Committee.[7] An "adequate period of careful preparation" of more than one and a half years was ordained, and after widespread public discussion the "new economic mechanism" was officially introduced on New Year's Day, 1968.

The New Economic Mechanism

Aimed at enhancing economic efficiency, improving lagging growth rates, raising living standards, and strengthening Hungary's competitive position on world markets, the basic aspects of the "new economic mechanism" are patterned after the now familiar reforms introduced in recent years in the Soviet Union and in most of the Communist countries of East Europe. In essence, all of these reforms amount to a reduction of specific economic dictates from above, and a corresponding delegation of authority to enterprises and enterprise associations to make economic decisions and to establish their own direct relations with other enterprises from which they buy or to which they sell. Within the framework of a socialist society, these reforms entail a much larger role for the market than previously conceptualized, which means primarily that production is to be more reflective of supply and demand and that profit is to become the principal measuring rod of enterprise performance as well as the paramount factor in decisions related to enterprise investments and credits and to bonuses for managers and workers.[8] To the extent the center wishes to render economic decisions contrary to those issuing from the market, their effectuation is to be brought about not by strictly enforced commands but by the use of economic levers such as variable interest rates, taxation policies, etc.

[5] Large enterprises remained under the direct jurisdiction of the respective ministries.

[6] See the report of Rezso Nyers, Central Committee Secretary and head of the party's Committee on the National Economy, to the Central Committee plenum held in November 1965; *Nepszabadsag*, Nov. 21, 1965. A summary of discussion at the plenum can be found in *ibid.*, Dec. 29, 1965.

[7] For details of the Central Committee resolution, see supplement to the *MTI Weekly Bulletin* (Budapest), June 9, 1966. (MTI is the official Hungarian News Agency.)

[8] As an achievement indicator, profit is to reflect not merely quantitative output but also the "correctness" of quality and assortment decisions (in terms of buyers' demand) and the efficient use of factors of production.

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While the fundamental features of the Hungarian reform may be similar to those of the reforms already introduced in other Communist countries, the *extent* to which the reform has been carried is more far-reaching in Hungary than anywhere else in Eastern Europe except Yugoslavia. In gauging the degree of Hungary's economic "liberalization," it is necessary to consider both the specific details and the implications of the reform proposals—including the extent of initial implementation, the regime's intention regarding future expansion of the reform, and its general attitude towards the introduction of a market mechanism into the framework of a basically socialist society.

Insofar as immediate impact is concerned, it is noteworthy that Hungary's new economic mechanism was introduced in one stroke throughout the entire economy—a procedure quite contrary to that adopted by other countries, including the Soviet Union, where implementation of economic reforms has progressed gradually, from enterprise to enterprise and industry to industry.

Hungary's bolder attitude toward fast and far-reaching change is apparent in various aspects of the reform program. Whereas, for example, the shift of a good part of all investment decisions and investment financing from the center to the individual enterprises and enterprise associations is a major feature of all the reforms, Budapest has expressly declared its intention to restrict centrally determined and financed investment to an irreducible minimum, and considerable progress in this direction has already been made in the short period since introduction of the reform.[9]

Foreign trade, to give another example, is also to be liberalized substantially: apart from the right already bestowed on numerous large enterprises to make their own export contracts with foreign importers, without the specialized foreign trade enterprises as intermediaries, the right of enterprises in general to export and import freely is to be gradually expanded, and consumers are eventally to be permitted to choose, "within the limits dictated by the interests of the economy," between the purchase of domestic goods and of imports.[10] Hungary has already taken a step towards allowing such freedom of consumer choice by permitting her citizens, as of mid-1969, to deposit in individual foreign-currency accounts in the National Bank a certain part of foreign exchange they themselves have earned. Such foreign exchange can then be used for travel in foreign countries, for purchase of goods abroad, and for purchase of goods in Hungarian stores heretofore restricted to tourists who could pay in convertible foreign currencies.[11]

Small-scale private enterprise, to give a further example, is not merely tolerated but greatly encouraged.[12] Also, the power of workers has been augmented considerably by giving labor unions the veto power over measures directly affecting workers' interests and by providing that labor unions be consulted on many other issues, including the hiring and firing of enterprise directors.[13]

While all of these features are notable, it is primarily in the important areas of pricing policies and of the role assigned to the central plan that Hungary has emerged as a pace-setter in the economic reform movement.

Price Formation

If market forces are to assert their influence over production correctly, and if profitability is to be the criterion for deciding enterprise activities, prices of inputs and outputs must be reflective of relative scarcities. This fact is at least partially recognized by all the East European countries now introducing economic reforms. Consequently, all of them have made extensive revisions of industrial wholesale prices an indispensable adjunct of economic reform, and have taken steps to make their pricing structure more flexible—*i.e.*, more readily responsive to changing market conditions. Yet, in many

[9] In 1967, prior to implementation of the new economic mechanism, 23 percent of total investments in Hungary were made by enterprises; by mid-1969 this figure had increased to 50 percent, and the plan for 1970 calls for an increase to 60 percent. *Nepszabadsag*, Nov. 28, 1967, and May 23, 1969.

[10] CC resolution of May 1966, *loc. cit.* (see footnote 7).

[11] See statement by Andor Laszlo, President of the Hungarian National Bank, *Magyar hirlap* (Budapest), July 3, 1969; and Decree of the Ministry of Finance, *ibid.*, July 11, 1969.

[12] The 1966 CC resolution (*loc. cit.*) stated clearly that while the socialist sector would remain in "decisive ascendancy," ". . . there will be continued justification for the private sector to maintain its complementary role, including small-scale industry and retail trade, market activities of producers, and part-time agricultural production by persons other than farmers." As a result of two decrees issued in April 1968, private entrepreneurs in more than 50 lines of trade can now purchase goods from industry or wholesale-trade outlets on the same basis as other trade organizations; and private artisans can obtain loans to purchase equipment and machinery (Radio Budapest, April 8 and 9, 1968).

[13] Hungarian labor unions have already gone so far as to veto not only decisions at the enterprise level but also a decision by the Ministry of Transport and one by the post office (Radio Budapest, July 9, 1968). For details of the new Hungarian Labor Code, which became effective Jan. 1, 1968, see *Magyar kozlony* (Budapest), Oct. 8, 1967.

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

A COMMON COMPLAINT

Above: "What [should we] import?"
Below: "The high-quality Hungarian goods [we] export."

—From *Ludas matyi* (Budapest), Aug. 29, 1968.

aspects of her pricing policies, Hungary has deviated much further from orthodox Marxism-Leninism than any of the others.

First, in price debates aimed at determining the theoretical-ideological basis for price formation, Hungary has in recent years paid less and less attention to Marx's "law of value" and "production price." [14] Instead, as Hungary's price chief Bela Csikos-Nagy has pointed out, Hungarian economists have been more concerned with such notions, inherent in Western price theory, as "use value [the equivalent of the Western concept of utility], marginal cost, scarcity, competitive prices, [and] equilibrium prices," and with a pricing system suitable for a controlled market economy.[15]

Secondly, while Hungary's newly-revised industrial wholesale prices are still essentially average-cost based, there is a rate of interest on fixed and current assets tied up in production (intended to be "expressive of the minimum effectiveness that can be expected from such committed assets"); there is a differential rent levied, where applicable, in the form of a differential production tax, aimed at giving all enterprises an equal starting point; and there is a regular land rent "to prompt the efficient use of land." [16] Since Marxist price theory paid inadequate attention to factors of production other than labor, the realization that capital and land represent real economic costs is of course of utmost importance.

Thirdly, explicit recognition in price formation is also given to demand [17]—somewhat of a deviation from orthodox Marxist price theory, which is predominantly a cost and hence a supply theory, as compared to Western analysis which basically conceives of market prices as resulting from the interaction of demand and supply. Furthermore, there are clearly expressed objectives of bringing about a functional correlation between industrial wholesale and retail prices [18] and eventually also a closer relationship between domestic and world market prices.[19]

Finally, and perhaps most important, Hungary intends to build flexibility into her pricing structure by permitting the prices of most goods to find their own level in response to the market forces of supply and demand. The shift to "free prices" must, however, proceed gradually, partly because in a country still short of many consumer goods there are great inflationary pressures, and partly because individual enterprises and enterprise associations in Hungary

[14] By "value," or "value in exchange," Marx meant the "socially necessary" labor time embodied in a commodity; by "production price" he meant the value of inputs other than labor, expressed in money, plus wages, plus an average rate of profit equal for all industries.

[15] Bela Csikos-Nagy, "The Monetary Framework of a Socialist Economy," *The New Hungarian Quarterly* (Hungarian News and Information Center, London), Spring 1969, p. 47. Head of Hungary's National Pricing Board from its inception in 1957, Csikos-Nagy remained in charge when it was reconstituted in July 1967 as the Board of Materials and Prices.

[16] Premier Jeno Fock's report to Parliament, *Nepszabadsag*, June 12, 1967.

[17] The 1966 CC resolution (*loc. cit.*) refers to the adjustment of production to demand and to the balancing of demand and supply as two of the elements encompassed in the fundamental function of prices.

[18] So far, industrial wholesale price changes in Communist countries, intended primarily to make these prices more reflective of cost, have not necessarily been accompanied by corresponding changes in retail prices. In general, Communist countries have aimed at unchanged or at declining retail price levels. Discrepancies between wholesale and retail prices of individual commodities are adjusted either through turnover taxes or through subsidies (in the case of overly high or overly low retail prices respectively).

[19] The 1966 CC resolution, *loc. cit.*

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frequently have strong monopolistic powers. If in any field there is no domestic competition to assure reasonable prices without government intervention, then such competition must be introduced by permitting the free importation of the products involved. While this is the eventual goal, shortage of foreign exchange makes such a step virtually impossible for the moment.

Despite the difficulties involved in introducing free prices, only about one-fourth of all prices (particularly those of essential staples and raw materials) remained centrally controlled at the outset of the reform, on January 1, 1968; about an equal number were "freed," and the rest, somewhat over 50 percent, were permitted to fluctuate within prescribed limits (so-called "from-to" prices), or at least with the upper limit stipulated by the center. Most of the Communist countries, including the USSR, consider price-setting a prerogative of the central planning organs and visualize price flexibility as issuing from frequent price reforms—a rather difficult task since in the Soviet Union, for example, there are some eight to ten million prices to be dealt with [20] (in Hungary there are an estimated two million varieties of industrial products [21]).

Some other countries such as Bulgaria have adopted the three-tier system of free, "from-to," and controlled prices, but the domain of free prices is confined to a few unimportant items (*e.g.*, souvenirs for tourists); and in personal interviews with leading economists and planners in Sofia, this author found little indication of any intention to enlarge the sphere of free prices. Only in Yugoslavia and in pre-August 1968 Czechoslovakia could one find an attitude similar to that prevailing in Hungary. As Bela Csikos-Nagy expressed it to this author in Budapest: "As recently as five or six years ago the generally accepted view was that prices had to be centrally fixed. Now, this is but the starting point. The goal is freer prices, with controls retained only where absolutely necessary." Csikos-Nagy predicted that after 1975 the Hungarian economy would in all probability be operating mostly on the basis of free prices. Even more optimistic was Sandor Ganczer's statement to this author that by 1973 "most if not all prices would be freed."

[20] A figure of 10 million is cited in *Turkmenskaia iskra* (Ashkabad), April 17, 1968. British economist Keith Bush estimates the number at 8 to 9 million ("The Reforms: A Balance Sheet," *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1967, p. 40).

[21] Bela Csikos-Nagy, quoted by *MTI*, July 12, 1968.

The Role of the Central Plan

One of the primary objectives of the economic reforms in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is to relieve the central planners of the thankless task of mapping out an economic plan for the entire nation in intricate detail. Instead, planners are to lay down only the broadest outlines for enterprises or enterprise associations (for instance, the total monetary value of a shoe factory's production, but not styles, quality, sizes, and colors; or the total expenditures on wages—the size of the wage fund—but not the number and types of workers to be hired). Details are to be determined by the enterprises or associations, chiefly on the basis of feedback issuing from the market. And even in the drafting of the broad outlines of the national plan, greater attention is to be paid to local plans drawn up at the enterprise level.

Only in Yugoslavia, however, did this author find an approach similar to that of the Hungarian reform, under which the central plan (put together chiefly from plans submitted by enterprises) is no longer legally binding on the enterprises. In interviews in the Soviet Union and throughout the rest of East Europe, this author was told almost everywhere that the central plan is to predominate and that market forces are to be allowed to exert their influence merely to make the plan more effective and its execution more efficient.

The central planning authorities in Hungary may, and often do, decide to incorporate in the overall plan certain economic goals that deviate from the aggregate of enterprise plans. Since the national plan no longer has the force of law, they can exact compliance only by the use of economic levers designed to induce cooperation by making it profitable for the enterprises involved (along with their workers and managers). Except in cases of overriding importance involving a conflict of private and public interests, in which government anywhere reserves the right to curb individual preferences, the final decision rests with the enterprise.

From the foregoing, the reader may get the impression that the Hungarian state and party are surrendering virtually all controls to the enterprises and to the market. This surely is not so, for in any modern economy, in the East or in the West, certain economic functions need to be under central control, and certain economic interests of society at large cannot be left to the free forces of the market.

As is the case to a greater or lesser extent in Western capitalist and semi-capitalist market economies, so in Hungary the state finances and adminis-

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ters certain social services such as education; acquires, holds, safeguards, and provides for the use of the nation's gold stocks; takes charge of foreign currency obtained by state enterprises in commercial transactions (as opposed to the disposal of foreign currency earned by private individuals, discussed above)[22]; finances road-building, city development, and other projects considered to be vested with a public interest but too large or too non-commercial to be handled profitably by individual enterprises; uses its powers of taxation, expenditures, control over interest rates, and the like to influence economic growth and stability; etc.

In addition to these more generally recognized prerogatives of government, the Hungarian state—as the owner of most enterprises—also retains and utilizes other economic powers usually left in private hands in Western nations, including the power to establish, liquidate, and amalgamate enterprises; to appoint enterprise directors[23]; to regulate the payment of labor; to determine the share of profits to be retained by the enterprises; and—by direct decree or by the use of variable taxes—to regulate the apportioning of enterprise-retained profits among various uses (such as enterprise investments, cultural and social expenditures, general wage increases, and bonuses for workers and managers). With respect to economic decisions at the macro level (*e.g.*, division of output between consumers' and producers' goods or proportions of aggregate investment in agriculture and industry), the party and the state planning authorities have adequate economic levers at their disposal to make their voices heard.

Imperfections and Difficulties

It could hardly be expected that the new economic mechanism would work perfectly from its inception and cure all of Hungary's economic ills overnight—and indeed such has not been the case.

During 1968, national income rose by 5 percent and so did production per man-hour in industry.[24] While these figures are not much different from those of previous years, they must be deemed satisfactory under the circumstances, since this was a year of conversion to a radically different system of economic planning and administration. It must also be said, to the credit of those who prepared the country for the new economic system, that the changeover was accomplished without concomitant inflation or unemployment, and that the 1968 growth rates were achieved while one-third of the industrial working force was shifted from a 48- to a 44-hour week.[25] For 1969, a 5 to 6 percent increase in national output was planned (6 percent for industry, 2-3 percent for agriculture), and per capita output was scheduled to rise by 3.5 percent.[26] But reports for the first five months of 1969 showed that industrial production had increased only 2 percent over the equivalent period of the preceding year, and that labor productivity in industry had actually dropped by about 2 percent.[27]

It is no easy task for administrators and enterprise executives, long accustomed to carrying out orders from above, to start making major economic decisions on their own. In the early days of the new economic mechanism, Premier Jeno Fock reported that production and trade enterprises were still reluctant to change prices (where they were permitted to do so) in response to changes in supply and demand, that trade enterprises were timid in placing orders with industry, that the Investment Bank was dragging its feet on justified requests for credit, and that shifting of manpower from uneconomic to more efficient enterprises had not been started.[28] A year and a half later these shortcomings were no longer so pronounced, but others were surfacing—some of them deficiencies lingering from the past and some the result of imperfections in the new system. Low labor productivity, unsatisfactory organization of production and work, wastefulness, and an insufficient increase in real wages were among the current problems cited by Jozsef Balint, Head of the Central Committee's

[22] Hungarian enterprises selling abroad turn all foreign currency over to the Foreign Trade Bank at the export rate of exchange, which usually averages about 60 forints per dollar (as compared with 30 forints paid to tourists). While control over foreign currency is also a prerogative of Western governments, it is generally exercised only in cases of severe foreign currency shortage.

[23] As noted earlier, unions now have some influence over the selection of enterprise directors. But the regime still holds to the official position that "in the present phase of development, the conditions are not yet ripe for the realization of the theory of electing economic leaders in the enterprises": *Tarsadalmi szemle* (Budapest), December 1966.

[24] *Nepszabadsag*, Feb. 2, 1969.

[25] The shift to a 44-hour week was decreed by the Ninth Party Congress and initiated in phases during 1968. There is evidence that it may be extended to all of industry in advance of the original target date, the end of 1970. *Magyar nemzet*, Dec. 5, 1968.

[26] Matyas Timar (Deputy Prime Minister and former Minister of Finance), writing in *Pravda* (Moscow), April 22, 1969.

[27] *Nepszava* (Budapest), June 22, 1969.

[28] *Nepszabadsag*, Feb. 24, 1968.

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Economic-Political Department.[29] Hungarian Minister of Finance Peter Valyi, in a report to the Hungarian National Assembly, pointed to such prevailing deficiencies as excessive manpower reserves retained by enterprises, investment demands that exceeded the resources of the national economy, and an increase in overall inventories amounting to 15 billion forints (at the tourist rate, the equivalent of $500 million) at a time when some commodities remained in very short supply.[30]

Finally, there have been frequent complaints, recurring since the early days of the debates on the economic reform, that wage differentiation is not large enough for effective economic stimulation.[31] A manager-oriented profit-sharing system, introduced as part of the new economic mechanism, is at best a partial solution since it divides employees into but three categories for purposes of differential incentive premiums. The system has met with widespread opposition from those who consider it too discriminatory. Unskilled and semiskilled workers feel that they do not share adequately in enterprise profits, and there is a realization that enterprise directors, who get much larger bonuses from profits than do workers (both in absolute and relative terms), have a vested interest in applying extra income to the incentive (profit-sharing) fund, rather than to higher wages.

Imperfect and in need of alteration though the new economic mechanism may be, most Hungarians seem convinced (and most Western economists would agree) that the new system is a vast improvement over the old, that its essential features must be retained, and that a return to centralized command planning would have extremely harmful economic effects.

Toward Greater Freedom

In Hungary, as almost everywhere else in Eastern Europe, the process of adopting and implementing economic reform has created a more relaxed environment, leading to freer discussion and greater tolerance not only in the economic but also in the political, cultural, and to some extent even the ideological spheres. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the broad impact of the reform in detail, a few examples may serve to indicate the ongoing—if carefully limited—liberalization of Hungarian society.

As evidence of the retreat from political rigidity, for instance, the selection of enterprise directors first and foremost on the basis of "political reliability" has given way to a new policy under which "equal consideration has to be given to expert knowledge, the gift of leadership, and a suitable political attitude and standard" (the last being

[29] *Ibid.*, May 13, 1969.
[30] Cited in *Radio Free Europe Situation Report: Hungary* (Munich), July 7, 1969, p. 2.
[31] On this subject see Matyas Timar, *loc. cit.*, and Jozsef Balint in *Nepszabadsag*, May 13, 1969.

THE PRESSURE TO PRODUCE

Top caption: "Warning." Falling "Production Graph" hounds the "Director" out of his office.

—From *Ludas matyi* (Budapest), Oct. 30, 1969.



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given even less weight and being interpreted even more loosely).[32] Workers, whether or not they make use of the state employment agencies, no longer have to take jobs they do not want.[33] And university graduates, who formerly had to work for two years in enterprises designated by the economic ministries—to repay the state, as it were, for their education—are now free to find their own jobs with or without the aid of cost-free state employment agencies.[34]

The signs of greater freedom of expression are widespread. Insofar as the published word is concerned, a number of works that were previously proscribed have been reissued in recent years. Subjects that no one would have dared to mention a few years ago are now debated in the press—as well as at the universities, in parliament, and in the ubiquitous Budapest cafés. And—at least on the basis of this author's experience—a Westerner can make contact and talk frankly with scholars, union leaders, and high-ranking government or party leaders more easily in Hungary than in any other East European Communist country.

The regime's more permissive attitude towards ideological unorthodoxy may be illustrated, *inter alia*, by the case of the Hungarian economist Tibor Liska, a non-conformist who has rejected socialist planning altogether. "A planned economy has not worked in 50 years," Liska said to this author; "what reason do we have to assume that it will work in the future?" Liska advocates an economic system under which society would still own the means of production but would lease them to private individuals on the basis of competitive bids—a system under which, he emphasizes, the market would play a role even greater than in capitalist societies. Although opposed by all "respectable" economists and planners, Liska has been allowed not only to espouse his views publicly but to travel and lecture abroad,[35] to hold a part-time job in the Economic Research Institute in Budapest, and to publish an occasional paper.

In recent years, public discussion of economic reform has produced increasingly clear and unequivocal statements linking economic to political liberalism—statements to the effect that "the enrichment of democracy is not only the result of an increase in economic independence but in a sense also the condition" necessary to such progress.[36] To be sure, the words "freedom" and "democracy," as used in the Communist lexicon, do not have the same meaning as they do in the West; yet in the view of this observer the Hungarian concept of these terms seems to have moved closer to Western criteria (and actually also to the original ideas of Marx) than is the case in most other Communist countries.

All this is not meant to imply that *any* position could be freely taken in Hungary today. It is one thing for Hungarians to recommend modest extensions of democratic rights and freedoms within the framework of the prevailing system; it would be quite another, and quite intolerable to the regime, for them to advocate changes in the political system itself (such as the establishment of genuine opposition parties). In fact, any views that might be classified as anti-Kadar, anti-Soviet, or—for that matter—pro-Chinese would not be tolerated. In this respect Hungary's liberalization has not even come close to the level of free political expression that characterized Czechoslovakia during the heyday of the "Prague Spring." That, of course, is part of the reason why the Hungarian reform program has survived intact, while Czechoslovakia's has largely aborted.

August 21 and After

On August 21, 1968, Hungary was one of five Warsaw Pact nations to send troops into Czechoslovakia. As stated at the outset of this paper, it seems evident that neither Hungary's population nor the party leadership had their hearts in this venture, since Czechoslovakia's "Sik model"—one of the main targets of Soviet attack—was strikingly similar to the economic system that had just been introduced in Hungary. Yet Budapest had little choice. The regime's decision to go along with the invasion is explicable only in part by remembrance of the events of 1956 and by fear that refusal might invite a fate similar to Czechoslovakia's. The de-

[32] The 1966 CC resolution, *loc. cit.*

[33] Departmental order proclaimed by Minister of Labor Jozsef Veres; Radio Budapest, Oct. 21, 1967.

[34] Decree of Council of Ministers published in *Nepszabadsag*, Nov. 3-4, 1967. An exception applies in the case of holders of special enterprise scholarships who are legally bound to keep the contractual agreements they made with enterprises.

[35] For example, Liska participated in a seminar in Florence, Italy, in 1966, presenting some of his novel ideas in a paper entitled "Econstat: A New Hypothesis about the Mechanism of Socialist Economy." See *Prices and Finance in Eastern Europe*, Part II, CESES International Seminar, Florence, Sept. 15, 1966, pp. 140-49.

[36] Radio Budapest, Oct. 31, 1968.

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cision must also be understood in the light of Hungary's great *economic* dependence on the East European Communist countries in general, and on the Soviet Union in particular.

Hungary, today, is more dependent upon exports and imports than almost any other country in the world, and this dependence has been increasing with the growth in industrialization and in national income.[37] In 1968 exports accounted for two-fifths of Hungary's entire national income; 37 percent of her foreign trade was with the USSR and another 33 percent was with Communist East Europe.[38] The Soviet Union alone supplies virtually all of the iron ore, fuel oil, and phosphorous fertilizer, about two-thirds of the copper sulphate and newsprint, and around one-half of the synthetic rubber, coke, raw cotton and wood pulp imported by Hungary; conversely, the Soviet Union is the largest purchaser of Hungarian-made lathes, passenger railway-cars, buses, trucks, motorcycles, leather footwear and fabrics (woolen and wool-type synthetics, silk, flax and hemp).[39] A new trade agreement signed in early 1969 between the Soviet Union and Hungary provides for a further 7-percent increase in trade between the two countries.[40]

Well over half of Hungary's imports consist of raw materials and semi-finished goods; more than two-thirds of her exports are made up of machinery, equipment, and industrial consumer goods.[41] Most of her production destined for foreign markets is currently geared to Soviet and East European needs; much of her industrial output does not yet measure up to Western standards, and there is a marked shortage of Western currencies. Under the circumstances, and quite apart from political considerations and pressures, there is little chance for the foreseeable future that Hungary could or would look to the industrial West as the major supplier of her import needs and the primary market for her exports. Adding together the economic *and* political realities of her situation, it is clear that Hungary would have incurred grave risks to her own interests, not to mention her very security, by refusing to participate in the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

At the same time, the Hungarian leadership moved quickly in the wake of the invasion to strike a firm stance in defense of its own liberalization measures (political as well as economic) and to reassure its apprehensive population that the reform program would be fully implemented. Within a few days after the occupation, Politburo member Istvan Szirmai, for instance, stated unequivocally that "the policy of the party will remain unchanged in both substance and methods," and the Council of Ministers issued a statement reiterating its basic approval of the new economic mechanism.[42] Similar assurances were issued frequently in the fall of 1968. In December the party Central Committee once again endorsed the reform program, declared that it had been proven correct, and urged that during 1969 it be extended to all aspects of economic life in Hungary.[43]

While thus reasserting their firm determination to continue on their chosen path, the Hungarians redoubled their efforts to defend their reforms in terms that would be reassuring to the Soviet Union. In their statements they went to considerable lengths to point out that the old system had become obsolete, that the adoption of the new system was dictated by harsh economic realities, that in working out the mechanics of the changeover they were mindful of the experience of other Communist countries and of the adverse effects of any precipitate actions, that the new methods were not contrary to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and, having been introduced by the party itself, would not weaken the power of the party nor affect Hungary's loyalty to the Communist camp, etc.[44] It seems clear from this effort to placate Moscow that the Hungarians are convinced that the fate of their policies ultimately depends upon Soviet approval or at least Soviet toleration.

It is in this light that Hungary's shifting attitude in the continuing Czechoslovak crisis must be understood.

Budapest vis-à-vis Prague

In the months prior to the invasion, the Hungarian party and government leadership had given

[37] From 1960 to 1965, Hungary's national income increased by 35 percent, while exports and imports each increased over 50 percent. *Statistical Yearbook, 1966,* pp. 39 and 185.
[38] *Nepszabadsag,* Feb. 2, 1969.
[39] *Statistical Yearbook, 1966,* pp. 202-20 *passim.*
[40] *Magyar nemzet,* Feb. 12, 1969.
[41] *Statistical Yearbook, 1966,* p. 190.
[42] *Nepszabadsag,* Aug. 30, 1968.
[43] *Magyar nemzet,* Dec. 5, 1968.
[44] See, for instance, Premier Jeno Fock, *MTI* release of Sept. 29, 1968; Lajos Cseterki, Secretary of the party's Presidential Council, as quoted in *Izvestia* (Moscow), Nov. 3, 1968; and state planning chief Imre Pardi, as quoted in *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta* (Moscow), No. 46, November 1968. For an earlier statement in the same vein, see CC Secretary Reszo Nyers in *Tarsadalmi szemle,* July 1965.

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general support to the Dubcek regime and to its "new economic model," although interjecting some criticism and "friendly advice" as the Soviet line toughened. Immediately after the intervention, Hungary hastened to reaffirm her approval of Czechoslovakia's reform program, pointed to similarities with her own reform measures, and demanded that "steps be taken to continue to implement the positive aspects of the policy started last January." [45]

Consistent with this approach, Hungary's news media did not join those of the Soviet Union, Poland, Bulgaria, and East Germany in their condemnation of Ota Sik (the architect of Czechoslovakia "new economic model"), of Yugoslavia's economic reforms, and of market socialism. Hungarian party leader Janos Kadar refrained for two months from making any statement at all on the Czechoslovak situation (until, according to some Western sources, he had secured Soviet guarantees that the Hungarian reforms would be allowed to continue).[46] Then, in a speech rather mild as compared with those issuing from the other invading powers, Kadar declared that Hungary had backed Czechoslovakia's post-January course until the danger of counterrevolution had become a serious menace.[47] In succeeding months, Hungary's official position remained as sympathetic to the Czechoslovak reforms as was apparently deemed advisable.

This position changed drastically, however, after the massive anti-Soviet demonstrations which occurred in Prague on March 21 and 28, 1969. In a virtual about-face, the official Hungarian press adopted a strong line condemning the "anti-Soviet" and "anti-socialist" provocations of "counterrevolutionary" forces in Czechoslovakia;[48] and Kadar, in a speech delivered on April 10, called upon the Czechoslovak party and government to take "a clear, firm stand to safeguard the interests of socialism and act with proper firmness and consistency against all rightist, reactionary, antisocialist, nationalist, anti-Soviet forces, because from January 1968 until today, such determination and activity have been lacking." [49] Husak's assumption of power on April 20 was applauded as proof of the Czechoslovak party's consciousness of the danger of anti-socialist forces, and Yugoslavia's backing of Dubcek *et al.* came in for severe criticism.[50]

From this point on, Hungary's official stance showed little difference from that of her more "conservative" Warsaw Pact allies. Nonetheless the tone of many comments left the distinct impression—on this writer, at least—that Hungary's leaders were still somewhat reluctant to attack the Czechoslovak reformists. Characteristic of this ambivalence was a statement made by Premier Jeno Fock in May 1969 to an Austrian journalist:

If questioned about Hungary's attitude in August 1968, even Dubcek, Cernik and Husak would express a positive assessment of the Hungarian position. In line with our own experiences we have fully supported the reforms of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, but at the same time have stressed that hostile forces could try to use the situation to their advantage. The Czechoslovak leaders were pleased by our support, but they disregarded our warnings [which were intended to] spare Czechoslovakia the negative Hungarian experiences of 1956, when only through Soviet help was it possible to get the situation under proper control.[51]

Moscow vis-à-vis Budapest

In recognition of Hungary's participation in the armed intervention in Czechoslovakia—and also in the expectation that Budapest would be wise enough to keep its reforms within acceptable limits —Moscow has adopted an official attitude of approval with respect to the Hungarian reform program. Accordingly, most Soviet comments have been favorable. To cite some examples, *Izvestia*'s permanent correspondent in Budapest wrote in the fall of 1968:

Experience has shown that the Hungarian economic reform was well thought out and carefully prepared, and [that] it has effectively combined broad enterprise independence with centralized regulation of the national economy through the aid of economic levers.[52]

Similarly, the head of the Soviet trade agency in Budapest stated:

The [Hungarian] party and government have kept very powerful economic levers in their hands so that the

[45] See *Magyar hirlap*, Aug. 22, and 25, 1968; *Magyar nemzet*, Aug. 23; *Nepszabadsag*, Aug. 24; and almost daily broadcasts on the issue over Radio Budapest. The last quote is from *Nepszava*, Sept. 11, 1968.

[46] See, for example, Victor Zorza, "Hungary Exacts a High Price," *The Guardian* (London), Oct. 30, 1968.

[47] *Maygar hirlap*, Oct. 26, 1968.

[48] See, for example, *Nepszabadsag*, April 1, 1969; *Magyar hirlap*, April 2; *MTI Daily News*, April 4 and 18.

[49] Radio Budapest, April 11, 1969.

[50] See, for example, National Assembly Chairman Gyula Kallai's speech before the party's Political Academy, in *Nepszabadsag*, May 9, 1969.

[51] *Die Presse* (Vienna), May 21, 1969.

[52] B. Rodinov in *Izvestia*, Sept. 18, 1968.

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enterprises do not only work for their own profit, but also take into account the interests of society at large. . . . I am convinced that as a result of the reform, the Hungarian people, under the leadership of the party and government will achieve successes in the economic development of the country.[53]

Soviet endorsement of the Hungarian course reached its warmest official expression in March 1969, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the proclamation of the Hungarian Soviet Republic.[54] Moscow's telegram to the Budapest authorities was phrased in such approbatory terms that it was clearly intended to be more than a mere formality. The message referred to Hungary's "worthy contribution to the theory and practice of socialist construction" and added: "The CPSU, the Soviet government, and all Soviet citizens are pleased with the successes of the Hungarian People's Republic in the building of socialism." [55]

In analyzing Moscow's stance toward Hungary, it is difficult to determine to what extent the Soviet position has been dictated by necessity—that is, by the exigencies of the Czechoslovak crisis—and to what extent it may represent a growing conviction that the Kadar regime can deliver on its promises of loyalty to the bloc and controlled reform at home.

It seems clear that from the start the Hungarian reform, although extremely similar in scope and intent to the Czechoslovak program, was more palatable to the Soviets for at least two reasons. First, whereas the Czechoslovak "new economic model" was implemented only after a prolonged fight within the party hierarchy and an eventual change in the party leadership, Hungary's reform was proposed, worked out, and implemented under the auspices of the same leadership that the Soviets had long considered dependable and trustworthy. Second, and probably more important, there was a significant difference in the two countries' attitude towards the Soviet Union itself. In the months preceding the invasion the verbal attacks of the Czechoslovak reformers and the Czechoslovak press against the Soviets became ever more critical, more aggressive, and more defamatory, at times culminating in outright ridicule of Soviet institutions and policies; by contrast, one would have searched in vain in the Hungarian press and literature for official or semiofficial statements that were derogatory towards the USSR.

These differences—added to the crucial factor of Budapest's supportive stance during and since the invasion—have no doubt influenced Moscow's public and private posture toward Hungary. At the same time, there has been a good bit of evidence to suggest that the Soviets continue to harbor grave reservations about Budapest's "road to socialism." For example, Nikolai Drogishinsky, head of the "Department for the Introduction of New Methods of Planning and Economic Stimulation" in the Soviet State Planning Commission (Gosplan, USSR) told this author in a personal interview in Moscow in November 1968 that insofar as economic reform is concerned, Hungary and Czechoslovakia must be put in the same category. He added:

We do not like to criticize our Hungarian comrades, but we think their approach to central planning is totally incorrect; and we should know because we here in the Soviet Union have had 50 years of experience with central planning.

Similar sentiments were apparent in a lecture delivered in late 1968 by Professor Rem A. Belosov, Section Chief of the Institute of Economic Sciences attached to Gosplan USSR, who explained the Soviet position thus:

We are now attentively watching the system being put into practice in Hungary. *Should it fail, then the Soviet Union can help Hungary.* We ourselves, however, must be very careful with such far-reaching experiments.[56]

The disquieting implications of such statements have surely not been lost on the Hungarians. As Drogishinsky's statement suggests, the Soviets' most crucial objection to Hungary's new economic mechanism has been its reduction of the central plan to a mere guideline for the economy. It is clear that Moscow has been apprehensive over the ultimate effects of this fundamental departure from Soviet practice, fearing that it might weaken the position of the party, that it might unfavorably alter Hungary's production patterns, that it could cause Hungary to slight her economic role in the bloc, and that it might even lead to a change in the pattern and scope of her trade relations with the West in a direction detrimental to Soviet interests. It is precisely these fears that the Hungarian lead-

[53] Boris Pushkin, quoted in *Esti hirlap* (Budapest), Feb. 17, 1969.

[54] The anniversary date is pegged to the short-lived "dictatorship of the proletariat" set up in Hungary on March 21, 1919, which lasted only 133 days.

[55] Radio Moscow, March 20, 1969.

[56] Speech to Rhine-Westphalian Foreign Relations Society and the Society for the Improvement of Relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union; published in *Handelsblatt* (Düsseldorf), Dec. 7, 1968. Emphasis added.

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ership has tried to allay, going out of its way to convince the Soviets by word and deed that Hungary will not step out of bounds, that she will remain a loyal ally of the Soviet Union, and that she will fulfill the obligations imposed on her by the Warsaw Pact and by her membership in Comecon.

It is a moot question whether the Soviet leadership has been genuinely reassured by the Hungarians' course, or whether its current attitude toward Budapest simply reflects the urgency of its need to restore unity to the bloc. For their part, the Hungarians are fully aware that the Soviets would be extremely reluctant to invite a further split in the Communist movement by cracking down on another bloc country. On the other hand, the Hungarians also know from bleak experience that the Soviets ultimately fix the rules of the game and the boundaries beyond which they will oppose reform efforts through every pressure they can bring to bear. Thus Hungary has been walking a tightrope, precariously balancing between the reforms it deems necessary and the limits of Soviet tolerance. Under the circumstances, Budapest's particular blend of independence and compliance is at the least understandable—and perhaps ought to be viewed as a demonstration of astute give-and-take political tactics. Whether the balancing act can go on indefinitely remains to be seen.

Hope and Caution

By E. Sandor

To one who has been observing the vagaries of the Hungarian brand of communism for some 20 years, and who has been a frequent visitor to that small landlocked country on the periphery of Soviet power, Hungary today represents one of the most extraordinary political experiments in Eastern Europe. The term experiment is perhaps misleading, for the Hungarians are proceeding along their present reform course in a manner that suggests, not the clinical approach of the laboratory, but rather a highly pragmatic, determined, and at the same time self-disciplined effort to improve everyday life. In a luncheon discussion a few months ago at the century-old Szaz Eves restaurant in Budapest, one of Hungary's leading intellectuals expressed this attitude to me somewhat as follows:

History has given us our share of suffering—the Turks, the Austrians and now the Russians. No one, not even the Russians, should blame us for trying to make something of our lives and our country. Call what we are doing socialist democracy, democratic socialism or just plain benevolent communism. What we need now, particularly after Czechoslovakia, is some peace and quiet. We know we're being closely watched, and we are cautious. But we are moving ahead.

Although the "new economic mechanism" (hereafter NEM), which went into effect in January 1968, contains many liberalizing features, moves for democratic reforms were forecast almost five years ago by Istvan Szirmai, who until his death late last September was Hungary's leading ideologist and an intimate associate of Janos Kadar, in and out of the Politburo. In 1965, in the wake of large-scale defections by Hungarian tourists abroad —including some 4,000 doctors, engineers and technicians—Szirmai discussed the problem of making the country more attractive with respect to its political institutions.[1] He addressed himself to such

E. Sandor is the pseudonym of an American journalist who makes frequent visits to Hungary and other East European countries.

[1] *Tarsadalmi szemle* (Budapest), November 1965.

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problems as electoral reform ("we are thinking about the possibility of several candidates being nominated for each constituency, so that the voter will have a choice") and educational democracy ("many critical remarks have been made about the system of university admissions, [calling for] an end to the system of screening according to family and class background"); and—in oblique defiance of Moscow's attitude toward such measures—he referred to "opinions . . . being aired that the Soviet Union has recently become more passive and less dynamic, as a result of which Soviet prestige has decreased."

A few days later Gyula Kallai, newly appointed premier at the time, devoted much of his maiden speech in Parliament to similar themes, emphasizing electoral reform and meaningful legislative debate.[2] The present writer watched Kallai make that speech and saw the surprised reactions of many Hungarians, some of whom later told me that even the cynics were bemused by it (the latter were comprised in large part of intellectuals who, having seen their hopes go up in Soviet flames in 1956, had withdrawn from political participation). In the period of 1965 through mid-1968, the regime continued to give evidence of its disposition to view cautious liberalization in the political sphere both as desirable in its own right and as necessary to the success of the economic reform program.

Then—in August 1968—came the critical turn of events in Czechoslovakia, intruding with shock-force on the Hungarians' new sense of paced progress and posing a potential threat, so it seemed, to their own reform program. The gloom that descended upon Prague in September and October was matched by an oppressive silence in official Budapest. Among most Hungarians, two sentiments seemed to predominate: on the one hand, the memories of 1956 were painfully revived; on the other, what almost amounted to a national psychosis developed out of fear for the security of the Hungarian reforms.

Among the reflections of this mass fear was the relatively overt concern expressed for the fate of Kadar, the one leader with whom the man-in-the-street associates the recent impetus toward the democratization of Hungarian life. For seven weeks following the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Kadar, whose dismay over the invasion was a matter of public knowledge, went into self-imposed isolation. He was absent from all public functions, made no appearance of any kind and saw no one but his closest colleagues. Rumors of his fate, ranging from imprisonment in Moscow to suicide, swept Budapest. I recall a conversation at the time with a man who had survived in the party for over 15 years and who knew Kadar well. He said:

This is quite something, you know, to see apolitical people worrying over the man they despised only twelve years ago. They called him Moscow's lackey then, and between that time and the execution of Imre Nagy in 1958 no Hungarian would have given you one forint for Kadar. But look at them now. On the trolley car the other day, I heard two housewives talking, and when one said she had heard that Kadar had cut his own throat, the other deplored the possibility that there was no one to take his place. . . .

These fears for the future of the party's First Secretary and his reform program were finally laid to rest when he re-emerged early in October 1968 and confirmed in a major pronouncement that the NEM would continue on its course.[3] The setting for Kadar's "resurrection," as he himself termed it to journalists, was a hosiery factory in Obuda, the oldest part of the capital, but the incongruity of the surroundings was irrelevant to the one overriding fact that was understood by everyone: despite the parallels of 1956 and of Prague only two months before, the Kremlin had given Kadar the green light to continue not only with his economic program but with the related reforms implied by the NEM.

The relief generated by Kadar's statement was palpable. Hungarians of all persuasions and backgrounds seemed to draw together with a renewed sense of having survived another national crisis. In the author's own contacts, it seemed that writers, artists, and members of the professions were almost rejuvenated after the weeks of anxiety, even as they rued the fate of their Czechoslovak neighbors. Thus Hungary turned anew to the task of making the regime's reform program work.

Profit and Progress

Since the basic economic concepts and features of the Hungarian reform program have been outlined in the preceding article, there is no need to go into them here. The broader impact of the reform —at least as envisaged—was suggested by the architect of the NEM, the young and dynamic

[2] *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest) Nov. 12-14, 1965.

[3] *Magyar hirlap* (Budapest) Oct. 21, 1968.

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Rezso Nyers, in a speech he made to the political academy of the party in November 1967.[4] Nyers made no bones about the ultimate implications of the far-reaching program he had planned: decentralization in the economy would inevitably lead to decentralization in areas other than planning and industry. But he also emphasized—as have all spokesmen for the regime—that "the Communist Party will always . . . represent the political interests of the workers best and most effectively."

The effects of Hungary's new economic thinking have already turned up far afield from the factory, in diverse areas of endeavor—and perhaps nowhere more interestingly than in the cultural sphere. Faced with the challenge to show a profit, theatre and concert directors have begun searching for the unusual in entertainment fare. The demand for Western plays, though always present, is now greater than ever, while the Hungarian concert agency is frantically searching for foreign talent to attract greater crowds to the opera house and the concert halls. The agents in charge of these bookings are the first to admit their motives are economic. One was quite frank:

I used to be just another bureaucrat writing routine letters to the Western agents of conductors, musicians and singers. I couldn't offer them much money because we had little hard currency for such purposes. Dollars, marks, francs and shillings were necessary for trade, equipment and heavy industry. Now, things are different. I have my hard currency and I take advantage of it. Sometimes I apparently go too far and have to explain why so many American and German artists are signed up. But my profits are my best explanation.

In the spring of 1968, just three months after the NEM went into effect, one of the most exciting musical events in postwar Hungary took place. Bypassing the standard (and frequently unproductive) government channels for events of this type, the Hungarian Concert Agency, acting on its own initiative, booked the American Negro singer Ella Fitzgerald and a jazz trio for a one-night appearance at the 2,000-seat Erkel Theater. The demand for tickets exceeded 50,000, even though it was well-known that the concert would be carried live on the radio. Several days later, with the city still talking about the extraordinary success of the American singer, I asked a Hungarian cultural official why this event had not been negotiated within some framework of official Hungarian-American cultural cooperation. He replied:

I am in the political game, while the concert agents are out to make profit. That is the NEM in a nutshell for you. But what's the difference how it happens? In the end the effect is the same.

Although the NEM accounts for some of these signs of liberalization, it would be unrealistic to ignore other encouraging developments which are not directly tied to economic motivation, but rather reflect the gradual evolution that has characterized Hungarian institutions in the past five years. Striking among these new attitudes is the regime's recognition of the importance of Hungarian youth to the future of the nation and the party. Last year new legislation granting students a greater say in the administration and policies of Hungarian universities was greeted enthusiastically by the youth —a segment of Hungarian society which has by and large remained remarkably phlegmatic and unmoved by the revolutionary ardor of its peers elsewhere, even in Eastern Europe. Student bodies all over Hungary interpreted the gesture as an affirmative nod by the party, inviting the emergence of an informed and participating youth in academic life. As though to underline this new policy, Kadar himself paid an unprecedented visit in May 1969 to Eotvos Lorand University in Budapest; standing in shirtsleeves before a packed auditorium, he spoke for some five hours on the problems of the nation and how they affected his audience. The free-wheeling question-and-answer period that followed was described to me by a member of that audience as remarkable for its candor.

In the following month a speech delivered by Gyorgy Aczel also created excitement in the academic and intellectual community. Aczel, a former Stalinist who has undergone a complete transformation and now counts among Kadar's most intimate and liberal associates (he is also close friends with such literary dissidents as non-Communist Gyula Illyes and veteran Communist Tibor Dery), has assumed charge of Hungary's intellectual life since the death of Szirmai. In a major address delivered to the party's Political Academy, Aczel spelled out a program of reorganization of the sciences which introduced concepts as bold and ideologically unorthodox in their premises as the NEM.[5] Hungarian intellectuals who have discussed the speech with me see in Aczel's approach the makings of a new humanism in science which could have repercussions in the liberal arts as well. Aczel called for a reorganization of scientific life along

[4] *Nepszabadsag*, Nov. 30, 1967.

[5] *Ibid.*, June 28, 1969.

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pragmatic lines, and for a return to emphasis on the universities as centers of learning, as opposed to the current emphasis in the sciences on individual institutes, which are under the control of the Academy of Sciences. The latter proposal was targeted at the Academy, which, as a physicist described it to me, functions as a gigantic Ministry of Science that has often stifled research and inquiry.

In his speech Aczel also affirmed the concept of the right of error in research and in effect "rehabilitated" sociology, long one of the most abused of disciplines in Hungary and other Communist countries. This emphasis was all the more striking since the Sociological Institute of the Academy had just been the center of a controversy related to the Czechoslovak crisis (in September 1968 three of its members were dismissed for protesting the invasion of Czechoslovakia; when the Institute's Director, former premier Andras Hegedus, voiced his protests in a widely-discussed letter to the Central Committee, he was also removed).[6]

Inquiries into the Past

Still another unpredicted turn of events took place in the spring of 1969 with the sudden resurfacing of the Rajk affair, which has haunted Hungarian Communists for two decades. A leading member of the early Communist regime, Laszlo Rajk was arrested, tried and executed in 1949 on charges of Titoism and treason. It has always been an open secret that Rajk, who was a close friend of Tito's, was the Hungarian sacrifice that Rakosi made to Stalin following the Yugoslav heresy. Far from being a traitor to the cause, Rajk was a dedicated Communist as well as patriot, widely respected at the time and still recalled with warmth. One of his friends from student days discussed him recently with me, and even though not a Communist himself, spoke about Rajk in glowing terms:

Laci was my dearest friend in those days, and we had one thing in common—a deep feeling for Hungary and the injustices that history had showered upon our native country. Laci believed profoundly that the binding force of communism would eliminate all future injustices. He had no love for the Russians or for the Soviet Union, and never went to Moscow. Stalin, through Rakosi, had him killed because he was the first of the Communist liberals. How he would have thrived today!

In October 1956 Rajk was rehabilitated, disinterred from an unmarked grave in the forest near Godollo, and reburied in a state funeral.

In May 1969, when Rajk would have been 60 years old, the Budapest authorities decided to name a street after him; thus Pannonia became Lazlo Rajk *utca*. In the same month Hungarian intellectuals were astonished to open their copies of the literary journal *Kortars* and read an article by veteran Communist Aladar Mod reviving the old controversy by asking questions about Rajk's trial and execution. Even more astonishing was the June issue of *Kortars*, which published a response by the hitherto silent widow of Rajk, Julia, in which she called for an investigation of the case and the fixing of responsibility for her husband's death.

Hidden behind these charges and innuendos was a fact known to every student of recent Hungarian political history: the closest friend Rajk had in Hungary at the time of his arrest was the Minister of Interior, Janos Kadar. Thus a number of intellectuals expressed the opinion to me that the articles were opening up a Pandora's Box which might have far-reaching repercussions, since it was generally believed that Rajk had "confessed" at the urging of Kadar, who in turn had been ordered by Rakosi to convince Rajk that his admission of guilt was for the good of the party. So far nothing more has been said on the matter, but it is nonetheless highly interesting that the articles were published in the first place. One party historian offered me his interpretation of the articles:

We are trying to introduce our youth into our thinking, our planning for the future. By talking about such a hypersensitive matter as the fate of Laszlo Rajk, we are telling the new generation of youth that no problem of the past is too delicate to discuss—that we are not afraid to talk openly even about this terrible tragedy of 20 years ago, in which many leaders of the present were involved—thereby giving assurance that such crimes cannot be repeated. How else can we attract the young into our ranks?

Toward Freer Discussion

In this respect, no figure in Hungary today is more vocal, more respected and more revisionist than the grand old man of Marxist philosophy, Gyorgy Lukacs, who sits in his apartment overlooking the Danube and with Olympian detachment hurls thunderbolts in the form of pronouncements, interviews and articles. Now fully rehabilitated and again in the party, the 85-year old scholar has Hungary's youth very much on his mind as he calls repeatedly for a complete rejection of the Stalinist-

[6] See *Partelet* (Budapest), December 1968.

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Rakosi past and for the freedom to ask pointed questions and have them answered. "How else," Lukacs asked recently, puffing vigorously on a cigar, "can the party ever again win confidence?"

Asking questions has in fact become a national pastime—and since late 1968, anyone with a telephone can take part. A television feature entitled "Forum" invites the public to address questions to a rotating panel of experts chosen to deal with specific subjects. The first program was concerned with foreign policy; the public, initially suspicious that no question would be given its full due, hesitated to phone in. But, as one of the panelists later told me, it was decided in advance to encourage questions about the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia so as to clear the air at the outset. The first question-and-answer on that touchy theme triggered other calls; and although some of the replies would not have satisfied a Western audience, Hungarian viewers sensed something new when occasional candor penetrated the television screen. With this small reserve of confidence, "Forum" took on economic problems in its second program, the panel headed by the NEM's chief expert, Rezso Nyers. A third program devoted to law and order featured the Minister of Justice. The calls, which are unscreened and can be heard as they are made, usually far exceeded what can be dealt with in 90 minutes of air time, and several newspapers have been running the questions—with replies—which could not be answered on live TV. Few themes have been too sacrosanct for treatment. I recall my own astonishment when a viewer asked: "What can you tell us about the mystery of the gun shots as the cosmonauts entered the Kremlin?" The reply, by one of Hungary's most prominent editors, was anodyne—it could not have been otherwise since that episode still remains a mystery—but the fact that a question with anti-Soviet implications could be aired on television did not go unnoticed.

There is other evidence of a growing freedom of spirit and inquiry in Hungary which may not seem important to some Western observers, but which Hungarians assess in a relative light—that is, relative to conditions prior to 1956, and to conditions in the Soviet Union and other Communist countries. Some of these small signs are worth noting. Early in 1969, for instance, an entire evening at the University Theater was devoted to readings by two of Hungary's leading theatrical personalities: a well-known actor offered excerpts from a "literary" document that turned out to be a Moscow regional party report attacking the late Hungarian poet Jozsef Attila, which incensed the youthful audience; and a well-known actress read excerpts from the New Testament, which enthralled it. In another sphere, a new ten-volume history of Hungary which, several historians have assured me, will be factual and heavily documented is now nearing completion and will be published later this year. In the literary field, after 17 years of silence a new history of Hungarian literature—a problematical subject given the vagaries of Communist cultural policy—is again to be published under the guidance of Bela Kopeczi, a highly cultivated party theoretician educated in Paris. Film critics are excited by the motion pictures of Miklos Jancso, the foremost new director in Hungary, who is unafraid to question the past or to defy his critics. As one intellectual recently mused over these "signs of change," he remarked, "Perhaps you in the West do not find these as significant as we do, but may I inquire—could these things have happened ten years ago here, or are they happening in East Germany, Romania, Bulgaria and the Soviet Union today?"

Does all this, meager as it may sometimes appear, satisfy the intellectuals? Not really, say many, but it could be worse, and it is enough to establish an atmosphere in which they can create. When asked by Western journalists whether artists can write, paint and compose as they wish, Hungary's intellectuals are apt to infer that the very question displays ignorance of the problems of East Europe—and that it is unrealistic to expect the party to give up its prerogatives in this field. Further, they add, creative freedom is not the major problem; their biggest worry is stagnation, for if they become sterile, there is no future for Hungarian culture.

The Outlook from Moscow

Thus, Hungary is moving forward on several fronts at a pace which provides an atmosphere everyone can tolerate, and which at the same time assures the Soviet leadership that the Hungarian party leaders are stable, dependable, and unwilling to leap into risky situations. Kadar and the liberal reformers with whom he has surrounded himself are pursuing this transformation with patience and a minimum of publicity. As to how far the present trend can go, some think it has already gone as far as it can, or as far as the Soviet leadership will permit. Others are more hopeful.

As seen through Soviet eyes, no situation in Eastern Europe should be more pleasing than that which obtains in Hungary. Thirteen years ago Kadar assumed power at the termination of the

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most tragic event in contemporary Hungarian history. Following a process of consolidation that lasted several years, Kadar gradually introduced measures which seemed aimed at achieving a degree of respectability abroad for his regime and at the same time promoting his own image as a socialist reformer among the cynical Hungarian masses. He released the intellectual leaders of the 1956 uprising, such as Tibor Dery and Zoltan Zelk; he filled the shops with clothing, food, television sets and imports from abroad; he stopped the jamming of the "Voice of America" and "Radio Free Europe"; he concluded cultural and scientific agreements with many Western nations, allowing—*inter alia*—the exchange of persons and the import of Western films, plays, books and magazines; and he permitted Hungarians to travel to the West in large numbers. At no time was there any indication that the Soviet leaders were disposed to interfere.

As the Dubcek era dawned and the other East European Communist rulers took positions pro and con the Czechoslovak course, Kadar assumed the role of a neutral—but by no means an indifferent neutral. Behind the scenes, he communicated with Dubcek and with Brezhnev, acting as intermediary. In June 1968 Dubcek displayed his pleasure at the sympathetic position of his Hungarian colleague by paying a much-heralded visit to Budapest, an event which caused much excitement in the country, especially when upon his arrival Dubcek greeted Kadar in Hungarian. The two-day visit was marred only by one inopportune development—the coincidental appearance in the Czech journal *Literarni listy* of an article commemorating the 10th anniversary of the execution of Imre Nagy. Party colleagues of Kadar's later described to me his dismay at this injudicious gesture, and suggested that despite the effusive warmth he showed his Slovak guest, Kadar for the first time had misgivings about his neighbor's judgment and ability to contain reformist trends. Toward the end of July he engaged in a series of unpublicized meetings with Dubcek and the Soviet leaders, apprising them of developments as he interpreted them. As the crisis approached a climax, Kadar began to warn Dubcek directly of the consequences of his unchecked policies, reminding him of Hungary's experience in 1956. Dubcek turned a deaf ear to Kadar's recommendations; according to the best information available to me, at their final secret meeting in Komarom near the Hungarian-Czechoslovak border on August 18, 1968, Dubcek became angry with Kadar and stormed out of the meeting.

Hungarian journalists with whom I have discussed Kadar's intensive, last-minute efforts to salvage the Czechoslovak situation have offered the following interpretation of events. Initially, as Prague's January program proceeded evenly, if exuberantly, Kadar saw only gains for his own reforms; he pleaded the Czechoslovak cause with Moscow in the conviction that in numbers there is strength—or as one editorial writer put it to me, "two socialist states pushing hard for democratic reforms are more formidable and difficult to crush than one." When the Czechoslovak media took an open anti-Soviet line, however, Kadar decided that Dubcek was getting dangerously close to the kind of rash defiance that had led Imre Nagy to withdraw Hungary from the Warsaw Pact in 1956. (One source told me that Kadar implored Dubcek at this point to fire Jiri Pelikan, Director of Czechoslovak Television, for having publicly announced that Czechoslovak Television did not belong to the Communist Party but to the people.) Kadar now realized the inevitable consequences of Dubcek's course and saw in it a direct threat to his own well-planned and soberly escalated reform program. Bitter and disillusioned in the wake of the military intervention, he at first withdrew from public life. But ultimately he returned to the fore, using his powers of persuasion to convince Moscow that Hungary—in contrast to Czechoslovakia—was not embarked on a perilous course. The liberal forces he generated are still in motion and thriving, and he has achieved something striking in view of the conditions 13 years earlier when he came to power: he has won the respect of large segments of the population. Lukacs expressed the general attitude to me one day in his study, putting it this way:

Kadar is probably the best man we could have had for what had to be done. And what had to be done is still going on. Of course there are problems, and I will not hesitate to criticize the present if it doesn't correspond to the future I hope for. But if there is a step backward here and there, which may be necessary, it is a mistake to hold this against Kadar or anyone around him. Some of those people know what Stalinism is, and none better than Kadar, who was imprisoned by Rakosi, tortured and humiliated. I hope that is generally known in the West. Kadar will never return Hungary to the pre-1956 era. Stalin's only major contribution to history was developing heavy industry, which helped save the Soviet Union from Hitler. Kadar's contribution is still in process with a great deal more to come.

The Prospects Ahead

Now 57, Kadar is clearly in charge of the party and the country, with no evidence of failing health, declining power, or opposition within the Politburo.

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In the 101-member Central Committee, there is a degree of nebulous resistance to the NEM and other reforms among conservative remnants of the past, but they carry little weight. Some months ago one of Hungary's foremost ideologues assessed the political situation as follows:

The Soviet Central Committee is a powerful body which can and has reversed Politburo decisions. We have reason to believe the decision to invade Czechoslovakia was just such a reversal. But the Hungarian Central Committee carries no such weight. All power lies in our Politburo, the most important members of which, besides Kadar, are Biszku, Nyers, Szirmai and to a lesser degree Komocsin. Fock, now Premier, is growing as a personality and may develop, but unless other new candidates emerge later, the orderly transformation taking place in Hungary today will be led, in the event of Kadar's retirement, by one of those four Kadar associates.

With the death of Szirmai the list is down to three; in the view of some, it is headed by Nyers, at 46 the youngest and most volatile of Kadar's associates, who has the advantage of direct contacts with the Soviet leadership through his periodic reports on the NEM. Other observers are beginning to point to Aczel, who has filled the vacancy left by Szirmai; but the tinge of antisemitic feeling that colors the great animosity still felt in Hungary toward Rakosi and his controlling trio, Gerö, Farkas and Revai—all of whom were Jews—makes it highly unlikely that Aczel, also Jewish, would be given the top position in the party, even though Kadar himself has an unblemished record on the score of antisemitism.

Late in 1970 the 10th Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party will convene. It is expected that some of the older members of the Politburo and the cabinet will be replaced; Kadar will submit his resignation, as is traditional, but he will again be re-elected. The Party Congress will be the culmination of other observances throughout the year: the 1000th anniversary of the birth of King Stephen, the 25th anniversary of the death of Bela Bartok, the 25th anniversary of the Soviet liberation of Hungary, and of course the Hungarian contribution to celebrations of the 100th anniversary of Lenin's birth.

Hungarians also have something else to celebrate, which will be implicit in all the declarations and festivities—the knowledge that Hungary has once again survived a difficult era and is headed on a positive course. The last decade has witnessed not only an economic but a spiritual revival in Hungary, despite its subjection—as often in the past—to a foreign authority and ideology. Hungary survived the Turks and the Austrians; it is now trying to find a *modus vivendi* with the Russians, operating within a "socialist" framework. Hungarians today are breathing easier, clothing their families better, enjoying greater personal liberties, and beginning to see some promise for the future of their children—to a degree which they have not experienced in the last two decades. Though Western-oriented in their outlook and allegiance, they are not concerned when their leaders publicly defend Soviet foreign policy positions, for they consider this a small price to pay for the protection and continuation of Hungary's domestic policies. Many Hungarians with whom I have talked over the years (including journalists, writers, artists, historians, and elements of the working class—some of them party members, many not) are shedding their apathy and cynicism of the post-Rakosi years, encouraged by what they interpret as a genuine concern for human welfare and for the betterment of Hungarian society. One of Hungary's most creative sociologists revealed his view of the situation to the writer one recent evening in the following thoughts:

After all, isn't what is happening here in Hungary a realization of Karl Marx's dream? In the West you associate Karl Marx with violent overthrow of government. This came later with Lenin and Stalin, and their interpretations of Marx. But the old man didn't spend all those hours in the British Museum planning revolutions. He examined and exposed social injustice. Our Lukacs know this better than anyone alive. This is what we think of as Marxism. We know the Chinese don't like what we are doing, and even some Russians. In their eyes we are revisionists. I say, all the more power to us. We wish to remain socialist, but we wish also to transform our society into a more democratic socialism. We have no interest in exporting revolutions. Let other people decide their own fate. We are trying hard here and we will make mistakes, but we shall learn from them. Most important of all, we are doing this without violence, and that already is a break with the past.

Some of Hungary's Communist neighbors are observing her reform course closely. They vividly recall the lessons of 1953, when revolution did not succeed in changing conditions in East Germany; of 1956, when thousands lost their lives in Hungary for naught; and most recently of 1968, when the Czechoslovak "spring" showed that even in the absence of violence reforms that promote too rapid a change or too independent an attitude toward the Soviet Union can be self-defeating. By contrast, the Hungarian blueprint for the future seems to be achieving recognition in Eastern Europe for its measured pace, its pragmatic approach to domestic problems, and its cognizance of Moscow's sensitivity to any reforms that may jeopardize Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe.

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Reviews in Brief

The Generals and the Generalissimo

SEWERYN BIALER, ED.: *Stalin and His Generals—Soviet Military Memoirs of World War II.* New York, Pegasus, 1969.

The stated purpose of this anthology, which contains excerpts from the war memoirs of 36 Soviet military commanders and political commissars, is to elucidate the "character of relations within the command group of the Soviet military establishment shortly before and during the Second World War and, more particularly, the relations among members of the Soviet High Command echelon and Stalin."

By defining his objectives in these terms, the editor is perhaps being a shade too modest. To the general reader, much of the study's value will be found in Mr. Bialer's balanced evaluation of Stalin's conduct of and preparation for the war. Mr. Bialer himself contributes 97 of the book's 565 pages (excluding notes and bibliography), and many of his excerpts from Soviet memoirs seem intended as much to document and illustrate his judgments as to reveal the "political mores among the Soviet elite in the period 1938-1945."

The volume opens with a useful review of Soviet writing on the "Great Patriotic War," which until some ten years ago offered little—apart from purely technical literature — that was worth reading. It was not until after Stalin's death and especially after Khrushchev's exposure of him three years later, in 1956, that historians and military professionals could begin to strive for a measure of objectivity and truthfulness. The basic principles of Soviet historiography remained unaltered: facts still had to be selected, omitted, or distorted so as to prove the wisdom of the party; at the same time, the new leadership realized that a more honest inquiry into the errors of the Stalinist past was indispensable if they were not to be repeated in the future. And thus a considerable improvement as well as a greater volume of Soviet military history ensued, even though Soviet standards of veracity continued to leave something to be desired. For example, without exception, the Soviet writers appearing in Mr. Bialer's book portray the victory over Nazi Germany as virtually an exclusive Soviet achievement, only rarely acknowledging the Allied contribution to it. Lt. General A. S. Yakovlev, a top executive in the Soviet aircraft industry and one of the authors most quoted by the editor, even manages to depict the Nazi-Soviet Pact as dating from after the partition of Poland rather than as preceding and, indeed, setting the stage for it. Thus it is hardly surprising, as Mr. Bialer points out, that the *current* standing of Soviet war leaders is determined by the value most recently attributed to their *past* services—witness the case of Marshal Zhukov, whose wartime achievements were almost never mentioned in print during his periods of eclipse.

Having thus put the reader on his guard against the witnesses quoted in this volume, Mr. Bialer completes his introduction with a general evaluation of the merits and demerits of Stalin as a war leader. All his witnesses "testify to Stalin's complete control over the political, industrial and military aspects of the Soviet war effort . . .," adding that he "personally made every wartime decision of any importance . . . [and] had an extraordinary grasp of war goals and major long-term plans for conducting the war". The Soviet authors are also agreed about Stalin's mastery of detail as well as his lack of talent as a military tactician. As Mr. Bialer sums up their findings:

It was in the middle area, between grand strategy and technical detail, in the area of operational leadership which involves planning and control of battles and campaigns . . . that Stalin made no real contribution. When he did participate, he made major errors, and for the most part he left operational planning to his marshals. Stalin's crucial contribution to victory derived . . . from his ability to organize and administer the mobilization of manpower and material resources. . . .

It is because Stalin relied so heavily on the professionals that they must bear a large part of the responsibility for the costly operational blunders which Khrushchev tried to place exclusively on Stalin's shoulders. The memoirs leave little doubt that it was largely the fault of Stalin's Chief of General Staff, Marshal Bagramian, that the Russian forces trapped at Kiev in the late summer and early fall of 1941 were not permitted to withdraw in time. It seems equally clear that Marshal Timoshenko, a member of the High Command, must assume a fair share of the blame for the dispersal of Soviet offensive strength following the Red Army's successful counterattack at Moscow in the winter of 1942.

At the same time, the witnesses also poignantly reveal the anguish suffered by commanders in the field upon receiving orders from Moscow which they knew would prove fatal to their

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troops, but which they dared not resist or even question. According to Mr. Bialer:

The fresh memory of the Great Purge, reinforced by the fate of frontier commanders executed for alleged treason at the start of the war, contributed to a situation where not only sabotage of Stalin's orders was considered unthinkable, but even legitimate questions concerning the wisdom of operational decisions in the planning stage were risked by few generals and pursued after rejection by almost none.

Marshal Rokossovsky's challenge to Stalin over the 1944 Belorussian campaigns was the exception that proved the rule. Twice sent out of the dictator's office and told to "go and think it over," he stood his ground and finally won Stalin over to his view.

Reminiscences going back to before the outbreak of hostilities provide vivid illustrations of Stalin's early failures that so nearly lost him the war. There are accounts of utterly baffled officers caught in the incomprehensible web of the Great Purge, which, according to the editor, "killed many more senior officers than the four years of war against Germany."

As a result, when the Soviet Union entered the war, only seven percent of its officers corps had received advanced military education, and 37 percent had not even completed intermediate military training. There are fascinating accounts of the astonishment experienced by Soviet arms-procurement missions when, on visits to Germany during the Hitler-Stalin honeymoon period, they were conducted through what were alleged to be the Reich's most modern aircraft plants:

I was uneasy at the candidness with which the most secret weaponry data had been revealed to us. Was it possible that we were being led by the nose and humbugged in an attempt to sell us obsolete equipment? (*Lt. General Yakovlev.*)

There are also revelations of the uncomprehending frustration suffered by commanders in the field who had every reason to believe—up to the moment of the invasion—that their superiors in Moscow were totally unaware of the imminent danger of a Nazi attack:

Right up to the last moment they did not believe in the possibility of an attack by Hitler. Stalin was unnerved and irritated by persistent reports about the deterioration of relations with Germany. He brushed facts and arguments aside more and more abruptly. (*Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov, People's Commissar of the Navy*).

The memoirs not only confirm Stalin's prewar miscalculations but emphasize that they were largely responsible for the reverses suffered by the Red Army in the initial stages of the war. For instance, Stalin's ill-starred preoccupation with offensive strategy proved disastrous:

. . . the decision-makers in Moscow formed a picture of events on the battlefront which bore little resemblance to reality, and they contributed astonishingly well to German success by means of unrealistic orders to counterattack when reinforcement of defensive positions should have been the order of the day.

Yet, Mr. Bialer's final summing up of Stalin's merits as a war leader inclines towards the positive, not only because as time went on the quality of his leadership improved in proportion to the quality of the men he appointed to advise him, but also because "it was in the area of Russia's greatest need, *i.e.*, organization and mobilization of its immense resources, that lay Stalin's greatest strength."

It only remains to say that the book is exceedingly well organized, the excerpts illuminating, and the contributions of the editor both lucid and incisive.

J. H. HUIZINGA

Reviewers in This Issue

J. H. HUIZINGA—Roving correspondent for the *Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant*; holder of the Robert Schumann Prize for his articles on European integration.

VLADIMIR PETROV—On the staff of the Sino-Soviet Institute, George Washington University (Washington, DC); author of *Money and Conquest: Allied Occupation Currencies in World War II* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967).

VERA DUNHAM—Professor in the Slavic Department of Wayne State University (Detroit); author of numerous studies on Soviet literature.

LOTHAR METZL—Research Professor of International Affairs at the Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies, George Washington University (Washington, DC).

DEBORAH HARDY—Assistant Professor of History at the University of Wyoming (Laramie).

PETER KENEZ—Instructor of History at the University of California (Santa Cruz); currently engaged in research in the USSR.

The Gathering Storm

JAMES E. MCSHERRY: *Stalin, Hitler, and Europe, 1933-1939: The Origins of World War II.* Cleveland, World Publishing Co., 1968.

The subject of Soviet-German relations during the Nazi era continues to fascinate historians and political scientists on both sides of the Atlantic. James E. McSherry's present volume (presumably to be followed by an account of relations between Stalin and Hitler during 1939-1941) is essentially a diplomatic history based on extensive research into British, French, Russian, German, and Polish documents, from

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which he quotes many illuminating passages.

It may be argued whether the origins of World War II really date from Hitler's assumption of power and the Nazi-Soviet interplay, or from the Versailles peace settlement and the European political climate created by it. Certainly, the Nazi rise to power can legitimately be regarded as a consequence of the virulent nationalism that emerged in the wake of defeat, and of the traumatic effects of the Great Depression in Germany; the Nazis capitalized on a national paranoia and feelings of isolation that were unquestionably rooted in the outcome of World War I.

Be that as it may, McSherry chooses 1933 as the starting point of his narrative, and the fact that only one-quarter of his book deals with the events preceding Munich indicates the crucial importance he attaches to the Nazi-Soviet rapprochement. Certain chapters of the book are very useful: one, too brief, deals with the Soviet-Japanese conflict and its influence on Stalin's decision to seek an accord with Hitler; another, equally interesting, is devoted to the British-French-Soviet negotiations in Moscow in the summer of 1939. McSherry's periodization of the secret parallel talks between Berlin and Moscow, with the initiatives shifting from one capital to another, is the author's original contribution to our understanding of that critical time.

On the whole, however, one closes the book only partially satisfied. Diplomatic history alone cannot impart an understanding of the magnitude of the events which led to the cataclysm destined to alter the face of the world. We learn what various leaders said and wrote; we sense how inexorably they were drifting toward Armaggedon; but we do not learn from the book *why* they acted as they did. One of the troubles with diplomatic correspondence is that it almost never sheds light on what really motivated the actors. It may be, of course, that most of the men who held the fate of humanity in their hands during the 1930's were in fact only petty politicians and bureaucrats oblivious to the consequences of their actions. But even that deserves elucidation. McSherry's book thus has its limitations, but it is nonetheless the product of considerable research and commendable for its richness of detail.

VLADIMIR PETROV

Mirror of Soviet Life

VERA ALEXANDROVA: *Literatura i zhizn* (Literature and Life). New York, Columbia University Press, 1969.

Soviet literature-watching is more "in" these days than it used to be. The new politics of literature, or literature of politics, focusses attention on the poet who protests, the author who seeks political asylum, or the defecting daughter-writer of the late Soviet dictator. But watching is not reading. Even most specialists exempt themselves from the reading—for most of what fills the fat Soviet journals remains a crashing bore.

For long years before the current fad, a handful of émigrés, joined by a few professors, kept a close and serious watch on the convolutions of the Soviet literary front. But they didn't read the material contained in the journals either. They read Vera Alexandrova.

Since no brief discussion can possibly do justice to the rich posthumous volume of Vera Alexandrova's essays that has now appeared, what follows is not a review, but rather a note in tribute to a unique talent. The volume evokes nostalgia, a feeling of irreparable loss, an urge to put things into perspective.

Vera Alexandrova, a Russian Social Democrat who had to flee her native country shortly after the Revolution, was a pioneer. She began her patient, perceptive readings when it occurred to no one else to do so. Frequently misunderstood as to her purpose, she did her job with singular modesty and selflessness. She was not a literary scholar nor critic in a restrictive sense. Nor could her approach be called narrowly sociological, although it was that more than anything else. Her rich, eclectic method held her probing in focus: the undigging of truth about the life of Everyman. For decades, she kept her eye on the contortions of literary policy and on the changing nuances in establishmentarian fiction because of the conviction that under Soviet totalitarianism everything is totally interconnected. She managed to do more than disclose the enslavement of literature. Through that enslavement and the tragic and futile resistance to it, she arrived at the very taste and flavor of daily Soviet life. She did not preach. She demonstrated and commented. Her ability to see was sustained by an unusual empathy, an empathy above all with the Soviet anonymous reader who saw the transcript, no matter how distorted, of his own life on those pages of perishable fiction.

Literature and Life contains essays Alexandrova wrote from 1927 through 1945. They have all been selected from her contributions to the Russian Social-Democratic journal *Sotsialisticheski vestnik* (Socialist Courier). If a choice had to be made, it was wise, of course, to compile her early work, when she stood alone in carrying it out. Nevertheless, she had just as much to say until the day she died, and a companion volume ought to be published.

The material in the present volume is arranged chronologically. It covers a vast variety of subjects, from reports on international writers' congresses to the perennial travails of the collective farms; from portraits of leading contemporary writers to accounts on the fate of classics. What holds this variegated quilt together is the precision of its purposeful stitching: what does Soviet man live by? And if toward the end there emerges the powerful story of war as a national experience, other major themes bring a natural order to the many-sided narrative from the start.

Although it seems that reporting on the lethal strife between literary bureaucrats and their underlings occupies much space, the main thrust of the book lies elsewhere. The story of the Russian peasantry (told with extraordinary insight), of the working class, and of the intelligentsia—as each lives under dictatorship—emerges as three central themes. A counterpoint is formed by the author's analysis of the changes that have taken place in the regime's "cultural policy." Full and rich treatment is accorded each of these themes, yet they do not run in separate channels. They blend and merge. For the author captures the growing divisiveness, the widening of the corrosive rifts in Soviet society. Shred by shred, cumulative evidence is amassed of the punitive isolation of the rulers from the people. The author shows sensitivity to the smallest detail, the most paradoxical source of solid information. At the time—in the mid-1930's—only Alexandrova cared to ferret out meanings like this from gray and redundant fiction:

The doorbells in the apartments of officials are inevitably answered by servants (*domrabotnitsy*), already nameless; cleaning the apartment,

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they try not to be noisy when the Soviet ladies and their daughters (*baryni i baryshni*) are ill-disposed; the "lower ranks," listening to their angered bosses curse, do not at all run to the party cell to complain about such anti-party behavior of their commanders. Instead, they "stand at attention and blink a lot."

Alexandrova adds:

Precisely this "at attention and blink a lot," resembling so much a figure of lower rank under the old regime, speaks more of the nature of the evolving society than the mile-long discourses of the writers themselves, breathless over its classlessness. (p. 260)

Clusters of detail such as these excised from an avalanche of worthless fiction justify its study as relevant to the study of Soviet society. They help the author to perceive the larger connections, to hear the truly elusive.

But from the depths of the enormous laboring country there swells a darkly boiling wave of the people's half-thoughts, half-feelings, alien to the religion of dictatorship (*vozhdism*), alien to the worship of the infallible wisdom of Communist leadership. It rushes on toward and against the tongue-wagging of the "urban bohemia of clerks." It crashes against the shore of the dictatorial regime. And this darkling wave says: "We, we and not you instead of us—have carried on our shoulders all the burden of reconstruction." (p. 204)

It is in the discontent of the worker and of the peasant, in the alienation from the regime, that Alexandrova saw the main challenge to the Soviet system. She believed in the possibility of growth in the "economic and social weight and social activism of the lower classes (*narodnye nizy*)" (p. 206), leading to the eventual disintegration of the totalitarian structure. Therein she showed herself an optimist.

Nobility of spirit permeates this volume. It is foolish to quarrel with the author's passionate political credo or with her hopes. They stem from one source: love and compassion for the Russian people whom she never left.

To Solomon Schwartz, her husband, who put this book together with the devotion it deserves, those who care for what Vera Alexandrova stood for owe a debt of gratitude.

VERA S. DUNHAM

In and Out of Uniform

ROBERT CONQUEST, ED.: *The Soviet Police System*. The Contemporary Soviet Union Series: New York, F. A. Praeger, 1968.

Considering the dearth of authoritative studies about the Soviet secret police, this slim, 80-page primer, graced by Robert Conquest's editorship and eloquent introduction, represents at least a welcome beginning—and a reminder of how much more work needs to be done on what Conquest calls "an extremely central and sensitive area of Soviet life and politics."

Commendably, the researchers have assembled more than 350 references, mostly from open Soviet sources, which trace the outlines of a bureaucratic jungle of vast proportions. It is evident, however, that this jungle still defies scholarly attempts to bring order into a system of repression which is itself a cultural disorder of the first magnitude. Be this as it may, the authors manage to cover many years (1917-1966) and much territory (operations at home and abroad), pointing out some of the uglier sights along the way.

The book's seven loosely-linked chapters discuss the organizational evolution and proliferation of the entire police apparatus; the size, organization, and budget of its specialized forces (militia, border troops, internal troops, etc.); the repressive campaigns of the Cheka and its successors from the days of the postrevolutionary Red Terror through the anti-kulak drive which accompanied mass collectivization, and from the great purges of the 1930's through the period of the prewar and wartime deportations, with a postlude on the purges of Beria and his men. A section on police controls (internal passports, frontier procedures, the licensing system, censorship, etc.) is followed by a glimpse into the role of the police in the judicial system and an assessment of the legal limitations placed upon police authority since Stalin's death. An essay on the evolution of the penal and economic function of the police (forced labor) and a rather thin summary of secret police operations abroad round out the book.

The virtue of this arrangement lies in its focus on the Soviet state security apparatus as an instrument of domestic represssion. This function is sometimes obscured by sensational Western accounts of Soviet spying abroad, as well as by recent Soviet literature glorifying the exploits of men like the famous Richard Sorge, the Soviet foreign agent who posed as an ardent Nazi and sat as a key advisor in the office of the German Ambassador in Tokyo before and during the early years of World War II. The focus on the internal role of the KGB, the latest in the line of successors to the Cheka, would have been even sharper had the authors seen fit to go more deeply into the present regime's campaign against intellectuals, nationalists, and ethnic minorities.

Nevertheless, the book should be useful to teachers and students, if only to stimulate further research. In this respect, however, a word of caution. The bibliography is good on Soviet reference materials, but its listing of Western sources is definitely out of date, omitting a number of respectable works published in the last ten to fifteen years.

LOTHAR METZL

Precursor of Bolshevism?

WEEKS, ALBERT L. *The First Bolshevik: A Political Biography of Peter Tkachev*. New York, New York University Press, and London, University of London Press Ltd., 1968.

Professor Weeks' contention that Tkachev was the "first Bolshevik" is—in the reviewer's opinion—a turnabout in historical thinking. It would be more accurate to adopt the phrase of the late historian, Michael Karpovich, and call this Russian revolutionary of the 1870's a "forerunner of Lenin." As a matter of fact, although Lenin's ideas about the tactics of revolution paralleled those of Tkachev, the two disagreed on many aspects of revolutionary theory. Among the concepts Lenin may have drawn from Tkachev, whom he admired, or from Auguste Blanqui, where Tkachev found them, are those on the role of the revolutionary minority, the importance of seizing political power, party organization, and the need for a post-revolutionary dictatorship. In fact, this Lenin-Tkachev-Blanqui relationship was hotly debated in the Soviet press in the 1920's.

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Beyond these tactical considerations, Professor Weeks' thesis loses ground. To begin with, Tkachev showed little sympathy for Marxism in any form. He admired Marx's research and approved of his economic determinism, having independently developed a somewhat similar though by no means identical outlook. But, contrary to what Prof. Weeks suggests, Tkachev's open quarrel with Engels was far more substantive than a squabble over the policies of the First International. It was a bitter argument anticipating later disagreements between Marxists and populists. At the time, Engels argued that capitalism already existed in Russia and not even the village communal tradition (which Tkachev idealized) could help her bypass the bourgeois era into immediate socialism. Tkachev thought the opposite and detested the Social Democrats for their assumption that socialism could only come about in an industrialized society, with the proleteriat battling the bourgeoisie. He frequently termed the Social Democrats "reactionaries" for opposing the idea of an immediate revolution. Lenin's modifications of Marxism in the direction of populism have provided material for interesting studies, but insofar as Lenin remained a Marxist, his differences with Tkachev remained fundamental.

Mr. Weeks' book provides little insight into Tkachev's personality, perhaps because biographical data is presented only in one summary chapter. There are minor factual errors: Tkachev's wife did not remain in Russia, as Weeks claims, but joined him in Switzerland. There is no evidence that Tkachev knew the young revolutionary Ballod; their cases were tried together merely for administrative convenience. The claim that Tkachev adopted the "Marxian labor theory of value" (p. 132) seems to be stretching a point, in that he probably came upon the theory indirectly from other sources. The same may be said about the author's tendency to affix the label "proto-Bolshevist" to many of Tkachev's writings, some of which, in the opinion of this reviewer, do not lend themselves at all to this designation.

All these strictures apart, it must nevertheless be acknowledged that Professor Weeks has offered us a challenging thesis, worthy of further investigation. As the first full-length book on Tkachev to be published in any language, this work is to be welcomed and recommended to students of populism and Marxism alike.

DEBORAH HARDY

Revolution Manquée

ALEXANDER RABINOWITCH: *Prelude to Revolution. The Petrograd Bolsheviks and the July 1917 Uprising.* Bloomington, Indiana, Indiana University Press, 1968.

Mr. Rabinowitch must have sifted through an enormous amount of primary and secondary sources in order to produce such a thorough and balanced study of the Petrograd Bolsheviks in the July Crisis of 1917.

Unfortunately, the description of the background of the crisis—and this takes up more than half of the study—is by far its weakest part. The author pays no attention to the dwindling food supply, to the dissatisfaction over the government's handling of the war, or to the government crisis created by the resignation of the Kadet ministers. He prefers, instead, to concentrate on the ultimately fruitless debates within the Petrograd Bolshevik Organization, leaving the impression that history, or at least the history of revolutions, is nothing more than the sum total of boring conferences. However, in his treatment of the uprising itself, Mr. Rabinowitch shows that he is adept at handling dramatic material: he is able to portray confusion without falling victim to it. Quite properly—and unlike Soviet historians—he concentrates on the role played by soldiers (as opposed to workers) in the rising.

The author's main points are all well taken. Only the Soviet historian, who must on occasion be anachronistic in order to serve the interests of the present, would question the author's contention that the Bolsheviks were divided in the summer of 1917. On this point, the evidence adduced by Mr. Rabinowitch (for example, about the independent policy of the Bolshevik Military Organization) seems conclusive. He also takes a sensible approach to the chief question which arises in connection with the July Crisis, namely, whether Lenin was preparing to take power at that particular time. In the author's view, nobody planned the rising—especially not Lenin, who was out of the city and only imperfectly in touch with the situation. Naturally, with soldiers and workers demonstrating in the streets, it may have appeared to revolutionary leaders that their time had come. But Lenin, clearheaded politician that he was, evaluated the situation correctly and understood that neither the soldiers at the front nor the rest of the country would tolerate a *coup d'etat* at that moment. There is nothing more impressive about Lenin's tactical genius than his ability to know when and how to call a retreat. His decision to avoid an untimely struggle with forces loyal to the government probably saved the Bolshevik Party from destruction.

The weaknesses of *Prelude to Revolution*, such as they are, result from the author's very narrow delineation of his topic. For one thing, it is impossible to understand the history of the July Days by concentrating on the role of the Bolsheviks alone. The reader will get the mistaken impression, perhaps unintended by the author, that the party played a more active role than in fact it did. The Bolsheviks did not create the disorders; they merely took advantage of them. On this point the author seems to have fallen prey to the Soviet conception of revolutionary history, which looks at events exclusively from the Bolshevik point of view. It is also a pity that his study is devoted solely to the Petrograd Bolsheviks. The leaders of the party obviously looked beyond Petrograd to the conquest of the entire country.

To sum up, then, the study suffers from a certain narrowness of focus. Had Mr. Rabinowitch decided to investigate the July Days within a somewhat larger context, he might have produced an invaluable book. As it is, he gave us a reliable and useful work—which, to be sure, is no mean achievement.

PETER KENEZ

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The Life and Afterlife of a Bolshevik Jurist

By Eugene Kamenka and Alice Erh-soon Tay

In the 1920's—the only period of genuine "creative Marxism" that the Soviet Union has ever known—Yevgeni Bronislavovich Pashukanis was the foremost and ablest expositor of Marxist jurisprudence. His *General Theory of Law and Marxism*, first published in Moscow in 1924, went through three Russian edition in five years, and the German translation of the third edition, issued in Berlin and Vienna in 1929, attracted international attention. As critical a non-Marxist jurist as Professor Lon Fuller of Harvard, reassessing Pashukanis' chief work more than twenty years later, wrote:

> **In this short book, Pashukanis expounds with clarity and coherence an ingenious development of Marxist theory that has been called the "Commodity Exchange Theory of Law." His work is in the best tradition of Marxism. It is the product of thorough scholarship and wide reading. It reaches conclusions that will seem to most readers perverse and bizarre, yet in the process of reaching these conclusions it brings familiar facts of law and government into an unfamiliar and revealing perspective. It is the kind of book that any open-minded scholar can read with real profit, however little he may be convinced by its main thesis.**[1]

Certainly, one finds in the book a freshness of style and of thought that was soon to disappear from Soviet intellectual life. Pashukanis combines a genuine and scholarly involvement in jurisprudence and legal history with an equally genuine feeling for Marx's method and concerns. Not only is he sensitive to the achievements of other scholars—of Laband, Jellinek, Duguit, Maine and Maitland—but he rejects the theoretically crude simplifications of Engels and Lenin to focus on the subtleties of a Marx that most of his contemporaries had not fully appreciated.

Early in his career, Pashukanis reaped the rewards of combining intelligence with Bolshevik *partiinost* (party-mindedness). Active in the Petersburg revolutionary student movement, he joined the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party in 1908, at the age of 17. Two year later he was arrested and sentenced to exile, choosing to continue his legal studies at the University of Munich. In 1914 he had a part in drafting the declaration of the Bolshevik fraction in the Duma opposing the war in Europe, and in 1917 he was briefly associated with the Menshevik Internationalists.

After he joined the Communist Party in August 1918, he undertook party work in the Moscow Region, becoming first a People's Judge and then a member of the Presidium of the Moscow Soviet of People's Judges and of the Appeals Tribunal attached to the All-Union Central Executive Committee of the party. In

Dr. Kamenka and his wife, Dr. Tay, are both of the Australian National University in Canberra. Marxism and Jurisprudence, *a book they are writing jointly, will soon be published in London and New York, as will Dr. Kamenka's* The Philosophy of Ludwig Feuerbach *and Dr. Tay's* Soviet Law and Legal Problems.

[1] L. Fuller, "Pashukanis and Vyshinsky: A Study in the Development of Marxian Legal Theory", *Michigan Law Review* (Ann Arbor), Vol. 47, 1949, p. 1159.

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1920 he was assigned to "responsible work" in the Commissariat of Justice, remaining there until 1924, when he was transferred to academic duties in the Communist Academy.[2] He was elected a full member of the Academy in 1927, subsequently becoming its Vice-President, and after 1931 served as Director of the influential Institute of Soviet Construction and Law. When, in 1936, he became Deputy Commissar of Justice of the USSR and was proposed for full membership in the Soviet Academy of Sciences, he seemed to be nearing the pinnacle of success.

Yet within less than a year, this honored innovator in Marxist jurisprudence was being denounced as an "unmasked traitor and wrecker," a propounder of "rotten theories," an ally of Trotskyism and Bukharinism, and a "liquidator" of socialist law and legality who, by submerging law in a flood of economic categories, had betrayed his ignorance of Marxism and Marxist philosophy. The new and barely literate champions of Soviet ideology, from the "philosopher" P. F. Yudin to the police prosecutor A. Ya. Vyshinsky, poured their venom on "the heinous activities and "traitorous 'philosophy' " of the "band of our enemies headed by Pashukanis, Krylenko, Berman and others."[3] Early in 1937, Pashukanis was arrested. Vyshinsky replaced him as Director of the Institute of Soviet Construction and Law[4] (charging that huge amounts of money had been squandered, and no work done), and Pashukanis' courses at the Moscow Juridical Institute were taken over by A. K. Stalgevich, a long-time critic of Pashukanis' work, who was himself dismissed in 1939. The main Soviet journal of legal theory, *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo*, of which Pashukanis had been editor, suspended publication from January until September of 1937, when it came out with an issue devoted entirely to "unmasking" the "enemy of the people" Pashukanis and his "un-Marxist" theories. One of the articles, written by S. Bratus, specifically elaborated upon the harmful effects of Pashukanis' "diversionist," anti-Leninist theories in the field of civil law. Though relatively literate in comparison with Vyshinsky's fulminations, Bratus' article made full use of the calumniatory language of the time.

Pashukanis himself disappeared with his arrest. No record of his trial has ever been published, and nothing has yet been revealed as to the date and manner of his death.

After nearly twenty years in disgrace and oblivion, the condemned jurists of the 1920's and 1930's—P. I. Stuchka, N. V. Krylenko, A. G. Goikhbarg, and Pashukanis—were accorded a general sort of rehabilitation following the 20th CPSU Congress. In the case of Pashukanis, however, renewed recognition of his genuine intellectual stature has been remarkably slow in coming. Stuchka, who had been vilified in terms no less abusive than those used against Pasukanis, and who had been commonly linked with him, has been resurrected to the status of a major hero of the Latvian Communist movement.[5] Also, a one-volume selection of his legal works, including the previously proscribed *Introduction to the Theory of Civil Law*, was published in Riga in 1964 and has since been freely available in the Soviet Union. The preface to this book mentions Pashukanis as one of the talented legal thinkers of Stuchka's time, and Stuchka's text frequently cites Pashukanis—though usually with reservations.

The works of Pashukanis himself, however, have to all appearances never been republished and remain generally unavailable. In 1965-66, when the present authors spent a year in the Soviet Union, it proved impossible to find any of these works in second-hand bookshops in Moscow, Leningrad and Riga, although the writings of other rehabilitated Soviet scholars, such as A. M. Deborin, as well as of non-Marxist legal writers of the pre-revolutionary period, were available. Assistants in the bookshops knew Stuchka's name but claimed never to have heard of Pashukanis or to have seen any of his works.[6] Current general texts on Soviet law and on its history do not mention Pashukanis, nor is he mentioned in the six-volume *History of Philosophy*, published in 1965, which does refer briefly to Stuchka. Only in

[2] Some of these details of Pashukanis' career are taken from the published report (*Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*, No. 8, 1968, pp. 150-51) of an address by L. I. Ratner on "The Life and Work of Ye. B. Pashukanis" delivered at a Moscow commemorative meeting in March 1968. More will be said about this meeting later.

[3] A. Ya. Vyshinsky, "The Fundamental Tasks of the Science of Soviet Socialist Law," an address to the First Congress on Problems of the Sciences of Soviet State and Law, translated in Hugh W. Babb and John N. Hazard, *Soviet Legal Philosophy*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1951, p. 315.

[4] The Institute had meanwhile been renamed the Institute of State Law.

[5] Stuchka, who died in 1932 and was condemned posthumously, left his post as People's Commissar of Justice in Lenin's government in August 1918 to play a leading part in the Latvian revolution and became president of the short-lived Latvian Soviet Republic. He subsequently served as Deputy Commissar of Justice and Chairman of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR. His relatively complete rehabilitation, symbolized by a statue in one of Riga's main squares, was probably speeded by a desire to provide the Latvians with a suitable (Soviet) national figure.

[6] The author's own copy of the first Russian edition of Pashukanis' *General Theory* was a valued present from a Soviet citizen, who had kept it on his bookshelf (in a paper cover) as an exciting "condemned book."

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some very specialized monographs—most notably, in a work by M. S. Strogovich in 1966—has Pashukanis been mentioned. These few references (not intended for law students at the undergraduate level) are not abusive, but they are decidedly critical and unenthusiastic.

Against this background, it was of some significance that in March 1968 the legal section of the Moscow *Dom uchenykh* (a club of scientists and scholars) staged a memorial meeting in honor of the "most gifted Soviet legal scholar, Ye. B. Pashukanis," a one-page account of which was later published in the leading Soviet legal journal, *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*.[7] Ironically enough, the meeting was presided over by the same S. [N.] Bratus who had played an active part in the campaign of vilification against Pashukanis in 1937—now one of the leading Soviet academic authorities on civil law. In his opening address, Bratus declared:

The memory of Ye. B. Pashukanis lives not only among his students and all those who came into close contact with him, but also among many legal scholars, both in the USSR and other socialist countries, and even in some capitalist countries. Ye. B. Pashukanis wrote more than a hundred works. Many scholars still today return to Pashukanis' book, *The General Theory of Law and Marxism*. In spite of some incorrect positions in this work, it is on the whole distinguished by the precision of its analysis and by its profound application of Marxist methodology.

According to the *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo* account, other speakers at the memorial meeting were: L. I. Ratner, of the Institute of State and Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences, who paid tribute to Pashukanis' leading role in organizing associations of Soviet legal scholars and representing the USSR in international juridical conference; L. Ya. Gintsburg, once a collaborator with Pashukanis on a textbook of economic-administrative law,[8] who discussed the place of Pashukanis' *General Theory of Law and Marxism* in the history of Soviet juridical science; and D. B. Levin, also of the Institute of State and Law, who stressed the innovative character of Pashukanis' contributions in the field of international law and noted that some of his positions still had not lost their significance. Among the others present were Ye. V. Rubinin, a close friend and colleague of Pashukanis in the Commissariat of Justice; the biologist N. S. Dorvatovsky, who was once a schoolmate of Pashukanis; and Pashukanis' widow and son.

If the meeting brought forth any disclosures concerning Pashukanis' fate following his 1937 arrest, the published account failed to reveal them. In fact, the account traced Pashukanis' career only up to 1936 and made no reference whatever to his arrest, dismissal, and disappearance. Nor did the account specify the occasion for the memorial meeting. Since Pashukanis was born February 10 (new calender: February 23), 1891, it is possible that the gathering was a slightly belated observance of the anniversary of his birth.

The memorial meeting may well have been the first clear signal to Soviet lawyers that they may again refer to Pashukanis in non-critical terms. When Bratus spoke of Soviet legal scholars "still today" returning to Pashukanis' *General Theory*, he was certainly reporting inaccurately, but he was probably doing something much more important—namely, licensing them to do so. Many Soviet lawyers, however, may prefer to wait until the exact conditions of the license are clarified. The second volume of the *History of State and Law in the USSR*, dealing with the post-1917 period, was published in the Soviet Union last year, but curiously enough it failed to shed any light on these conditions. Making no mention whatever of Pashukanis, it treated the development of Soviet law and legal institutions as inspired by Lenin and the various collective organs of the party and government and eschewed any reference to personalities. Thus it is not from contemporary Soviet writing that we can gain any real impression of Pashukanis' stature or any insight into his theories. Let us therefore look at these theories independently.

Although Marx began his university career as a law student, the classics of Marxism notoriously contain no comprehensive or systematic discussion of legal systems or jurisprudential theories. That law, like the state, will "wither away" under communism is clearly stated and has become (and officially still remains) an article of the Leninist faith. But precisely how the materialist interpretation of history explains past and existing legal systems is not clear. Marx, in his popular pamphleteering, and Engels, in his work generally, tend to treat elements of the social superstructure as expressions of class interests, and law or the legal system as a system of normative rules employing state and police power to impose the interests of the ruling class on society as a whole. In much of his more serious work, however—*e.g.*, in *The German Ideology* and in *Capital*, as well as in

[7] "In memory of Yevgeni Bronislavovich Pashukanis," No. 8 (August) 1968, p. 150.

[8] This fact was not mentioned in the report of the meeting. Pashukanis and Gintsburg's joint work, *Kurs sovetskovo khoziaistvennovo prava*, was published in Moscow in 1935 and subsequently condemned.

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some of his early writings—Marx suggests a subtler view. "Rights and duties," he writes in *The German Ideology*, "are the two complementary sides of a contradiction which belongs only to bourgeois society" [9] —*i.e.*, to the Hobbesian world of abstract individuals engaged in fierce economic competition with one another. Here and elsewhere, the suggestion is that law is a *form of alienation* arising out of the hostile confrontation of individuals treated as ultimate and self-sufficient; it abstracts men out of their community and their affairs and recognizes that they can live only at one another's expense.

Thus, a careful study of the Marxist classics leaves us with two competing tendencies. One, represented by Engels, takes an Austinian view of law as a body of commands, and hence as primarily punitive in nature, enforcing the will of the state, or whatever will the state represents. The other, represented by Marx in his subtler mood, thinks of law as a system of adjudication and judgment in terms of abstract concepts linked to conflicts in civil society, and therefore takes civil law and its categories as the model in terms of which law is to be understood.

Lenin, though himself a lawyer by training and early profession, was interested in law only as a vehicle and expression of political power; for him, it represented the will of the ruling class backed by physical sanctions. After the 1917 Revolution and the creation of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the law became the will of the working class, to be used both as an instrument of coercion against the enemies of the working class and as a form of propaganda within its own ranks defining the aims of the revolutionary movement. Once the proletariat had completely triumphed and all men had become workers, law would disappear because there would be no particular class to impose its will on other classes. Men would live as a cohesive community, settling disputes informally and on the spot. This was the line followed in the more popular forms of Communist propaganda and ideological writing even in the 1920's. In sum, the law was seen as the instrument by which a section of society imposed its will on the rest, and the law of each historical stage of society simply represented the will of its ruling class.

In line with this view, the People's Commissariat of Justice in 1919 defined law as "a system (set of rules) for social relationships which corresponds to the interests of the dominant class and is safeguarded by the organized force of that class." [10] The serious Marxist academic lawyers in Russia, trained in the traditions of 19th-century Continental jurisprudence with its emphasis on the categories of Roman private law, were in the main not Austinians and tended to see law not merely as a set of commands or decrees but rather as a system. On the whole, however, they stressed its normative and ideological character. M. A. Reisner, drawing on the famous psychological view of law espoused by the non-Marxist Russian-Polish legal theorist L. I. Petrazhitsky, argued that law was the expression of predominantly internalized norms varying from class to class, so that Russia after the Revolution had competing systems of proletarian and bourgeois law along with remnants of feudal law, each expressing the interests and attitudes of the appropriate class. The new Soviet state, according to Reisner and a number of other legal writers, was sanctioning and enforcing a particular system of class-law—*i.e.*, proletarian law—against the other systems. When classes disappeared, the need for a formal system of sanctions would disappear, and law would dissolve into morality.

Pashukanis went farther and deeper in his analysis. His *General Theory of Law and Marxism* is essentially a radical and thoroughgoing critique of any attempt to treat law as mere class ideology or to speak of a proletarian system of law replacing a bourgeois system. The point on which any analysis of *law* must concentrate, he argues, is that not all rules or norms are *legal* rules or norms and not all social relationships are *legal* relationships. Although most Marxists before him had taken the element of state compulsion to be the characteristic or defining element of law, Pashukanis rejects this view. Army regulations, rules binding the members of an order or priesthood, or the authoritarian prescriptions of a family head or elder, for example, do not constitute or become *law* if or because they are sanctioned by authority—be it even the authority of the state. They are not law and do not have the form of law because they are based on relations of domination and submission, because they involve obedience to rules rather than the determination of rights.

What is characteristic of *law* and constitutes the

[9] Marx and Engels, *Die deutsche Ideologie* (The German Ideology), in Marx-Engels, *Historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe* (MEGA), Section I, Vol. 5, Moscow-Leningrad, Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, 1933, p. 192.

[10] *Sobranie uzakonenii RSFSR* (Collected Laws of the RSFSR), 1919, No. 66, p. 590. Also cited in P.I. Stuchka, *Izbrannie proizvedeniia po marksistsko-leninskoi teorii prava* (Selected Works on the Marxist-Leninist Theory of Law), Riga, Latvian State Publishing House, 1964, p. 58.

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"essence" or formal quality of law, according to Pashukanis, is the conception of a juridical subject confronting other juridical subjects on the basis of equality and "equivalence." Law is thus characteristically adjudicative and is thereby distinguished from administration; its essence is involved and revealed in the conception of *contract* rather than of decree. The categories and principles characteristic of law presuppose the legal subject as an individual acting "freely" in his relations with other "free" individuals and having rights as well as duties. Such legal subjects must, in law, be abstracted from their social context and reduced to legal individuality and abstract equality, so that even the state can appear in litigation only as another individual subject having rights and duties vis-à-vis the citizen in the same way that the citizen has rights and duties vis-à-vis it.

In line with this, Pashukanis attempts to show how the contractual model in fact dominates all areas of law—public law, with its conception of the social contract and the rights of the citizen; criminal law, which makes the wrongdoer "pay" for his crime according to a scale of fixed penalties; matrimonial and family law, which dissolves familial relationships into a system of reciprocal rights and duties. Here Pashukanis is much closer than Lenin or Reisner—or Vyshinsky and the contemporary Soviet legal theorists—to Marx's fundamental critique of "abstract" law and "abstract" bourgeois justice as proclaiming a formal equality which, in the concrete social situation of class societies, amounts to real *in*equality. "The 'Republic of the Market'," Pashukanis writes in the preface to the second Russian edition of his *General Theory of Law and Marxism*, "conceals the 'Depotism of the Factory.'"

Pashukanis further contends that many Marxist writers, in treating law as ideology and emphasizing the elements of state compulsion and hypocritically-concealed class interest, fail to notice the much more direct connection between law and the economic structure of society. The fundamental presupposition of law, *i.e.*, the principle of the juridical subject (involving the formal principle of freedom and equality, autonomy of the person, etc.), is not, he argues, merely a hypocritical tool used by the bourgeoisie to enslave the proletariat; it is a real, active principle embodied in bourgeois society once it breaks free from the feudal-patriarchal order. Further, the victory of law is not merely an ideological process, but a real, material one—a "judicializing" of human relationships which accompanies the development of a commodity and money economy (in Europe, of capitalism), and which involves the overthrow of serfdom and the separation of political power from society as a particular, *partial* power. Thus, law is not just the "ideology" of the bourgeoisie, but a reflection of the assumptions of commodity exchange: it reflects and secures the conditions necessary for the barter and exchange of products on which commodity production (*i.e.*, production for a market) is built.

Legal categories, Pashukanis goes on to argue, are a precise parallel to the similarly "abstract" economic categories of commodity-producing societies—value, capital, labor, rent—which are fundamental to bourgeois economics and economies (and to all commodity-producing economies), but which lose their medium of existence in societies not oriented to exchange, where, for example, production is for use. Just as the bourgeois economy is the most highly-developed and most abstract form of commodity production, so bourgeois law is the most highly developed and abstract form of law and legal relations. The juridic subject is the abstract goods-possessor elevated to the heavens; the legal relations he enters into correspond to his commercial relations in the market place, express them, and safeguard the conditions of their existence. Thus, according to Pashukanis, law in the proper sense develops around the activities of barter and trade, finds its initial strongholds in cities, comes into conflict with patriarchal relations and all other relations of formal domination and submission, and finally reaches its apogee in bourgeois society.

In socialist society, however, where production is no longer for exchange, Pashukanis holds that the categories of law become as irrelevant, and are as fatally undermined, as the categories of market economics. Policy, economic planning, and administration replace law. The concept of the juridical subject becomes as inapposite as it would be in a primitive commune, an army, or a work-team. It gives way to the socio-economic norm.

On the basis of this analysis, Pashukanis took the position that the Soviet codes of the 1920's were in no sense "socialist law"—in itself a contradiction in terms—but bourgeois law necessitated by the fact that exchange relations had not yet been eliminated in the Soviet Union. Even in criminal law, he argued, these codes were still bourgeois in that they were permeated through and through with the principle of equivalence of retribution. The systematic development of a genuine socialist principle based on the protection of society, he declared,

would require not a tabulation of the separate *constituents of crime* (with which *the measure of punishment* . . . is logically associated) but an exact description of *the symptoms* characterizing a condition which is so-

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cially dangerous, and an elaboration of the *methods* which must be applied in each given case in order to make society secure.[11]

With the abolition of the new Economic Policy and the introduction of the first Five-Year Plan, Pashukanis saw the elimination of the juridical element in human affairs beginning in earnest. In line with his theories, the institute he headed was named the Institute of Socialist Construction and Law—soon, he thought, the word "law" could be dropped. Courses in civil law, under Pashukanis' influence, were replaced by courses in "economic-administrative policy and law" dealing with the regulation of relations between the state and enterprises, which were seen as becoming increasingly non-juridical. Individual rights were relegated to a few hours at the end of these courses, and their status was regarded as merely temporary and linked with the hangovers of bourgeois relations.

By the mid-1930's, Pashukanis had become the acknowledged leader of a school of jurists who were developing and applying his theories in various specific areas of law. (Pashukanis himself did a good deal of work in international law, where he began by denying that there could be a concept of proletarian international law to be distinguished from bourgeois international law.) Nevertheless, even in the 1920's there were critics of his views. The subtlety of his analysis of bourgeois law did not much appeal to Communist propagandists, who preferred to see that law as simply a hypocritical cloak for bourgeois interests; and his insistence that the new Soviet codes, because they still embodied bourgeois attitudes and provisions, did not constitute a creative "socialist" contribution to law conflicted sharply with the growing Soviet penchant for vainglory. Many of his critics felt, more sincerely, that he minimized the normative element in law and ignored the ideological interests enshrined in specific legislation, which—they contended—were precisely what distinguished socialist from bourgeois law.

Following the promulgation of the 1936 Stalin Constitution and the proclamation that socialist law was to be strengthened before law in general began to wither away, the attacks on Pashukanis suddenly took on an entirely different character. Totally devoid of intellectual content, they became a mixture of gross political misrepresentation and vulgar abuse. A volume entitled *The Law of the Soviet State*, issued under Vyshinsky's name in 1938 (and partly written by him), became the new ideological guide for Soviet jurists. Professor Fuller has aptly described this work:

The book dodges every real problem its thesis might seem to suggest and substitutes for reasoned analysis the scurrilous and abusive recriminations for which its author-editor has become famous in international conferences. . . . About 50 percent of it is taken up with a tedious and unenlightening exposition of the details of the Soviet political and legal system. Another 20 percent is devoted to refighting doctrinal battles within the Marxist ranks and to nailing down more securely the lids on the coffins of the "deviationists," "wreckers" and "Trotskyists" who have been liquidated by the Stalin regime. The remaining 30 percent is given over to disclosing the frauds of bourgeois political and legal ideologies. In the course of this exposé some remarkable misinformation is conveyed.[12]

As Vyshinsky's book shows all too clearly, the condemnation of Pashukanis had little to do with intellectual dispute or the values and requirements of work in legal theory—even Marxist legal theory. The Stalin Constitution of 1936 proclaimed, as a matter of ideological doctrine, that the Soviet Union had achieved socialism, and that socialism would be accompanied by formal social and legal stability, by the *strengthening* of the state, and by the reinforcement of legal guarantees for the life, interests and activities of citizens devoted to the socialist order. To many Soviet citizens, this last must have seemed a hideous joke in the context of the Great Purge of 1937-38 and the era of police rule it inaugurated. Nevertheless, "socialist legality"—a concept flatly contradictory to the whole of Pashukanis' view of law and of socialist society—was a Stalinist concept, and it has remained one of the most vaunted (if still in many respects only formal) principles of Soviet society ever since. Indeed, one of the main Soviet criticisms of Stalin after 1956 has been that he did not *observe* socialist legality, not that the concept itself was wrong.

In the Soviet atmosphere, especially during the Stalinist period, it is hardly surprising that there has been little in the way of a genuinely intellectual criticism of Pashukanis' ideas. Yet, in the West, too, his views have received far less attention and study than they deserve. He has been dismissed, far too readily, as a legal nihilist or crude economic reductionist. He would have been far better understood if his work had been linked with one of the most important traditions in the sociology of law: the view of

[11] Ye. Pashukanis, *Obshchaia teoriia prava i Marksizm (The General Theory of Law and Marxism)*, Moscow, The Socialist Academy, 1924, pp. 157-58; English translation by Hugh W. Babb, in Babb and Hazard, *op. cit.*, p. 223.

[12] Fuller, *loc. cit.*, pp. 1157-58.

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law adumbrated by Ferdinand Tönnies and worked out, in a somewhat different and more detailed way, by Max Weber.

The word "law" can be used in many senses As Professor Glanville Williams has pointed out, one of least interesting forms of juristic discussion has to do with differing prescriptions as to how the honorific term "law" should be used. Contemporary anthropologists, for instance, are inclined to view any body of rules by which men live as "laws," and they therefore think of all societies as having some form of legal system, and of most societies as having a number of complementary or even conflicting legal systems. Lawyers, impressed with the importance of state authority, tend to see state-promulgated or state-sanctioned rules as making up the "laws" of a society. In both these senses, of course, all societies with organized government have law.

Pashukanis, however, uses the term "law" in a different sense: *i.e.*, in the sense we assume when we speak of some societies as having the "rule of law" and others not. Pashukanis, in his exposition of the concept of the juridical subject and of the equivalence-relation, sees as the marks of true law those conceptions of adjudicative justice which modern Western writers sum up in the phrase "the rule of law." He is arguing that adjudicative justice, or the "rule of law" and the formal "bourgeois" democracy associated with it, is a product of commercial relations, that it requires the concept and the reality of economic exchange between comparatively independent economic individuals. He thus sees law, in the "rule of law" sense, as a typical and necessary product of what Tönnies called the *Gesellschaft* (the society based on commerce) as opposed to the *Gemeinschaft* (the community based on dedication to a common order and on familial and social ties rather than on contracts and individual rights and duties).[13]

Max Weber, emphasizing political as well as economic factors, draws a somewhat similar distinction between patriarchal and rational-legal justice. Writing of traditional China, he observes:

Chinese administration of justice constitutes a type of patriarchal obliteration of the line between justice and administration. Decrees of the Emperor, both educative and commanding in content, intervene generally or in concrete cases. The finding of the judgment is oriented towards substantive rather than formal standards. When measured by formal or economic "expectations," it is thus a strongly irrational and concrete type of fireside equity.[14]

For Weber there was a sharp contrast between this "patriarchal" type of patrimonial-princely justice found in the Orient (and elsewhere, *e.g.*, in Africa) and the "estate" type found in medieval Europe. In the latter, the prince grants rights in the form of "privileges" to estates and persons in society; a rigorously formal, adjudicative conception of law develops; and even "administration" becomes a matter of negotiating, bargaining, and contracting about "privileges," so that it operates in the spirit of judicial procedure.

This is the sort of process that Pashukanis has in mind when he speaks of "law" or law proper. He and Weber would agree that the development of commerce and of production for a market plays a very great role in strengthening this formal, "abstract" concept of law as adjudication on the basis of formal, rational principles isolating the "legal issues" and the legal "subject" from the social context. In the patriarchal form of princely justice, on the other hand, Weber sees the prince as issuing "regulations" instead of according privileges, treating law administratively instead of treating administration judicially. For Pashukanis (as for Weber), the separation of law and administration is typically capitalist-commercial, and he sees socialism as a return (albeit at a higher level) to the *Gemeinschaft* and, in a sense, to patriarchal justice—that is, to the treatment of law as a form of administration. This is what he means when he says that the Plan will replace law, that policy will play the role that legal categories have played in the past, and that the notion of the right-and-duty-bearing individual, and of the judicial power as a particular power, will disappear.

The great theoretical about-face wrought by the 1936 Stalin Constitution was the relegation of the anarchist element in Marxism-Leninism to a remote and highly uncertain future and the ruthless excision of all anarchistic strains from the Marxist present. Before it could wither away, the state had to be strengthened; the forms of law, before

[13] See Ferdinand Tönnies, *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* (1st ed., 1887, revised eds. to 1936), translated by Charles P. Loomis as *Community and Association*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1955, *passim*, especially pp. 67-68, 74 and 90; and Eugene Kamenka, "*Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*," in *Political Science* (Wellington, New Zealand), Vol. 17, 1965, p. 3.

[14] Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (2nd ed., 1925), as translated in Max Rheinstein (ed.), *Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society*, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1967, pp. 264-65. *Cf.* Alice Erh-Soon Tay, "Law in Communist China —Part I," in the *Sydney Law Review* (Sydney, Australia), Vol. VII, No. 1, 1969.

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disolving into morality, had to be "exhausted" (*i.e.*, utilized to the full)—such was Stalin's mystifying use of the dialectic. Much of the hysteria directed against Pashukanis in 1937-38 was the product of Stalin's theoretical insecurity, the rage of the liar afraid of being exposed.

We should not, however, think of Pashukanis as a legal nihilist-anarchist who believed that society can live without rules, and that all law is bad. In an address delivered in 1930, he declared:

In bourgeois-capitalist society, the legal superstructure should have maximum immobility, maximum stability, because it represents a firm framework for the movement of the economic forces whose bearers are capitalist entrepreneurs. . . . Among us it is different. We require that our legislation possess maximum elasticity. . . . law occupies among us . . . a subordinate position with reference to politics. We have a system of proletarian politics, but we have no need for any sort of juridical system of proletarian law.[15]

Pashukanis' vision of the future socialist society was a mixture of a planned economy run on administrative rather than judicial lines and a tightly-welded social group judging its members in the light of group requirements and interests, and not on the basis of conceptions of individual rights and individual "responsibility." Curiously enough, in its attitude towards law, Communst China is much closer than the Soviet Union to Pashukanis' conception of socialism. If, in this regard, we see Communist China as reflecting, in part,, traditional Chinese attitudes, this in itself lends support to Pashukanis' emphasis on the role of capitalism in creating and strengthening the typically "legal" ideology.

Since the death of Stalin—despite many lapses and even some retrogression, especially of late—there has been a movement in the Soviet Union to give more real substance to the concept of "socialist legality." Soviet law, though subject to frequent and improper political interference, is becoming more technical and more formal in Pashukanis' sense. As Soviet citizens become somewhat more affluent, they have more interests to protect, and the results can be seen in an extension of the areas of judicial activity and an increasing interest in civil law. Like everything else in the Sovet Union—except perhaps political leadership—the law has become more professional. The rehabilitation of Pashukanis is almost certainly a concession to this new spirit of professionalism and an indication of a certain depoliticization of intellectual and professional standards of excellence. Pashukanis was by far the ablest legal theoretician the Soviet Union has produced, and it has become increasingly important to the Soviet intelligentsia of today to feel that intellectual ability is not irrelevant.

Moreover, the rehabilitation of Pashukanis in present circumstances no longer entails any ideological risks. His discussion of law is acceptable as neutral sociology (though perhaps still too subtle to be widely understood in the Soviet Union), and his program would now have little, if any, popular appeal. Soviet citizens today do not want a large-scale dismantling of legal procedure and legal guarantees in favor of indeterminate sentences, group responsibility, *ad hoc* decisions, and the subordination of social life to the Plan or to the voice of the unalienated collective. Those who are most likely to understand Pashukanis—the lawyers—are least likely to assail the Soviet legal system on the basis of his ideas. His rehabilitation thus becomes a low-cost operation in restoring professional dignity.

Nevertheless, the operation may give rise, in time, to some deeper reflections by legal thinkers and sociologists of law. Pashukanis' work makes one aware of a fundamental tension between the ideology of law as adjudicative justice and economic centralization and political mobilization. These are themes still worth exploring.

[15] Translated by Hugh W. Babb, in Babb and Hazard, *op. cit.*

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Correspondence

A Complaint

To the Editors: With regard to my article, published in your November-December 1969 issue under the title "The Pursuit of Purity: Mao's Cultural Revolution," I would be grateful if you could apprise your readers of the following facts: 1) my original title was "Mao Tse-tung and the Cultural Revolution;" 2) I was not consulted regarding the change; and 3) I do not wish to be associated with the vision of the Cultural Revolution as a "pursuit of purity."

Richard M. Pfeffer
The Johns Hopkins University
Baltimore, Maryland

A Rejoinder

To the Editors: Mr. Gordon Bennett's review of our book, *Peking's Red Guard: The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution*, in the November-December 1969 issue of *Problems of Communism*, is unfair, perhaps even malicious. He says that our book is "thrown together in apparent haste at the end of 1967," and "relies for major documentation upon up-to-the minute, often speculative Western press reports about contemporary events in China." His allegation is far from the truth.

Our book was completed after about two years of careful research and preparation. One of us (Mr. de Jaegher) is a Belgian who lived in China for more than 30 years and can speak and write Chinese. The other of us (Mr. Pan) received his college education in China, has long been a newspaper editor there, and knows many of the Chinese Communist leaders personally. We used mostly the original Communist Chinese sources, such as big-character posters, the *People's Daily*, the *Red Flag*, the *Liberation Army Daily*, as well as publications issued by the Peking Foreign Languages Press and dispatches by the Hsinhua (or the New China News Agency). The few Western sources we used were simply intended to support or substantiate some points of the subject matter, and we did try to keep up with current reports from China.

Among the Western sources were materials published by the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *Congressional Record*, and some news reports from *The New York Times*. How can Mr. Bennett accuse us of using "often highly speculative Western press reports about contemporary events in China"? Perhaps he did not peruse the Communist Chinese sources on which our book is based, or he may not care to read them.

As to our assertion that "Lo Jui-ch'ing . . . is presumably dead," which Mr. Bennett criticizes, it was made at a time when the mass of conflicting evidence and absence of any official statement about Lo Jui-ch'ing's whereabouts seemed to justify that qualified conclusion.

Mr. Bennett claims that "the authors were wrong in asserting that Peking has frequently denied that the Proletarian Cultural Revolution is a power struggle among the leaders of the party." Can he show us an official Communist document which admits that the PCR is a power struggle among the Mao-Lin group of the Chinese Communist party? Mr. Bennett does not seem to fully understand the meaning of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution proclaimed by the Chinese Communist Party, which has recently been under the domination of the Mao-Lin group.

Furthermore, Mr. Bennett says that he is "bored by the authors' unremitting attempts to demonstrate that China is now in a state of great confusion and disorder." At the time when we wrote our book, in the early part of 1968 (though it remains largely true in 1969), there were still reports (both Chinese and foreign) indicating that Mainland China was far from being orderly or stabilized. Possibly this does bore Mr. Bennett, but it is factual.

However, we are grateful to Mr. Bennett for catching the few misspellings of Tsao Ti-chiu, as we overlooked the printer's error. In our next edition, we shall try to make these corrections.

As to the possibility of Communist China going to war against the United States, it will depend on many tangible and intangible factors. Besides, the logic of Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao is quite different from the average thinking of the Americans. That is the reason why we simply pointed out the various possibilities without definitely committing ourselves to any of them. This again shows that we have tried to be objective, while Mr. Bennett insists that we should have committed ourselves one way or another.

Stephen Pan
Raymond J. de Jaegher

A Comment

To the Editors: In his article "From a Reporter's Notebook" (July-August-September-October 1969 issue), Mr. Christopher Bird criticizes the director of a Yugoslav toy factory which exports to the United States through Austrian and other intermediaries for not attempting to sell directly to the American distributors. Unfortunately, Mr. Bird fails to take into account that there are two parties to any business transaction and that the US importer deserves an equal share of criticism for not taking action which would bring him into direct contact with the Yugoslav seller. For if one assumes—as does Mr. Bird—that the exclusion of the intermediary would benefit the seller, there is no reason for not making the same assumption for the buyer. Finally, it may be possible that the buyer prefers to buy through a third country for non-economic reasons. Should such attitudes prevail among buyers, the Yugoslav factory director might have little choice but to sell through intermediaries.

Toussaint Hocevar
New Orleans, La.

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